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  The	  aim	  of	  my	  thesis	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  role	  interpersonal	  networks	  play	  in	  determining	  innovation	  outcomes,	  and	  the	  antecedents	  of	  individual	  behaviour	  in	  networks	  by	  “players”	  in	  the	  innovation	  game.	  	  These	  investigations—two	  qualitative	  studies	  and	  a	  detailed,	  highly	  developed	  conceptual	  framework—give	  rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  propositions	  that	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  greater	  understanding	  and	  which	  make	  a	  range	  of	  novel	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  networks	  and	  innovation	  management.	  	  Too	  little	  is	  understood	  about	  social	  networks	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  innovation.	  	  As	  the	  world	  of	  business	  continues	  its	  move	  away	  from	  bureaucratic	  hierarchies	  to	  projectified	  network	  organisations,	  from	  integrated	  monoliths	  to	  modular	  specialists,	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  an	  understanding	  grows.	  	  Innovation	  has	  always	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  embedded	  ties—its	  prospective	  nature	  does	  not	  normally	  sit	  well	  with	  a	  depersonalised,	  arms-­‐length,	  market-­‐based	  approach.	  	  Yet	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  intersection	  of	  individuals’	  and	  teams’	  networks	  (and	  networking)	  with	  their	  ability	  to	  succeed	  in	  innovative	  action	  is	  limited.	  	  There	  are	  various	  trajectories	  within	  both	  the	  innovation	  management	  literature	  and	  the	  networks	  literature	  which	  take	  on	  the	  challenge,	  but	  often	  the	  theoretical	  roots	  on	  which	  they	  draw	  are	  planted	  in	  old	  forms	  of	  organisation	  and	  this	  limits	  the	  speed	  of	  their	  advance	  in	  delivering	  understanding	  of	  the	  new	  realities	  in	  bringing	  innovations	  to	  market.	  	  Hence,	  this	  thesis	  uses	  qualitative	  methods	  and	  conceptual	  models	  to	  propose	  new	  contributions	  to	  these	  fields.	  	  The	  principal	  contributions	  of	  this	  thesis	  are:	  
• A	  new	  perspective	  and	  theoretical	  offering	  concerning	  how	  innovation	  teams	  can	  succeed,	  synthesising	  boundary-­‐spanning	  with	  Burt’s	  models	  of	  brokerage,	  and	  Obstfeld’s	  tertius	  iungens.	  
• A	  team-­‐	  and	  leader-­‐based	  model	  of	  the	  characteristics	  needed	  over	  the	  stages	  of	  business	  model	  innovation.	  
• A	  fresh	  perspective	  on	  how	  agents	  (specifically	  venture	  capitalists)	  select	  and	  pursue	  networking	  strategies	  to	  “hunt”	  or	  “harvest”	  opportunities.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  	  Motivation,	  a	  brief	  theoretical	  background	  and	  summaries	  of	  
the	  three	  studies	  	  The	  three	  studies,	  which	  make	  up	  this	  thesis	  are	  united	  by:	  1. an	  interest	  in	  the	  evolution	  and	  dynamics	  of	  social,	  organisational	  and	  economic	  networks	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  team	  2. an	  interest	  in	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  network	  with	  innovation	  outcomes	  3. behavioural,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  cognitive,	  perspectives	  on	  mechanisms	  of	  action	  4. qualitative	  and	  exploratory	  method	  and	  propositional	  logic	  
The	  four	  themes	  interweave	  to	  create	  some	  interesting	  contributions.	  	  The	  first	  theme	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  scholars,	  and	  especially	  organization	  theorists,	  because	  in	  many	  aspects	  of	  its	  activities	  the	  world	  is	  moving	  away	  from	  organising	  through	  hierarchies	  and	  pure	  market	  mechanisms	  to	  organising	  through	  networks;	  in	  other	  aspects	  it	  is	  recognising	  that	  networks	  have	  always	  influenced	  the	  outcomes	  of	  what	  otherwise	  appeared	  as	  hierarchies	  and	  markets.	  	  The	  network	  analysis	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  driven	  by	  its	  disciplinary	  roots,	  methodological	  tools,	  and	  structuralist	  focus	  was	  often	  static	  or	  comparative-­‐static	  in	  its	  outputs—while	  even	  such	  an	  approach	  yielded	  valuable	  insights,	  new	  models	  (and	  new	  methods)	  must	  be	  developed	  to	  give	  practitioners	  and	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  scholars	  insights	  into	  the	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  structural	  constraints	  and	  strategic	  action	  interplay	  to	  generate	  interesting	  theory	  and	  useful	  practical	  wisdom.	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It	  could	  perhaps	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  network	  perspective	  is	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  understanding	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  challenges	  for	  organisations	  and	  economies:	  	  how	  systems	  and	  incentives	  can	  be	  designed	  or	  managed	  for	  pro-­‐social	  outcomes.	  	  The	  efficiency	  of	  the	  market	  invites	  bad	  actors	  to	  use	  its	  anonymity	  to	  create	  asymmetries	  and	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  externalities;	  the	  strong	  form	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  in	  the	  hierarchy	  creates	  and	  entrenches	  power,	  which	  corrupts.	  	  The	  network	  as	  an	  organising	  principle	  steers	  a	  middle	  course	  between	  these	  two	  extremes	  and	  provides	  potential	  for	  adaptation	  and	  reconfiguration	  without	  (or	  with	  less)	  anonymity	  and	  coordination	  without	  (or	  with	  less)	  corruption.	  	  There	  are	  of	  course	  dark	  and	  corrupt	  networks—but	  an	  understanding	  of	  network	  dynamics	  and	  evolution	  is	  an	  important	  asset	  for	  a	  world	  in	  need	  of	  ways	  to	  respond	  to	  turbulence	  and	  change.	  	  The	  second	  theme	  is	  of	  interest	  both	  because	  of	  the	  general	  and	  well-­‐understood	  importance	  of	  innovation	  and	  because	  innovation	  represents	  the	  “ideal	  type”	  of	  challenge	  to	  be	  undertaken	  through	  networks.	  	  The	  right	  network	  configurations	  are	  necessary	  to	  scan	  for	  novelty	  and	  novel	  potential,	  to	  recombine	  that	  novelty,	  to	  gain	  initial	  adopters	  of	  an	  innovation,	  and	  to	  diffuse	  the	  innovation	  across	  other	  domains	  where	  it	  will	  be	  useful.	  	  Markets	  are	  of	  some	  use	  for	  the	  first	  and	  fourth	  of	  these	  challenges	  but	  of	  little	  significance	  for	  the	  second	  and	  third;	  hierarchies	  are	  famously	  poor	  at	  fostering	  innovations	  which	  challenge	  their	  dominant	  logic.	  	  While	  some	  network	  theorists	  point	  to	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  networks	  as	  retarding	  innovation,	  the	  perspective,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  of	  this	  work	  is	  that	  we	  must	  embrace,	  understand	  and	  build	  theory	  about	  embeddedness	  in	  order	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  it	  to	  solve	  problems	  and	  meet	  challenges.	  	  (Across	  the	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three	  studies,	  while	  the	  construct	  of	  embeddedness	  is	  occasionally	  touched	  upon,	  it	  is	  not	  central	  to	  the	  work.	  	  I	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  an	  underspecified	  and	  overly	  vague	  way	  of	  considering	  the	  range	  of	  relational	  and	  structural	  issues	  that	  characterise	  network	  relations.	  	  After	  a	  long	  search	  for	  alternative	  constructs	  and	  extended	  debate,	  it	  is	  used	  in	  the	  propositions	  of	  the	  second,	  conceptual	  study,	  but	  the	  search	  continues	  for	  better	  specified	  ways	  to	  frame	  the	  subject	  of	  non-­‐economic	  tie	  content.)	  	  	  The	  third	  theme	  is	  significant	  for	  developing	  our	  understanding	  of	  networks,	  because	  the	  most	  common	  and	  famous	  critique	  of	  the	  network	  perspective	  is	  that,	  like	  all	  structuralist	  perspectives,	  it	  lacks	  appreciation	  of	  agency.	  	  Behavioural	  (and	  cognitive)	  perspectives	  on	  action	  in	  networks	  are	  vital	  to	  help	  us	  begin	  to	  remedy	  that	  gap.	  	  The	  fourth	  of	  these	  themes,	  that	  of	  qualitative	  and	  exploratory	  research,	  resulting	  in	  testable	  propositions,	  is	  apropos	  to	  the	  other	  three,	  because	  the	  three	  themes	  have	  in	  common	  that	  scholars’	  investigation	  of	  them	  is	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  and	  so	  the	  textured,	  situated	  and	  (it	  is	  to	  be	  hoped)	  nuanced	  findings	  of	  qualitative	  research	  can	  light	  the	  way	  to	  provide	  avenues	  of	  interest	  and	  impact	  for	  colleagues	  to	  pursue.	  	  While	  some	  theorists	  of	  theory	  argue	  that	  propositions	  are	  not	  necessarily	  the	  ideal	  outcome	  of	  theorising,	  as	  they	  are	  reductive	  and	  don’t	  spring	  from	  a	  fully	  “joined	  up”	  theory,	  they	  are	  appropriate	  in	  this	  case:	  	  the	  first	  and	  third	  studies	  presented	  in	  this	  dissertation	  are	  exploratory	  and	  the	  propositions,	  while	  related	  to	  each	  other,	  do	  not	  try	  to	  form	  a	  full	  answer,	  a	  “theory”	  of	  their	  respective	  research	  questions.	  
9 of 191 
	  The	  three	  studies	  are:	  	  Chapter	  2:	  	  a	  study	  of	  value	  proposition	  innovation	  teams.	  	  The	  fieldwork	  (extensive	  interviews	  and	  non-­‐participant	  observation)	  was	  undertaken	  during	  2008-­‐2009	  and	  I	  entered	  the	  field	  fresh	  from	  my	  MSc	  Org	  and	  Social	  Psych,	  less	  than	  two	  months	  after	  beginning	  PhD	  studies.	  	  The	  major	  contributions	  of	  this	  study	  are	  propositions,	  drawing	  on	  the	  seminal	  work	  of	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell	  on	  boundary-­‐spanning,	  about	  how	  innovation	  teams	  circumvent	  blocks	  to	  their	  progress	  in	  developing	  innovations	  and	  what	  team	  network	  characteristics	  lead	  to	  innovation	  success.	  	  Chapter	  3	  includes	  some	  retrospective	  consideration	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  study,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  due	  to	  entering	  the	  field,	  in	  the	  arguably	  too-­‐purist	  spirit	  of	  grounded	  theory,	  with	  little	  theoretical	  grounding.	  	  	  	  Chapter	  4:	  	  A	  conceptual	  paper	  with	  four	  other	  authors,	  positing	  a	  fully	  dynamic	  stage	  model	  on	  the	  team	  characteristics	  of	  business	  model	  innovation	  success.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  hierarchies	  are	  very	  poor	  at	  driving	  radical	  innovation	  or	  any	  innovation	  counter	  to	  the	  dominant	  logic	  of	  the	  “host”	  organisation—this	  paper	  proposes	  how	  this	  handicap	  can	  best	  be	  overcome.	  	  There	  are	  two,	  intertwined,	  theoretical	  lenses	  in	  this	  paper—one	  on	  networks	  and	  the	  other	  on	  leadership.	  	  Dr	  Daan	  Stam	  and	  Mr	  Jaco	  Smit	  took	  responsibility	  for	  the	  leadership	  thread,	  I,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  some	  brief	  conversations	  and	  email	  exchanges	  with	  Dr	  Fei	  Qin,	  and	  drawing	  heavily	  on	  the	  fieldwork	  experience	  that	  informed	  the	  first	  study	  outlined	  above,	  executed	  the	  networks	  thread,	  and	  Professor	  Harry	  Barkema	  led	  a	  process	  (to	  which	  all	  co-­‐authors	  contributed	  equally)	  of,	  over	  a	  four	  year	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period,	  redesigning	  and	  refining	  the	  model	  and	  eventually	  of	  framing	  it.	  	  The	  paper	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Academy	  of	  Management	  Review	  and	  I	  have	  edited	  it	  somewhat	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  present	  work—there	  is	  a	  parallel	  process	  of	  editing	  going	  on	  among	  all	  the	  co-­‐authors	  in	  preparation	  for	  submission	  to	  another	  journal,	  but	  that	  is	  a	  different	  ‘fork	  in	  the	  road’	  than	  the	  study	  included	  here.	  	  The	  principal	  contributions	  of	  this	  study	  are	  propositions	  about	  the	  network	  characteristics	  helpful	  for	  teams’	  business	  model	  innovation	  success	  and	  how	  these	  change	  over	  the	  lifetime	  of	  an	  innovation	  project.	  	  Chapter	  5:	  	  a	  study	  of	  venture	  capitalist	  networking	  strategies.	  	  I	  was	  fortunate,	  through	  my	  brother-­‐in-­‐law	  (a	  former	  corporate	  lawyer	  and	  now	  an	  LSE	  PhD	  student)	  to	  gain	  remarkable	  access	  to	  a	  range	  of	  prominent	  London	  VCs	  and	  through	  them	  to	  the	  London	  VC	  community.	  	  This	  has	  enabled	  me	  to	  conduct	  (through	  fieldwork	  in	  2012-­‐2013)	  an	  in-­‐depth	  qualitative	  investigation	  into	  the	  networking	  strategies	  of	  VCs	  and	  to	  generate	  grounded	  theory	  regarding	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  their	  selection	  and	  implementation	  of	  networking	  strategies.	  	  The	  area	  of	  individual-­‐level	  choices	  about	  why,	  how	  and	  with	  whom	  to	  “network”	  is	  almost	  an	  entirely	  blank	  area	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  the	  resulting	  propositions,	  though	  well-­‐grounded	  in	  the	  data,	  are	  somewhat	  diverse	  and	  could	  potentially	  spawn	  multiple	  papers.	  	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  this	  work	  is	  being	  refined	  with	  the	  help	  of	  my	  new	  colleagues	  in	  the	  Management	  Science	  and	  Innovation	  department	  at	  University	  College	  London,	  for	  submission	  to	  Organization	  Science	  this	  autumn.	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  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  following	  questions/sub-­‐questions:	  	  How	  can	  firms	  use	  boundary-­‐spanning,	  co-­‐ordinating	  teams	  to	  support	  successful	  innovations?	  	  Can	  a	  team	  create	  or	  exploit	  bridging	  ties	  more	  effectively	  than	  an	  individual	  and	  if	  so,	  how?	  	  Can	  a	  team	  diffuse	  the	  ‘blocking	  power’	  of	  gatekeepers	  and	  if	  so,	  how?	  	  Which	  types	  of	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  styles	  contribute	  to	  Business	  Model	  Innovation	  performance?	  	  How	  does	  this	  differ	  across	  the	  concept	  and	  development	  stage	  of	  BMI?	  	  How	  do	  BMI	  team	  characteristics	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  influence	  those	  same	  variables	  –	  and	  ultimately	  BMI	  performance	  –	  in	  the	  development	  stage?	  	  	  	  How	  do	  venture	  capital	  partners	  and	  associates	  employed	  by	  firms	  of	  variable	  status,	  allocate	  time	  between	  different	  ties	  and	  different	  categories	  of	  ties,	  selecting	  whether	  to	  “hunt”	  for	  new	  ties	  or	  to	  “nurture”	  or	  “harvest”	  the	  existing	  ones?	  	  How	  do	  they	  decide	  upon	  particular	  alters	  as	  potentially	  fruitful	  connections?	  	  How	  do	  they	  approach	  new	  prospective	  alters:	  	  what	  tactics	  are	  selected	  for	  forming	  relationships?	  	  What	  efforts	  are	  made	  to	  influence	  or	  determine	  the	  basis	  (e.g.,	  social,	  quasi-­‐social,	  transactional,	  multiplex)	  of	  the	  relationship?	  	  How	  do	  they	  select	  the	  desired	  content	  and	  affect	  of	  their	  communications	  with	  their	  ongoing	  alters?	  	  How	  do	  they	  take	  the	  time	  horizon	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of	  their	  activities	  (the	  cycle	  speed	  of	  the	  types	  of	  transactions	  they	  conduct)	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  appropriate	  action?	  	  Chapter	  6	  summarises	  and	  discusses	  the	  findings	  and	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	  proposes	  trajectories	  for	  further	  research	  in	  these	  domains.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  	  Unveiling	  innovation	  team	  microfoundations:	  	  boundary	  
spanning,	  brokerage	  and	  blockages	  	  	  INTRODUCTION	  Innovation	  team	  performance	  is	  argued	  to	  hang	  on	  a	  balance	  of	  diverse	  extra-­‐workgroup	  ties	  and	  internal	  cohesion	  (Reagans	  et	  al,	  2004;	  Oh	  et	  al,	  2006).	  	  Essential	  collaboration,	  characterised	  by	  “trust,	  fine-­‐grained	  [identity-­‐based]	  information	  transfer	  and	  joint	  problem-­‐solving	  arrangements”,	  (Uzzi,	  1996)	  can	  take	  place	  within	  dense	  clusters,	  while	  the	  existence	  of	  clique-­‐cross-­‐cutting	  ties	  enables	  access	  to	  fresh	  perspectives	  and	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  spark	  and	  develop	  new	  approaches	  to	  problems.	  	  Such	  boundary-­‐spanning	  (Ancona	  and	  Caldwell,	  1992)	  is	  believed	  particularly	  vital	  to	  innovation	  processes,	  allowing	  workgroups	  to	  gain	  information,	  marshal	  resources	  and	  build	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  innovations	  they	  attempt	  to	  shepherd	  through	  their	  organisation.	  	  However,	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  this	  desirable	  diversity	  of	  ties	  translates	  into	  effective	  innovation	  are	  not	  fully	  understood	  or	  well	  specified.	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  proposed	  network	  mechanisms	  that	  may	  be	  at	  work	  in	  team	  boundary-­‐spanning	  (e.g.,	  Borgatti	  and	  Cross	  (2003),	  Burt	  (2000)).	  	  Prominent	  among	  these	  network	  perspectives,	  small	  world	  network	  theorists	  (Uzzi	  and	  Spiro	  2005,	  Verspagen	  and	  Duysters	  2002,	  Schilling	  and	  Phelps	  2007)	  showed	  small	  world	  structures	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  innovation.	  	  This	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  straightforward	  implication	  for	  practice	  (derived	  from	  small	  world	  theory’s	  founding	  principle,	  ‘random	  rewiring’):	  	  that	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  cosmopolitan	  node	  or	  two	  to	  a	  cluster,	  bringing	  some	  structural	  hole-­‐spanning	  ties	  with	  them,	  might	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enable	  a	  situation	  where	  fresh	  information	  could	  easily	  (Dodds	  Muhamad	  and	  Watts,	  2003)	  be	  sought,	  by	  a	  strategizing	  would-­‐be	  innovator	  (Cowan	  and	  Jonard	  2003),	  through	  the	  network.	  	  	  	  This	  rather	  stimulating	  and	  intuitively	  valid	  suggestion	  has	  been	  rejected	  in	  several	  dimensions	  by	  more	  recent	  studies.	  	  Reagans	  and	  Zuckerman	  (2008a)	  argue	  that	  such	  structural	  hole-­‐spanning	  nodes	  in	  a	  (by	  definition,	  stratified)	  small	  world	  network,	  able	  to	  act	  as	  brokers	  (or	  tastemakers	  at	  least,	  cf	  Powell	  et	  al	  2005),	  are	  as	  likely	  to	  block	  as	  to	  facilitate,	  and	  ensure	  that	  knowledge	  is	  distributed	  “unequally”,	  and	  to	  their	  own	  benefit.	  	  Fleming	  and	  Marx	  (2006)	  likewise	  argue	  that	  an	  important	  task	  of	  innovation	  managers	  in	  small	  worlds	  is	  to	  ‘harness’	  the	  unpredictable	  power	  of	  the	  “gatekeepers”	  who,	  as	  they	  provide	  the	  innovators’	  ‘window	  to	  the	  world’,	  may	  extract	  rents	  or	  otherwise	  deflect	  their	  system	  from	  productive	  ends.	  	  Reagans	  and	  Zuckerman	  (2008b),	  building	  on	  Centola	  and	  Macy	  (2007),	  note	  the	  significance	  of	  bandwidth	  to	  the	  transmission	  of	  complex	  information	  and	  that	  some	  types	  of	  knowledge	  will	  only	  be	  accepted	  by	  network	  actors	  when	  confirmed	  by	  more	  than	  one	  source.	  	  Given	  these	  complications,	  the	  seeming	  path-­‐shortening	  benefit	  of	  brokerage	  is	  undermined:	  	  highly	  connected	  nodes	  may	  not	  have	  the	  bandwidth	  (even	  when	  there	  is	  an	  apparent	  rent-­‐seeking	  opportunity)	  to	  transmit	  complex	  knowledge	  through	  the	  network	  and,	  if	  there	  must	  be	  two	  routes	  between	  nodes	  in	  order	  that	  transmission	  take	  place,	  the	  “path	  length	  benefits”	  arising	  from	  random	  rewiring	  between	  caves	  are	  significantly	  dented.	  	  Cowan	  and	  Jonard	  (2004)	  make	  the	  same	  point,	  though	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  actors’	  ability	  to	  absorb	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  knowledge	  diffusing	  through	  the	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network:	  	  when	  ability	  to	  absorb	  knowledge	  is	  high,	  small	  world	  benefits	  are	  at	  their	  minimum	  level.	  	  	  Singh,	  Hansen	  and	  Podolny	  (2009)	  highlight	  the	  barrier	  that	  out-­‐group	  status	  presents	  to	  the	  smooth	  operation	  of	  an	  information-­‐sharing	  network.	  	  Even	  before	  the	  rise	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  “small	  world”,	  sticky	  network	  phenomena	  such	  as	  homophily,	  preferential	  attachment	  (Barabási	  and	  Albert	  1999),	  the	  psychological	  constraints	  of	  embeddedness	  (Kogut	  and	  Walker	  2001),	  the	  pre-­‐judged	  “problemistic	  search”	  (Cyert	  and	  March	  1963),	  “control	  partnering”	  (Baum	  Shipilov	  and	  Rowley	  2003)	  by	  influential	  nodes	  attempting	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  their	  own	  network	  neighbourhoods,	  and	  a	  preference	  for	  the	  transaction	  cost	  efficiencies	  of	  confining	  search	  to	  local	  ties	  (Jackson	  and	  Rogers	  1995)	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  credit	  a	  straightforward	  relationship	  between	  theoretical	  access	  to	  information	  and	  its	  actual	  transmission.	  	  Fleming	  King	  and	  Juda	  (2007)	  offer	  an	  intriguing	  speculation:	  	  they	  propose	  that	  the	  sheer	  volume	  and	  diversity	  of	  information	  within	  the	  whole	  of	  a	  network	  component—in	  other	  words,	  its	  potential	  information-­‐sharing	  capacity—may	  offer	  more	  predictive	  power	  for	  innovation-­‐critical	  information	  transfer	  than	  does	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  path	  length	  to	  that	  information.	  	  	  Given	  this	  multiplicity	  of	  reasons	  for	  a	  network	  to	  fail	  to	  allow	  generative	  information	  transfer,	  what	  is	  driving	  innovation	  success?	  	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell’s	  conception	  of	  the	  innovation	  process	  proposes	  that	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities	  needed	  by	  a	  successful	  workgroup	  are	  fundamentally	  political	  and	  strategic.	  	  In	  their	  much-­‐cited	  typology	  of	  boundary	  spanning	  (1992),	  innovation	  workgroups	  engage	  in	  four	  primary	  sorts	  of	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external	  activity:	  	  two	  of	  these,	  scouting	  (for	  information)	  and	  task	  co-­‐ordination	  (marshalling	  resources)	  comprise	  the	  explicit	  task	  of	  the	  workgroup;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  ambassadorial	  activity	  (influencing,	  typically	  upward-­‐directed)	  and	  guarding	  (boundary	  protection	  or	  filtering	  against	  both	  ‘management	  interference’	  and	  the	  quasi-­‐competitive	  actions	  of	  other	  innovation	  workgroups),	  relate	  to	  an	  implicit	  task	  with	  a	  less	  formal	  dimension:	  	  carving	  out	  the	  organisational	  ‘turf’	  (Anand,	  Gardner	  and	  Morris	  2007)	  into	  which	  the	  innovation	  can	  put	  down	  roots.	  	  Innovation	  process	  models,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Burgelman	  (1983a)	  and	  Van	  de	  Ven	  et	  al	  (1999),	  similarly	  assign	  considerable	  weight	  to	  the	  interdependence	  of	  legitimacy-­‐building	  with	  resource-­‐gathering.	  	  	  Yet	  most	  studies	  of	  boundary	  spanning	  focus	  on	  the	  formal	  (and	  more	  easily	  susceptible	  to	  analytic	  technique)	  side	  of	  generative	  information	  sharing:	  	  for	  example,	  exploration	  and	  search	  (e.g.,	  Rosenkopf	  and	  Nerkar	  2001),	  knowledge-­‐sharing	  (e.g.,	  Hansen	  1999),	  and	  the	  process	  of	  translating	  knowledge	  from	  one	  context	  into	  another	  (e.g.,	  Carlile	  2004).	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  innovation	  process	  is	  often	  tortuous.	  	  It	  is	  well	  known	  (March	  1991)	  that	  actions	  and	  contingencies	  that	  in	  one	  particular	  phase	  support	  successful	  innovation	  may	  prove	  counterproductive	  at	  another.	  	  Similarly,	  roles	  and	  tie	  characteristics	  which	  are	  important	  at	  one	  stage	  in	  the	  process	  may	  be	  of	  less	  help	  at	  another:	  	  for	  example,	  Fleming	  and	  Marx	  (2006b)	  suggest	  that	  brokers	  may	  be	  able	  to	  access	  novel	  information	  and	  generate	  novel	  ideas,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  develop	  and	  diffuse	  them.	  	  By	  seeking	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  innovation	  process	  from	  end	  to	  end,	  we	  may	  avoid	  recommendations	  for	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practice	  based	  on	  an	  atomised	  understanding,	  which	  inadvertently	  serve	  only	  to	  undermine	  the	  success	  of	  the	  process	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  	  This	  study,	  a	  longitudinal	  qualitative	  examination	  in	  a	  large	  telecoms	  firm	  of	  a	  value	  proposition	  innovation	  process,	  managed	  by	  a	  workgroup	  explicitly	  set	  the	  task	  of	  boundary-­‐spanning,	  attempts	  to	  investigate	  micro-­‐foundations	  of	  innovation	  team	  behaviour	  as	  a	  step	  towards	  remedying	  these	  deficits.	  	  By	  examining	  the	  entire	  process	  from	  idea	  generation	  through	  launch,	  and	  by	  bringing	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  recent	  advances	  in	  network	  theory,	  we	  seek	  to	  generate	  testable	  theoretical	  propositions	  as	  to	  how,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions,	  boundary-­‐spanning	  workgroups	  support	  successful	  innovations.	  	  	  	  This	  study	  will	  examine	  how	  tie	  characteristics	  (such	  as	  tie	  relational	  embeddedness,	  tie	  affect,	  tie	  mutual	  affiliation,	  tie	  formal	  and	  power	  relations	  and	  tie	  bandwidth)	  and	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities	  change	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  innovation	  process.	  	  It	  examines	  how	  workgroups	  create	  or	  exploit	  ties	  for	  scouting,	  task	  co-­‐ordinating,	  ambassadorial	  and	  guarding	  activities.	  	  It	  considers	  how	  tie	  characteristics	  relate	  to	  success	  in	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities	  and	  thence	  to	  success	  in	  innovation.	  	  	  	  Investigating	  and	  synthesising	  the	  brokerage	  and	  boundary-­‐spanning	  perspective	  (i.e.,	  the	  use	  of	  ego-­‐centred	  networks	  and	  their	  role	  in	  facilitating	  innovation),	  the	  individual’s	  accumulation	  of	  and	  use	  of	  social	  capital	  (the	  parallel	  process	  whereby	  innovation	  is	  driven	  by	  and	  facilitates	  status	  and	  “career”	  ambitions	  beyond	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  a	  particular	  innovation),	  and	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the	  role	  of	  network	  structure	  surrounding	  an	  individual	  or	  team	  in	  allowing	  an	  innovation	  to	  flourish	  or	  stagnate,	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  theory	  about	  how	  networks	  can	  be	  constructed	  to	  support	  innovation.	  	  One	  important	  focus	  for	  this	  study	  is	  occurrences	  of	  ‘blocks’	  to	  a	  workgroup’s	  progress.	  	  Innovations	  arising	  within	  a	  corporate	  setting	  must	  almost	  always	  circumvent	  blocks	  to	  their	  progress	  if	  they	  are	  to	  find	  the	  information,	  accumulate	  the	  resources	  and	  be	  accorded	  the	  legitimacy	  needed	  to	  mature	  into	  a	  place	  within	  the	  portfolio	  of	  the	  firm’s	  activities,	  benefit	  from	  sustained	  market	  effort	  and	  the	  chance	  of	  long-­‐term	  market	  acceptance,	  in	  turn	  leading	  to	  a	  place	  at	  the	  top	  table	  of	  the	  corporation’s	  efforts.	  	  Such	  obstacles	  arise	  from	  an	  inability	  to	  access	  needed,	  or	  appropriate,	  information,	  financial	  or	  physical	  resources	  or	  needed	  permissions.	  	  The	  inability	  may	  derive	  from	  time	  or	  cognitive	  constraints,	  or	  from	  other	  firm	  actors’	  opposition	  or	  indifference	  to	  the	  innovation	  and	  to	  its	  potential	  effects	  on	  the	  firm’s	  activities.	  	  	  	  Recognising	  both	  the	  need	  to	  innovate	  and	  the	  increasing	  benefits	  of	  rapid	  innovation,	  organisations	  can	  lubricate	  an	  innovation’s	  journey	  through	  some	  of	  its	  phases	  and	  eliminate	  obstacles.	  	  A	  permissive	  and	  pro-­‐innovation	  firm	  culture,	  well-­‐managed	  ideation,	  protection	  of	  nascent	  innovations	  from	  metrics	  and	  filters	  developed	  to	  judge	  less	  novel	  activities,	  or	  providing	  slack	  on	  which	  immature	  value	  propositions	  or	  ventures	  may	  temporarily	  feed,	  may	  all	  allow	  an	  innovation	  to	  flourish	  for	  a	  time.	  	  Eventually,	  however,	  nearly	  all	  innovations	  that	  are	  not	  to	  die	  or	  exit	  the	  organisation	  must	  shoulder	  aside,	  or	  slip	  through,	  the	  barriers	  presented	  by	  the	  firm’s	  incumbent	  operations.	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  When	  a	  workgroup	  is	  prevented	  from	  reaching	  the	  next	  milestone	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  innovation	  for	  which	  it	  is	  responsible,	  it	  is	  a	  reflexive,	  interruptive	  moment	  (Okhuysen	  and	  Eisenhardt	  2002,	  Zellmer-­‐Bruhn	  2003)	  and	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  it	  often	  creates	  an	  inflection	  in	  the	  workgroup’s	  pattern	  of	  network	  activity	  and	  its	  tie	  characteristics.	  	  The	  workgroup’s	  ability	  to	  surmount	  such	  obstacles	  depends	  heavily	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  access	  ties:	  	  ties	  to	  information	  contradicting	  an	  objection,	  or	  satisfying	  a	  request	  for	  assurance;	  ties	  to	  holders	  of	  permissions	  and	  resources;	  ties	  to	  management	  figures	  able	  to	  confer	  legitimacy	  on	  the	  project.	  	  How	  and	  when,	  then,	  are	  innovation	  workgroups	  “blocked”	  and	  how	  do	  they	  then	  circumvent	  those	  blocks	  or	  fail	  to	  do	  so?	  	  	  	  	  I	  selected	  a	  research	  site	  in	  which	  a	  boundary-­‐spanning	  workgroup	  was	  engaging	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  scouting,	  ambassadorial,	  co-­‐ordinating	  and	  guarding	  activities	  (Ancona	  and	  Caldwell,	  1992)	  to	  support	  innovation	  efforts.	  	  This	  site,	  with	  its	  high	  volume	  of	  innovation	  efforts	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  also	  provides	  a	  case	  where	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  interest	  appears	  with	  substantial	  intensity,	  and	  features	  high	  levels	  of	  variation	  among	  innovation	  proposals	  that	  were	  considered	  but	  not	  launched,	  those	  that	  were	  launched	  and	  have	  failed,	  and	  those	  that	  launched	  with	  some	  success.	  	  The	  underlying	  logic	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  develop	  testable	  theoretical	  propositions,	  and	  its	  principal	  results	  are	  insights	  regarding	  the	  intersection	  between	  team	  composition	  (leadership	  and	  the	  leader’s	  roots	  in	  the	  organisation),	  team	  ties,	  and	  time	  pacing.	  	  The	  findings	  are	  supportive,	  if	  not	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definitively	  so,	  of	  Fleming,	  King	  and	  Juda’s	  speculation	  that	  the	  as-­‐yet-­‐untapped	  potential	  within	  a	  network	  component	  to	  build	  new	  ties	  may	  be	  as	  important,	  for	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  understand	  innovation,	  as	  the	  existing	  pattern	  of	  ties.	  	  While	  I	  believe	  the	  insights	  themselves	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  innovation	  management	  theory,	  the	  most	  significant	  contribution	  of	  the	  study	  is	  to	  propose	  a	  “way	  of	  seeing”	  the	  interaction	  between	  ties,	  team	  composition	  and	  time.	  	  Next,	  I	  describe	  the	  setting.	  	  Then	  I	  discuss	  the	  qualitative	  method	  selected	  for	  this	  study.	  	  I	  describe	  the	  findings	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  those	  findings,	  explain	  the	  insights	  derived	  from	  the	  analysis	  and	  put	  forward	  a	  set	  of	  propositions.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  I	  connect	  these	  propositions	  to	  the	  broader	  effort	  to	  develop	  theory.	  	  	  SETTING	  AND	  METHOD	  I	  studied	  an	  ad	  hoc	  cross-­‐functional	  workgroup	  created	  to	  develop	  rapidly	  a	  series	  of	  new	  value	  propositions	  for	  UK	  public	  sector	  clients	  within	  a	  large	  multinational	  telecommunications	  firm.	  	  	  	  Between	  May	  2008	  and	  April	  2009	  the	  workgroup,	  in	  two	  ‘waves’,	  reviewed	  66	  proposals	  and	  from	  among	  these	  launched	  13	  new	  value	  propositions.	  	  These	  made	  use	  almost	  entirely	  of	  tested	  technologies,	  though	  combining	  them	  in	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  novel	  ways	  and	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  marketing	  and	  contractual/pricing	  components	  of	  these	  new	  offers.	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While	  my	  study,	  which	  includes	  both	  real-­‐time	  observations	  from	  November	  2008	  to	  April	  2009,	  and	  retrospective	  qualitative	  data,	  followed	  the	  workgroup	  and	  its	  work	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  13	  value	  propositions	  (and	  the	  53	  other	  proposals	  reviewed	  by	  the	  workgroup	  and	  not	  brought	  to	  launch)	  provided	  multiple	  case	  studies,	  permitting	  a	  replication	  logic	  (Yin,	  1984)	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  individual	  cases	  as	  a	  series	  of	  independent	  experiments.	  	  I	  followed	  a	  theory-­‐based	  sampling	  strategy:	  	  the	  study’s	  purpose	  was	  to	  reappraise	  and	  build	  theory	  on	  the	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  holistic	  process	  of	  innovation,	  and	  to	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  network	  theory	  in	  interaction	  with	  innovation	  efforts.	  	  	  Operationalising	  success	  is	  challenging	  when	  examining	  innovation	  practice.	  	  Failure	  may	  be	  the	  ground	  and	  success	  the	  figure,	  but	  tight	  definitions	  of	  success	  are	  elusive.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  purpose	  of	  innovation	  is	  to	  improve	  a	  firm’s	  competitive	  position	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  generate	  above-­‐normal	  returns:	  	  to	  consider	  the	  contribution	  a	  launched	  innovation	  makes	  to	  this	  aim,	  we	  may	  consider	  its	  novelty,	  market	  potential	  and	  profitability.	  	  For	  those	  innovations	  that	  are	  not	  launched,	  it	  is	  convenient	  to	  assume	  that	  where	  a	  proposal	  is	  rejected	  only	  at	  the	  last	  stage	  gate	  prior	  to	  launch,	  it	  is	  a	  more	  “successful”	  proposal	  than	  one	  which	  is	  rejected	  at	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  assessment.	  	  Yet	  this	  too	  is	  problematic:	  	  if	  an	  innovation	  process	  is	  set	  up	  in	  a	  way	  that	  rejects	  truly	  novel	  proposals,	  preferring	  the	  apparently	  low-­‐risk	  ‘me	  too’	  imitation	  of	  competitor	  offerings,	  or	  the	  proposal	  with	  the	  heavyweight	  sponsor,	  then	  identifying	  ‘last	  stage	  gate	  reached	  before	  rejection’	  may	  tell	  us	  less	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  proposal	  than	  we	  might	  like.	  	  (Indeed,	  a	  successful	  innovation	  process	  may,	  in	  part,	  be	  one	  that	  rejects	  inadequate	  ideas	  at	  the	  earliest	  stage	  rather	  than	  the	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latest	  one.)	  	  Thus,	  though	  we	  examine	  the	  launched	  value	  proposition	  proposals	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  dimensions,	  such	  as	  immediate	  sales,	  profit	  margins	  achieved,	  novelty	  and	  market	  potential,	  and	  the	  unlaunched	  proposals	  on	  their	  progress	  through	  the	  innovation	  pipeline,	  these	  are	  imperfect	  measures.	  	  Timeline:	  	  	  
2008	  May:	  	  group	  formed	  for	  Rapidstart	  1,	  25	  members	  May-­‐June:	  	  40	  proposals	  reviewed,	  6	  chosen	  for	  immediate	  launch	  July:	  	  launch	  of	  6	  value	  propositions	  September:	  	  success	  in	  meeting	  original	  in-­‐year	  ‘extra	  margin’	  target	  declared,	  launch	  of	  2	  further	  propositions.	  	  Original	  management	  sponsor	  of	  process	  promoted.	  	  Process	  relaunched	  as	  Rapidstart	  2,	  in	  a	  new,	  less	  time-­‐constrained	  format,	  with	  the	  core	  group	  reconfigured	  to	  8	  people	  October-­‐December:	  	  58	  proposals	  reviewed	  (many	  of	  them	  carried	  over	  from	  previous	  review),	  eight	  chosen	  for	  Rapidstart	  2	  launch	  	  
2009	  April:	  	  five	  of	  the	  eight	  Rapidstart	  2	  proposals	  launched	  May:	  	  25%	  reduction	  in	  head	  count	  across	  the	  firm	  announced;	  group	  reconfigured	  and	  reduced	  to	  three	  people,	  review	  of	  its	  purpose	  undertaken	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Figure	  1	  shows	  a	  brief	  typology	  of	  the	  66	  proposals.	  	  	  Figure	  1:	  
Cases	   Proposed	  RS1	   Launched	  RS1	  	  (Succeeded/Failed)	   Proposed	  RS2	   Launched	  RS2	  (Succeeded/Failed)	   Interview	  Data	   Archival	  Data	  8	   X	   4/4	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	  32	   X	   	   X	   	   Some	   Yes	  2	   X	   	   X	   0/2	   Yes	   Yes	  3	   	   	   X	   0/3	   Yes	   Yes	  21	   	   	   X	   	   Some	   Yes	  	  
	  
DATA	  COLLECTION	  My	  aim	  was	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  innovation	  process	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  network	  connections	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  process.	  	  I	  collected	  data	  through	  interviews,	  questionnaires,	  non-­‐participant	  observation	  and	  archival	  sources	  such	  as	  emails,	  meeting	  minutes	  and	  presentation	  packs	  (such	  as	  presentations	  by	  proposal	  champions	  and	  subgroups	  of	  the	  overall	  working	  group)	  and	  internally-­‐	  and	  externally-­‐focused	  marketing	  materials.	  	  	  	  I	  relied	  on	  68	  semistructured	  interviews	  of	  between	  45	  and	  90	  minutes	  with	  41	  individual	  managers	  as	  the	  main	  source	  of	  data	  on	  the	  innovation	  process	  and	  the	  accompanying	  changes	  in	  network	  connections.	  	  I	  interviewed	  20	  of	  the	  25	  core	  workgroup	  members,	  who	  came	  principally	  from	  other	  pre-­‐existing	  teams	  within	  the	  Strategy	  directorate	  of	  the	  division,	  and	  using	  a	  snowball	  technique	  for	  selection,	  interviewed	  managers	  and	  sales	  executives	  outside	  the	  group	  who	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had	  been	  responsible	  for	  initiating	  or	  championing	  a	  variety	  of	  proposals	  for	  new	  value	  propositions,	  including	  all	  of	  the	  13	  propositions	  that	  were	  eventually	  selected	  for	  launch.	  	  Many	  managers	  were	  interviewed	  several	  times	  as	  the	  project	  progressed	  and	  they	  took	  on	  new	  responsibilities	  in	  respect	  of	  particular	  value	  propositions	  or	  proposals;	  these	  reiterations	  assisted	  in	  uncovering	  the	  dynamics	  at	  work.	  	  Over	  a	  five	  month	  period,	  I	  also	  attended	  four	  half-­‐day	  and	  three	  all-­‐day	  meetings,	  as	  well	  as	  six	  60-­‐minute	  to	  half-­‐day	  conference	  calls,	  as	  a	  non-­‐participant	  observer,	  where	  I	  made	  notes	  and	  recorded	  impressions	  of	  the	  interactions.	  	  I	  also	  participated	  with	  the	  group	  in	  coffee	  breaks	  and	  lunches	  and	  at	  one	  of	  the	  launch	  events	  for	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  propositions.	  	  The	  interview	  protocol	  evolved	  in	  two	  phases.	  	  Initially,	  I	  asked	  managers	  to	  walk	  me	  through	  the	  processes	  being	  followed	  and	  the	  experiences	  so	  far	  in	  the	  project	  and	  asked	  probing	  questions	  to	  establish	  detail.	  	  After	  I	  was	  oriented,	  I	  created	  a	  further	  interview	  guide	  to	  create	  case	  histories	  and	  timelines	  of	  the	  propositions	  that	  had	  been	  launched	  and	  to	  uncover	  network	  connections	  of	  the	  interviewee	  and	  how	  these	  had	  changed	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  project.	  	  	  	  Among	  the	  archival	  data	  collected	  were	  financial	  data	  (sales	  and	  profit	  margin)	  on	  the	  first	  eight	  months	  of	  sales	  for	  the	  first	  eight	  value	  propositions	  to	  be	  launched,	  and	  on	  the	  sales	  targets	  ‘signed	  up	  to’	  by	  the	  sector	  vertical	  sales	  teams	  for	  the	  second	  wave,	  of	  five	  propositions,	  to	  be	  launched.	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DATA	  ANALYSIS	  A	  sequential	  data	  analysis	  (Miles	  and	  Huberman	  1984)	  began	  with	  writing	  case	  stories	  (Eisenhardt	  1989)	  for	  each	  innovation	  and	  its	  associated	  team.	  	  All	  data	  were	  entered	  into	  chronological	  charts,	  assigning	  dates	  to	  each	  known	  activity,	  output,	  and	  change	  in	  group	  structure	  or	  connection.	  	  The	  stories	  were	  then	  open	  coded,	  grouping	  conditions,	  interactions,	  decision	  points,	  activities,	  outputs/consequences,	  and	  patterns	  of	  network	  connections	  under	  a	  total	  of	  32	  themes,	  these	  themes	  including	  the	  15	  types	  of	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities	  identified	  by	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell.	  	  I	  then	  created	  one-­‐page	  overviews	  of	  the	  charts	  that	  allowed	  easier	  cross-­‐case	  analysis	  while	  still	  being	  able	  to	  note	  important	  themes,	  sequences	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  data.	  	  I	  then	  carried	  out	  cross-­‐case	  analysis.	  	  I	  used	  the	  chronological	  charts	  and	  overviews	  I	  had	  created	  to	  analyse	  the	  data	  in	  several	  ways,	  reviewing	  key	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  cases,	  grouping	  them	  in	  families	  (Miles	  and	  Huberman,	  1984),	  comparing	  cases	  on	  continuous	  measurement	  scales	  and	  using	  2x2	  and	  other	  matrices	  to	  compare	  and	  identify	  similarities	  and	  differences	  (Eisenhardt,	  1989).	  	  I	  noted	  common	  patterns	  and	  propositions	  that	  emerged,	  relating	  to	  correspondences	  between	  boundary	  spanning	  activities	  and	  innovation	  success.	  	  I	  considered	  several	  instances	  of	  “discrepant”	  patterns	  in	  order	  to	  test	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  emerging	  findings.	  	  Finally,	  I	  returned	  to	  the	  literature,	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  the	  patterns	  that	  I	  had	  noted	  with	  existing	  evidence	  and	  theory.	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FINDINGS	  In	  Philoctetes,	  a	  Fortune	  250	  ICT	  firm,	  a	  challenge	  was	  identified	  in	  May	  2008,	  within	  the	  public	  sector	  market	  division,	  to	  create	  a	  pipeline	  of	  rapid-­‐payoff,	  high	  margin	  value	  proposition	  innovations.	  	  A	  boundary-­‐spanning	  workgroup,	  made	  up	  of	  25	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  division’s	  Strategy	  Directorate,	  was	  put	  into	  place	  to	  gather	  ideas	  for	  new	  value	  propositions	  and	  bring	  as	  many	  as	  possible	  of	  them	  to	  launch	  in	  six	  weeks.	  	  While	  many	  of	  the	  individuals	  had	  some	  cross-­‐functional	  experience,	  nearly	  all	  spontaneously	  identified	  themselves	  at	  interview	  as,	  prior	  to	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  strategy	  directorate,	  having	  roots	  in	  either	  a	  marketing/business	  development	  context	  or	  a	  ‘product	  line’	  (engineering)	  context,	  and	  of	  those	  interviewed	  who	  did	  not	  volunteer	  this	  information	  spontaneously	  (five),	  just	  one	  declined	  to	  categorise	  herself,	  claiming	  roots	  in	  both	  camps	  within	  the	  business.	  	  Two	  justifications	  were	  regularly	  mentioned	  by	  workgroup	  members	  for	  the	  initiative:	  	  firstly,	  that	  the	  company	  had	  to	  navigate	  between	  two	  types	  of	  eroding	  margins:	  	  a	  Scylla	  of	  large	  custom	  projects	  which	  frequently	  underperformed	  against	  their	  financial	  targets,	  and	  a	  Charybdis	  of	  commoditised	  legacy	  ‘wholesale’	  products	  (“lines	  and	  minutes”);	  secondly,	  that	  this	  ongoing	  problem	  was	  thrown	  into	  high	  relief	  because	  the	  company’s	  business	  services	  division	  faced	  an	  accounting	  period	  where	  a	  large	  loss	  was	  to	  be	  recognised	  from	  a	  long-­‐running	  and	  problematic	  contract	  with	  the	  UK	  government,	  severely	  damaging	  the	  company’s	  overall	  financial	  performance.	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Therefore,	  the	  workgroup	  had	  been	  assembled	  on	  an	  ‘emergency’	  basis	  and	  tasked	  to	  identify	  ‘low	  hanging	  fruit’:	  	  value	  propositions	  that	  could	  be	  launched	  rapidly	  and	  would	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  within	  the	  current	  accounting	  period.	  During	  this	  initial	  phase	  (RapidStart,	  or	  RS1)	  of	  the	  project,	  processes	  were	  developed	  somewhat	  ad	  hoc.	  	  However,	  they	  were	  largely	  based	  upon	  procedures	  already	  in	  place	  for	  the	  evaluation	  and	  development	  of	  new	  value	  propositions,	  with	  the	  difference	  that	  the	  compressed	  timeframe	  required	  a	  reworking	  of	  some	  processes,	  particularly	  commercialisation	  processes,	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  parallel	  rather	  than	  in	  sequence.	  	  Three	  milestones	  punctuated	  the	  process:	  	  a	  ‘playbook’	  signoff,	  when	  the	  underlying	  potential	  of	  the	  new	  value	  proposition	  was	  ratified	  by	  the	  workgroup;	  a	  ‘market	  requirements’	  signoff,	  when	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  commercially	  viable	  target	  market	  and	  a	  means	  to	  sell	  to	  it	  was	  certified;	  and	  a	  ‘product	  requirements’	  signoff,	  when	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  relevant	  product	  line	  manager	  to	  provide	  the	  resources	  to	  execute	  the	  value	  proposition	  was	  secure	  and	  a	  green	  light	  was	  therefore	  provided	  to	  produce	  the	  requisite	  collateral	  to	  launch	  the	  new	  offering.	  	  At	  the	  point	  of	  the	  ‘playbook’	  signoff,	  the	  workgroup	  usually	  designated	  a	  ‘controlling	  author’	  for	  the	  proposal:	  	  either	  the	  person	  who	  had	  originated	  the	  proposal	  and	  therefore	  had	  authored	  the	  playbook	  document,	  or	  another	  manager,	  typically	  within	  the	  core	  workgroup	  itself.	  	  	  	  Managers	  often	  represented	  the	  process	  as	  an	  analytical	  one.	  	  First,	  expert	  opinion	  is	  sought	  on	  the	  market	  potential	  for	  the	  new	  proposition.	  	  Then,	  the	  ‘product	  line’	  managers	  who	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  execution	  are	  consulted	  for	  their	  views	  on	  the	  costs	  and	  feasibility	  of	  the	  new	  proposition.	  	  In	  the	  final	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stage,	  the	  sales	  managers	  are	  asked	  to	  consider	  their	  target	  customers	  and	  sign	  up	  to	  a	  promise	  of	  the	  sales	  expected	  in	  the	  first	  six	  months	  and	  first	  year.	  	  	  	  One	  account	  of	  the	  process	  was:	  “Each	  proposal	  goes	  through	  four	  stages.	  	  First	  you	  have	  to	  put	  together	  two	  PowerPoint	  slides	  following	  a	  template	  called	  the	  Playbook.	  	  This	  gives	  us	  an	  idea	  of	  whether	  it’s	  got	  any	  legs	  at	  all—does	  it	  really	  solve	  a	  customer	  problem?	  	  Then	  if	  the	  group	  approves	  it,	  it	  goes	  to	  the	  MRD	  [Market	  Requirement	  Development]	  stage.	  	  This	  means	  we	  have	  identified	  a	  proposition	  with	  market	  potential.	  	  The	  MRD	  is	  where	  we	  establish	  whether	  we	  have	  a	  good	  target	  market	  for	  the	  first	  few	  sales	  and	  that	  we	  know	  how	  to	  sell	  it	  and	  the	  sales	  group	  is	  happy	  to	  sell	  it.	  	  The	  PRD	  stage	  is	  next,	  we	  see	  if	  we	  can	  make	  the	  project	  operational	  before	  the	  deadline.	  	  And	  if	  it	  passes	  that,	  then	  it’s	  launch	  planning,	  doing	  the	  contracts,	  providing	  the	  sales	  group	  with	  any	  training	  needed	  and	  so	  on.”	  	  This	  representation,	  of	  successive	  rational	  analyses,	  evaluating	  projects	  against	  some	  factual	  hurdles	  and	  letting	  those	  that	  surmount	  the	  hurdle	  through	  to	  the	  next	  stage,	  is	  somewhat	  illusory.	  	  The	  facts	  of	  any	  given	  value	  proposition’s	  potential,	  particularly	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  are	  highly	  speculative	  in	  all	  but	  a	  few	  cases:	  	  only	  the	  most	  incremental	  innovations	  can	  be	  explained	  to	  their	  customers	  in	  a	  simple	  way,	  fall	  under	  existing	  client	  budgets,	  require	  simple	  steps	  for	  adoption,	  or	  can	  be	  guaranteed	  to	  prove	  a	  hit	  with	  customers	  prior	  to	  launch.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  new	  proposition’s	  potential	  is	  actually	  an	  opinion.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  MRD	  stage	  is	  to	  put	  that	  opinion	  to	  the	  test	  of	  scrutiny	  by	  a	  number	  of	  individuals	  whose	  frames,	  functional	  backgrounds	  and	  loyalties,	  and	  power	  differ.	  	  Emergence	  from	  this	  stage	  is	  intended	  to	  certify	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  potential	  has	  been	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  working	  group	  responsible	  for	  the	  Rapidstart	  initiative	  as	  a	  whole:	  	  it	  therefore	  should	  be	  “good	  enough”	  for	  the	  product	  line	  manager	  whose	  agreement	  is	  required	  to	  mobilise	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the	  resources	  for	  putting	  it	  into	  place,	  and	  “good	  enough”	  for	  the	  sales	  team	  whose	  consent	  to	  sell	  it	  and	  commitment	  to	  a	  certain	  sales	  target	  is	  sought.	  	  This	  opinion	  may	  be	  carefully	  considered.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  arriving	  at	  the	  opinion	  is	  done	  in	  part	  through	  group	  discussion	  with	  internal	  stakeholders	  of	  diverse	  functional	  backgrounds,	  optimising	  the	  chance	  that	  dissent	  and	  discussion	  can	  emerge.	  	  A	  checklist	  of	  eight	  dimensions	  of	  potential	  was	  applied	  to	  most	  propositions,	  with	  a	  green/amber/red	  designation	  to	  indicate	  the	  opinion	  held	  by	  the	  group	  and	  the	  manager	  filling	  in	  the	  checklist	  on	  that	  dimension.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  initiators	  or	  controlling	  authors	  held	  a	  series	  of	  interviews	  with	  sales	  staff	  to	  gather	  views	  on	  the	  market	  potential;	  in	  a	  few,	  they	  visited	  prospective	  clients	  whom	  sales	  staff	  had	  arranged	  for	  them	  to	  meet.	  	  (For	  some,	  more	  novel,	  propositions,	  the	  case	  for	  market	  potential	  rested	  not	  on	  an	  assessment	  of	  trends	  in	  demand	  and	  strength	  of	  competing	  offers,	  but	  on	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  direct	  benefits	  clients	  could	  realise	  by	  using	  the	  proposition:	  	  making	  it	  possible,	  for	  example,	  for	  a	  client’s	  employee	  to	  complete	  administrative	  duties	  on	  a	  mobile	  device	  rather	  than	  having	  to	  do	  so	  by	  returning	  to	  base,	  would	  create	  value	  for	  the	  customer	  through	  eliminating	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  hours	  per	  employee	  per	  annum.)	  	  CONTESTING	  OPINIONS	  	  The	  contestation	  of	  the	  opinion	  sometimes	  proceeded	  as	  the	  process	  was	  designed	  for	  it	  to	  proceed:	  	  the	  emergence	  from	  each	  stage	  providing	  an	  assurance	  to	  those	  participating	  in	  the	  next	  stage	  that	  scrutiny	  had	  been	  applied.	  	  When	  the	  opinion	  was	  accepted	  by	  those	  participating	  in	  the	  next	  stage,	  the	  next	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question	  would	  be	  how	  precisely	  to	  sell	  the	  proposition,	  or	  how	  precisely	  to	  execute	  it,	  or	  how	  precisely	  to	  fit	  it	  into	  the	  grid	  of	  commercial,	  legal	  and	  accounting	  support	  and	  monitoring	  systems	  in	  which	  it	  would	  reside.	  	  But	  at	  other	  times,	  the	  contestation	  of	  market	  potential	  would	  continue	  into	  subsequent	  phases,	  after	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  settled	  question.	  	  If	  the	  product	  line	  executive	  whose	  agreement	  was	  sought	  to	  bring	  together	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  launch	  the	  proposition	  declined	  to	  prioritise	  the	  proposition,	  his	  counter-­‐argument	  was	  typically	  based	  upon	  the	  need	  to	  actuate	  the	  market	  potential	  inherent	  in	  the	  proposition.	  	  	  If	  this	  argument	  failed,	  the	  next	  step	  could	  be,	  as	  happened	  fifteen	  times	  within	  this	  study,	  for	  the	  notional	  champion/team	  leader	  of	  the	  innovation	  project	  to	  seek	  a	  person	  with	  the	  authority	  or	  other	  power	  to	  persuade	  the	  recalcitrant	  product	  line	  executive	  to	  co-­‐operate.	  	  These	  milestones	  therefore	  corresponded	  with	  two	  phases	  of	  activity:	  	  Phase	  One:	  	  establishing,	  among	  the	  workgroup,	  a	  socially	  constructed	  “accepted	  opinion”	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  proposal	  has	  market	  potential	  (including	  whether	  this	  potential	  can	  be	  realised	  in	  the	  short	  term).	  	  Phase	  Two:	  	  “forcing”	  resources	  and	  support	  for	  the	  new	  proposition	  from	  the	  product	  line	  and	  commercial	  functions	  based	  on	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  the	  central	  Rapidstart	  working	  group,	  while	  gaining	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  relevant	  individuals	  in	  the	  salesforce	  and	  focusing	  it	  on	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  new	  offering.	  	  (This	  was	  required	  because	  of	  a	  complex	  and	  diverse	  legacy	  of	  existing	  offerings,	  meaning	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that	  any	  launch	  of	  a	  new	  offering	  was	  dependent	  on	  ‘punching	  through’	  inertia	  to	  capture	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  salesforce.)	  	  For	  the	  most	  part	  these	  phases	  were	  purely	  sequential:	  	  new	  proposals	  could	  fail	  because	  they	  did	  not	  achieve	  consensus	  around	  market	  potential	  in	  general,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  feasibility	  and	  likelihood	  of	  immediate	  market	  acceptance;	  they	  could	  fail	  because	  time	  constraints	  would	  not	  allow	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  proposal	  in	  the	  specified	  time	  scale.	  	  However,	  in	  several	  significant	  cases	  (both	  in	  RapidStart	  1	  and	  the	  later	  RapidStart	  2),	  the	  process	  was	  iterative—a	  product	  line	  or	  commercialisation	  manager,	  indicating	  that	  he	  or	  she	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  projections	  of	  market	  potential	  to	  carry	  sufficient	  weight	  to	  justify	  the	  mobilisation	  or	  commitment	  of	  the	  requisite	  resources,	  could	  send	  the	  process	  back	  to	  Phase	  One.	  	  Sometimes	  this	  blocking	  action	  resulted	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  proposition;	  in	  others,	  the	  workgroup	  devised	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  the	  blockage,	  either	  by	  securing	  the	  support	  of	  a	  manager	  whose	  seniority	  or	  other	  power	  was	  sufficient	  to	  override	  the	  block,	  or	  by	  re-­‐channelling	  the	  proposed	  offering	  to	  a	  different	  product	  line	  manager	  with	  access	  to	  a	  different	  set	  of	  resources.	  
	  During	  RapidStart	  1,	  the	  value	  proposition	  proposals	  originated	  in	  two	  distinct	  sources:	  	  with	  sales	  and	  business	  development	  employees,	  or	  with	  product	  line	  managers.	  	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  the	  rationale	  supporting	  the	  proposal	  typically	  revolved	  around	  the	  ready	  market	  perceived	  by	  the	  salesforce	  member	  among	  his	  or	  her	  existing	  account	  relationships	  for	  the	  proposed	  proposition;	  in	  the	  latter,	  rationales	  offered	  were	  similar	  to	  this	  manager’s:	  
This	  is	  something	  we’ve	  intended	  to	  do	  for	  ages.	  	  This	  was	  a	  good	  way	  to	  get	  it	  
off	  the	  ground,	  as	  the	  sales	  teams	  are	  all	  being	  geared	  up	  to	  launch	  these	  ideas.	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  Across	  the	  six	  weeks	  of	  RS1,	  40	  propositions	  were	  considered	  and	  rejected,	  but	  five	  new	  propositions	  were	  launched	  in	  June	  2008.	  	  Total	  sales	  for	  these	  propositions	  in	  their	  first	  six	  months	  were	  c	  £85m.	  	  A	  further	  three,	  which	  had	  taken	  longer	  to	  develop,	  were	  launched	  that	  September.	  	  This	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  success,	  as	  the	  target	  originally	  set	  for	  “in	  year	  margin”	  going	  to	  the	  bottom	  line	  in	  FY	  2008-­‐09	  had	  been	  hit.	  	  The	  manager	  who	  had	  initiated	  the	  programme	  was	  promoted	  to	  a	  new	  role,	  and	  Rapidstart	  2	  (RS2)	  was	  initiated	  in	  November	  2008.	  	  A	  number	  of	  changes	  were	  made	  to	  the	  programme.	  	  The	  target	  launch	  date	  for	  RS2	  was	  April	  2009,	  meaning	  the	  process	  would	  run	  over	  six	  months	  instead	  of	  six	  weeks.	  	  Eight	  of	  the	  original	  25	  workgroup	  members	  who	  had	  collaborated	  on	  RS1	  would	  continue	  to	  focus	  on	  RS2—these	  were	  the	  eight	  members	  whose	  ‘day	  jobs’	  before	  they	  were	  involved	  with	  the	  RS1	  initiative	  were	  evaluating	  and	  shepherding	  new	  value	  propositions	  through	  the	  process.	  	  The	  success	  of	  RS1	  gave	  birth	  to	  a	  bold	  new	  ‘strategic	  objective’	  for	  the	  value	  proposition	  innovation	  process:	  	  to	  lift	  new,	  replicable	  value	  propositions	  to	  50%	  of	  gross	  revenue	  in	  the	  business-­‐to-­‐business	  services	  division.	  	  This	  new	  objective,	  combined	  with	  the	  longer	  timeframe	  of	  RS2,	  led	  the	  remaining	  group	  to	  consider	  that	  it	  should	  shift	  somewhat	  away	  from	  purely	  recombinative	  projects	  and	  welcome	  (and	  indeed	  search	  for,	  unearth	  and	  stimulate)	  proposals	  that	  were	  less	  “obvious”	  than	  those	  which	  had	  been	  evaluated	  and	  developed	  during	  RS1.	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  Post-­‐mortem	  evaluation	  of	  RS1	  indicated	  that	  a	  major	  reason	  for	  the	  perceived	  success	  of	  the	  innovation	  launches	  had	  been	  successful	  engagement	  of	  the	  sales	  force.	  	  Based	  on	  this	  finding,	  the	  RS2	  approach	  was	  to	  “strengthen”	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  process,	  by	  engaging	  the	  sales	  managers	  responsible	  for	  the	  various	  market	  sectors	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  in	  the	  process,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  in	  more	  formal	  discussions,	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  the	  dialogue	  would	  culminate	  in	  each	  industry	  vertical	  sales	  manager	  “taking	  a	  target”,	  or	  stating	  in	  writing	  an	  agreement	  to	  what	  had	  been,	  in	  RS1,	  simply	  an	  opinion,	  arrived	  at	  by	  the	  core	  workgroup,	  about	  short	  term	  market	  potential.	  	  	  The	  RS2	  process	  evaluated	  58	  propositions	  and	  selected	  eight	  for	  launch;	  five	  of	  these	  were	  ready	  in	  time	  to	  be	  launched	  in	  April	  2009.	  	  Industry	  vertical	  sales	  managers	  signed	  up	  to	  targets	  to	  sell	  £133m	  of	  these	  value	  propositions	  during	  the	  2009/10	  financial	  year.	  	  	  	  The	  April	  2009	  launch	  was	  unsuccessful.	  	  Less	  than	  a	  week	  after	  the	  first	  of	  several	  planned	  launch	  events	  was	  held,	  Philoctetes	  announced	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  the	  size	  of	  its	  workforce,	  and	  accompanying	  restructuring	  of	  management	  responsibilities,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  economic	  changes	  of	  2008-­‐2009.	  	  The	  attention	  of	  the	  sales	  force	  was	  not	  on	  embedding	  new	  propositions	  into	  their	  client	  relationships,	  but	  on	  the	  restructuring,	  and	  managers	  in	  several	  parts	  of	  the	  organisation	  indicated	  that,	  effectively,	  “all	  bets	  were	  off”	  in	  terms	  of	  commitments	  and	  plans	  that	  had	  been	  made	  in	  the	  period	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  restructuring	  announcement:	  	  the	  impending	  changes	  of	  management	  roles	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were	  believed	  by	  many	  of	  the	  study’s	  informants	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  newly	  launched	  propositions	  were,	  to	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  “dead”.	  	  The	  RS2	  leader	  (who	  had	  also	  been	  a	  leading	  member	  of	  the	  RS1	  management	  workgroup)	  was	  moved	  to	  a	  key	  account	  management	  role,	  the	  value	  proposition	  innovation	  workgroup	  was	  reduced	  to	  three	  members,	  and	  its	  role	  reviewed.	  	  ANALYSIS	  The	  innovation	  proposals	  arising	  during	  RS1	  were	  grouped,	  under	  analysis,	  into	  two	  families:	  	  innovations	  proposed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  sales	  teams	  and	  innovations	  proposed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  product	  line	  management	  teams,	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  those	  teams.	  	  During	  RS2,	  some	  innovation	  proposals	  fell	  into	  a	  third	  family:	  innovations	  proposed	  by	  intrapreneurs.	  	  These	  latter	  proposals	  were	  initiated	  by	  individuals	  in	  the	  product	  line	  management	  teams,	  but	  without	  the	  support	  of	  those	  teams.	  	  Intrapreneur-­‐originated	  proposals	  sought	  financial	  resources	  from	  the	  RS2	  workgroup	  to	  complete	  or	  move	  forward	  some	  aspect	  of	  development	  of	  the	  value	  proposition,	  whereas	  product	  line-­‐originated	  proposals,	  as	  has	  been	  mentioned,	  were	  characterised	  by	  their	  proposers	  as	  “ideas	  we’ve	  been	  meaning	  to	  do	  anyway”	  and	  arrived	  at	  their	  earliest	  stage	  with	  an	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  promise	  of	  access	  to	  the	  product	  line-­‐controlled	  resources	  needed	  for	  their	  operationalisation,	  once	  the	  market	  opportunity	  was	  validated	  by	  the	  RS	  workgroup.	  	  	  	  The	  “family	  of	  origin”	  of	  the	  proposal	  had	  a	  fundamental	  effect	  on	  the	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  the	  RS	  workgroups	  in	  identifying,	  evaluating	  and	  developing	  that	  proposal.	  	  These	  boundary	  spanning	  activities	  are	  described	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below.	  	  First	  I	  examine	  how	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities	  differed,	  and	  contributed	  to	  or	  constrained	  success	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  innovation	  process;	  secondly,	  I	  consider	  how	  the	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activity	  varied	  between	  RS1	  and	  RS2	  and	  what	  impact	  this	  had	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  innovations	  in	  each	  stage.	  	  	  	  
The	  search	  for	  proposals	  Many	  informants	  spontaneously	  mentioned	  that	  being	  associated	  by	  colleagues	  and	  senior	  managers	  with	  a	  successful	  new	  offering	  was	  an	  important	  source	  of	  informal	  power	  and	  springboard	  for	  promotion	  opportunities	  within	  Philoctetes,	  and	  this	  was	  offered	  as	  a	  rationale	  and	  motivation	  by	  many	  originators—including	  all	  of	  the	  intrapreneurial	  originators—for	  putting	  forward	  proposals	  to	  the	  RS	  workgroup.	  	  The	  family	  of	  proposals	  originating	  with	  the	  sales	  teams	  were	  also	  stimulated	  by	  a	  more	  direct	  incentive:	  	  sales	  team	  originators	  emphasised	  that	  if	  their	  proposals	  were	  accepted	  and	  developed,	  they	  believed	  they	  had	  ready	  customers	  for	  the	  new	  propositions.	  	  This	  would	  at	  least	  generate	  sales	  commission	  and	  help	  towards	  meeting	  personal	  and	  group	  targets;	  some	  originators	  further	  suggested	  that	  their	  proposals	  were	  important	  in	  responding	  to	  competitive	  threats	  to	  their	  strategic	  client	  relationships,	  or	  simply	  to	  cultivating	  those	  relationships	  through	  the	  value	  the	  propositions	  might	  deliver	  to	  their	  clients.	  	  	  	  The	  RS	  process	  did	  not	  start	  by	  scanning	  the	  network	  of	  core	  workgroup	  members	  for	  potential	  opportunities.	  	  The	  mechanism	  for	  eliciting	  opportunities	  was	  a	  “pull”	  process,	  depending	  on	  informing,	  through	  email,	  informal	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communication	  and	  announcements	  at	  meetings,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  division	  about	  the	  RS	  initiative	  and	  then	  relying	  on	  self-­‐interest	  to	  drive	  the	  production	  of	  initial	  “playbook”	  proposals.	  	  Unidirectional	  communications	  emanated	  from	  the	  core	  workgroup	  through	  the	  thin	  conduits	  of	  the	  division’s	  network,	  supported	  by	  the	  perceived	  seniority	  and	  position	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  strategy	  directorate	  sending	  the	  communications,	  and	  innovation	  proposals	  were	  the	  response:	  	  there	  was	  no	  aspect	  of	  persuasive	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  dialogue	  involved.	  	  	  
	  
Validating	  market	  opportunity	  During	  RS1,	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  that	  an	  innovation	  proposal	  related	  to	  a	  realisable	  market	  opportunity	  was	  based	  on	  very	  rapidly	  conducted	  dialogues	  between	  key	  decision	  makers.	  	  Here,	  the	  network	  connections	  and	  boundary-­‐spanning	  functions	  of	  the	  core	  workgroup	  were	  significant	  in	  determining	  the	  outcome	  of	  these	  dialogues	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  provided	  support	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  Where	  proposals	  arose	  from	  the	  sales	  teams,	  they	  came	  with	  data	  about	  prospective	  clients	  attached.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  considered	  that	  these	  clients,	  and	  the	  supporting	  information	  in	  the	  proposal	  about	  their	  readiness	  to	  buy,	  validated	  the	  opportunity	  and	  supported	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off;	  in	  others,	  they	  required	  more	  information	  from	  the	  sales	  managers	  of	  industry	  verticals	  different	  to	  that	  of	  the	  originating	  sales	  team	  member,	  to	  estimate	  and	  consider	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  market	  potential	  across	  a	  broader	  cross-­‐section	  of	  the	  market.	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  Where	  proposals	  arose	  from	  product	  line	  managers,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  market	  opportunity	  was	  less	  concrete.	  	  In	  several	  cases,	  RS	  workgroup	  members	  arranged	  and	  accompanied	  product	  line	  managers	  on	  visits	  to	  clients	  with	  whom	  Philoctetes	  had	  a	  strategic	  relationship,	  to	  sound	  out	  the	  client’s	  reception	  of	  the	  innovation	  proposal	  and	  thereby	  to	  develop	  support	  for	  the	  market	  requirements	  element	  of	  the	  evaluation	  process.	  	  In	  RS1,	  with	  its	  rapid	  time	  pacing,	  the	  boundary-­‐spanning	  RS	  workgroup	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  opening	  up	  channels	  of	  communication,	  seeking	  feedback	  and	  gathering	  information	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  the	  innovations.	  	  34	  proposals	  were	  rejected	  in	  RS1,	  but	  then	  reviewed	  again	  in	  RS2;	  of	  these,	  over	  half	  were	  eventually	  to	  achieve	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off	  (and	  two	  were	  to	  be	  launched,	  in	  April	  2009.)	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  this	  simply	  reflects	  the	  underlying	  ‘true’	  market	  potential	  of	  the	  proposal;	  however,	  one	  difference	  between	  those	  proposals	  which	  were	  able	  to	  achieve	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off	  within	  the	  compressed	  timescale	  of	  the	  RS1	  initiative	  and	  those	  that	  had	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  second	  stage	  to	  achieve	  this	  status	  was	  whether	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  member	  principally	  responsible	  for	  assessing	  the	  particular	  proposal	  was	  able	  to	  access,	  through	  pre-­‐existing	  ties,	  a	  person	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  additional	  information	  needed	  to	  validate	  and	  support	  (or	  invalidate	  and	  reject)	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  market	  potential.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  such	  pre-­‐existing	  ties	  to	  confirming	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  predicted	  the	  boundary	  spanning	  workgroup	  member’s	  ability	  to	  
rapidly	  validate	  the	  projections	  made	  by	  the	  proposal	  originator	  as	  to	  market	  potential,	  but	  such	  ties	  were	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  boundary-­‐spanning	  member	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to	  do	  it	  at	  all—creating	  new	  ties	  to	  the	  needed	  knowledge	  required	  time	  and,	  in	  several	  cases,	  introductions	  through	  other	  members	  of	  the	  RS	  workgroup.	  	  
	  
Assembling	  resources	  and	  commitments	  Phase	  Two	  of	  the	  RS	  process	  took	  place	  when	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off	  stage	  was	  complete.	  	  As	  with	  the	  market	  scoping	  process,	  the	  originating	  source	  of	  the	  innovation	  proposal	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  task	  structure	  in	  this	  phase.	  	  Where	  sales	  teams	  had	  originated	  the	  proposal,	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  had	  now	  to	  persuade	  product	  line	  and	  commercial	  managers	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  market	  projections	  ratified	  by	  the	  workgroup	  credibly	  supported	  the	  request	  for	  resources	  and	  commitments	  necessary	  to	  operationalise	  the	  innovation.	  	  Where	  the	  product	  team	  had	  originated	  the	  proposal,	  the	  road	  was	  considerably	  smoother:	  	  such	  proposals	  arose	  from	  managers	  who	  already	  believed	  the	  innovation	  was	  necessary	  and	  credible.	  	  Thus,	  proposals	  originating	  in	  the	  sales	  teams	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  market	  requirements	  signoff	  and	  fall	  at	  the	  operationalisation	  hurdle;	  those	  originating	  from	  the	  product	  lines	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  struggle	  with	  establishing	  market	  viability	  while	  passing	  more	  easily	  through	  the	  process	  of	  assembling	  resources	  and	  commitments	  to	  launch.	  	  However,	  the	  difficulties,	  in	  both	  cases,	  were	  mitigated	  when	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  assigned	  a	  controlling	  author	  to	  manage	  a	  particular	  proposal	  whose	  personal	  background	  prior	  to	  working	  in	  the	  strategy	  directorate	  was	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  proposal.	  	  Having	  such	  a	  controlling	  author	  appears	  to	  support	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  proposal	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  successive	  hurdles	  in	  the	  process.	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Figure	  2—RS1	  “Launched”	  initiatives	  
Case	   Domain	  of	  Origin	   Team	  Leader	   Passed	  Market	  Requirements?	   Passed	  Operations	  Requirements?	   Rerouted	  around	  block?	   Judged	  a	  success?	  A	   Marketing	   Marketing	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	  B	   Marketing	   Product	  Line	   Y	   N	   Y—used	  existing	  ties	  
Y	  
C	   Product	  Line	   Product	  Line	   N	   Y	   Y—used	  existing	  ties	  
Y	  
D	   Product	  Line	   Marketing	   Y	   Y	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐	   Y	  E	   Marketing	   Marketing	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   N	  F	   Marketing	   Product	  Line	   Y	   Y	   	  	  	  -­‐	   N	  G	   Product	  Line	   Product	  Line	   N	   Y	   Y—used	  existing	  ties	  
N	  
H	   Product	  Line	   Marketing	   N	   Y	   Y—used	  existing	  ties	  
N	  
	  Cases	  B	  and	  D,	  where	  a	  mismatch,	  or	  complementarity,	  occurred	  were	  by	  some	  distance	  the	  most	  successful	  innovations,	  in	  terms	  of	  sales	  and	  the	  eventual	  assessment	  by	  managers	  of	  the	  lasting	  impact	  the	  new	  value	  proposition	  has	  had	  and	  would	  continue	  to	  have	  on	  the	  firm’s	  success.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  and	  in	  others	  in	  RS2,	  the	  mismatch	  was	  not	  in	  any	  way	  an	  accident:	  	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  identified	  these	  as	  high	  potential	  opportunities	  early	  on,	  knew	  they	  would	  sail	  through	  the	  process	  related	  to	  their	  originating	  context,	  and	  assigned	  a	  controller	  who	  would	  be	  able	  to	  steer	  the	  proposal	  through	  the	  stage	  in	  which	  it	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would	  be	  more	  contested.	  	  This	  type	  of	  complementarity	  was	  not	  always	  the	  result	  of	  a	  planned	  approach,	  however.	  	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  decision	  to	  assign	  a	  controlling	  author	  different	  to	  the	  actual	  originator	  of	  the	  proposal	  was	  based	  on	  the	  workload	  of	  the	  originator;	  in	  at	  least	  four	  other	  cases	  in	  RS2,	  the	  decision	  was	  based	  at	  least	  in	  part	  on	  replacing	  an	  originator	  seen	  as	  too	  junior	  or	  lacking	  interpersonal	  expertise	  with	  a	  more	  seasoned	  operator.	  	  (The	  importance	  of	  interpersonal	  skill	  in	  boundary	  spanning	  is	  emphasised	  by	  Burt	  (2004),	  who	  suggests	  that	  experience	  of	  structural	  hole	  spanning	  builds	  up	  the	  skills	  of	  comprehending	  and	  translating	  communications	  between	  the	  two	  contexts.)	  	  Figure	  3—RS1	  ‘unlaunched’	  initiatives,	  all	  proposed/reviewed	  again	  in	  RS2	  
Number	  of	  Cases	   Domain	  of	  Origin	   Team	  Leader	   Passed	  Market	  Requirements?	   Passed	  Operations	  Requirements?	  13	   Marketing	   Marketing	   Y	   N	  4	   Marketing	   Product	  Line	   Y	   N	  7	   Product	  Line	   Product	  Line	   N	   Y	  7	   Product	  Line	   Product	  Line	   N	   N	  3	   Product	  Line	   Marketing	   N	   N	  	  
Overcoming	  blockages	  During	  RS1,	  there	  were	  many	  reasons	  why	  17	  of	  the	  24	  proposals	  which	  surmounted	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off	  hurdle	  were	  unable	  to	  achieve	  the	  product	  requirements	  sign-­‐off	  needed	  to	  progress	  to	  launch.	  	  Often	  these	  reasons	  related	  to	  the	  tight	  timescales	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  agreeing	  some	  aspect	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of	  executing	  the	  proposition	  with	  a	  third	  party	  such	  as	  a	  supplier	  or	  an	  alliance	  partner	  which	  could	  not	  be	  done	  without	  negotiation.	  	  However,	  in	  four	  cases,	  proposals	  which	  had	  notionally	  passed	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off	  milestone	  encountered	  resistance	  from	  product	  line	  managers,	  explicitly	  stated	  to	  be	  based	  on	  “disbelief”	  of	  the	  ratified	  market	  projections	  and	  their	  credibility	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  allocating	  product	  line	  resources.	  	  (Some,	  or	  many,	  of	  the	  other	  cases	  of	  failure	  by	  proposals	  to	  surmount	  this	  hurdle	  may,	  of	  course,	  have	  been	  related	  to	  such	  disbelief,	  merely	  not	  openly	  expressed	  by	  the	  product	  line	  managers.)	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  did	  not	  accept	  this	  rejection	  by	  the	  product	  line	  manager,	  but	  sought	  to	  find	  a	  more	  senior	  product	  line	  manager,	  or	  a	  product	  line	  manager	  who	  controlled	  a	  parallel	  set	  of	  resources,	  to	  override	  the	  rejection	  or	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  path	  to	  the	  launch	  process.	  	  In	  observing	  this	  critical	  moment	  for	  the	  workgroup,	  a	  recurring	  pattern	  emerged	  which	  shows	  the	  interplay	  of	  ambassadorial	  boundary	  spanning	  activity	  with	  network	  structure.	  	  In	  two	  of	  the	  four	  cases,	  when	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  discussed	  the	  quest	  for	  “someone	  senior”	  or	  “someone	  different”	  to	  override	  the	  veto	  from	  the	  product	  line,	  the	  workgroup	  was	  only	  able	  to	  identify	  one	  member	  who	  had	  pre-­‐existing	  ties	  to	  a	  ‘likely	  prospect’	  to	  target.	  	  In	  the	  other	  two	  cases,	  there	  were	  two	  workgroup	  members	  who	  identified	  “someone	  we	  can	  work	  on”	  among	  their	  contacts.	  	  In	  the	  former	  cases,	  the	  member	  with	  the	  tie	  to	  the	  necessary	  political	  support	  is	  a	  gatekeeper	  and	  a	  broker.	  	  In	  the	  latter,	  there	  is	  no	  gatekeeper,	  broker,	  or	  structural	  hole	  (one	  could	  say	  ‘there	  are	  two	  gatekeepers’,	  but	  by	  definition	  if	  there	  are	  two	  bridges	  then	  there	  is	  no	  structural	  hole	  and	  therefore	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no	  broker).	  	  In	  the	  latter	  cases,	  both	  efforts	  succeeded	  in	  finding	  an	  alternative	  sponsor	  and	  in	  rising	  above	  the	  original	  veto.	  	  And	  in	  these	  two	  cases,	  the	  workgroup	  members	  providing	  the	  bridges	  to	  the	  new	  sponsors	  described	  their	  efforts	  in	  locating	  someone	  with	  a	  diligence	  and	  enthusiasm	  which	  appeared	  to	  contrast	  with	  more	  diffident,	  tentative	  efforts	  made	  by	  the	  lone	  workgroup	  members	  in	  the	  cases	  where	  they	  were	  the	  sole	  bridge	  to	  a	  potential	  sponsor.	  	  	  	  How	  does	  a	  gatekeeper	  profit	  from	  her	  structural	  hole-­‐spanning?	  	  In	  some	  cases	  she	  may	  block	  a	  particular	  route	  for	  information	  or	  resources,	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  an	  overall	  state	  of	  affairs	  she	  finds	  desirable	  or	  profitable.	  	  In	  others,	  in	  which	  she	  co-­‐operates	  with	  his	  alters	  within	  the	  various	  workgroups	  of	  which	  she	  is	  a	  member,	  she	  routes	  a	  desirable	  piece	  of	  access	  to	  knowledge	  or	  resources	  (tangible,	  such	  as	  a	  budget	  allocation,	  or	  intangible,	  such	  as	  an	  endorsement	  leading	  to	  legitimacy)	  to	  the	  contact	  from	  whom	  she	  perceives	  she	  will	  receive	  the	  highest	  value	  return	  in	  immediate	  or	  future	  recognition.	  	  This	  recognition	  may	  come	  purely	  in	  the	  form	  of	  exchange,	  but	  unless	  the	  particular	  tie	  between	  the	  gatekeeper	  and	  the	  alter	  is	  perceived	  by	  the	  gatekeeper	  to	  be	  a	  transient	  one,	  the	  recognition	  will	  also	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  “relationship”—one	  in	  which	  the	  alter	  may	  return,	  for	  reasons	  of	  efficiency	  or	  habit,	  to	  the	  gatekeeper	  again	  and	  again	  for	  further	  access	  to	  the	  bridge	  she	  holds.	  	  In	  a	  workgroup	  context	  this	  means	  being	  established	  as	  the	  “go	  to”	  person	  for	  particular	  sorts	  of	  knowledge	  or	  resources.	  	  Where	  the	  workgroup	  or	  alter	  has	  a	  choice	  of	  two	  or	  more	  people	  who	  can	  provide	  bridges,	  and	  all	  parties	  know	  it,	  the	  (former)	  gatekeeper’s	  position	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changes	  markedly.	  	  The	  blocking	  option	  vanishes,	  or	  requires	  the	  “bridges”	  to	  collude	  in	  such	  blocking.	  	  Also,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  second	  bridge	  hugely	  diminishes	  the	  value	  that	  the	  quondam	  structural-­‐hole	  spanner	  can	  extract	  for	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  information	  or	  resource,	  as	  shown	  by	  Burt	  (2000).	  	  But	  the	  behaviour	  of	  both	  bridges	  will	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  utility	  they	  ascribe	  to	  their	  ongoing	  relationship	  with	  the	  workgroup	  or	  alter.	  	  If	  the	  alter	  or	  workgroup	  perceives	  one	  or	  the	  other	  bridge	  as	  being	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  other	  at	  accessing	  knowledge	  or	  activating	  support	  in	  the	  target	  domain,	  he	  or	  it	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  “use”	  that	  bridge	  as	  the	  preferred	  ‘supplier’	  of	  the	  knowledge	  or	  support-­‐activation,	  giving	  that	  bridge	  more	  opportunities	  to	  gain	  from	  such	  interactions.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  presence,	  within	  a	  workgroup,	  of	  a	  second	  bridge	  to	  a	  desired	  target	  domain	  may	  do	  much	  more	  than	  simply	  double	  the	  chances	  for	  that	  workgroup	  to	  activate	  support	  or	  access	  knowledge	  from	  that	  domain.	  	  All	  the	  usual	  benefits	  of	  competition	  may	  come	  into	  play	  as	  well,	  as	  the	  “bridges”	  work	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  more	  successful	  and	  useful	  of	  the	  two	  alternative	  routes.	  
	  
	  
RS1	  vs	  RS2	  The	  organisation	  of	  the	  original	  RS	  workgroup,	  which	  brought	  together	  25	  fairly	  senior	  managers,	  most	  with	  cross-­‐functional	  experience	  (and	  therefore	  clique-­‐crossing	  ties),	  created	  a	  new	  dense	  cluster	  with	  collectively	  new	  bridging	  ties.	  	  It	  also	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ties—the	  relatively	  open-­‐ended	  nature	  of	  the	  innovation	  scanning,	  evaluation	  and	  development	  task,	  compared	  to	  the	  “day	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job”	  where	  obligations	  were	  based	  primarily	  on	  functional	  roles;	  the	  new	  responsibilities	  within	  the	  11	  subgroups	  of	  the	  workgroup;	  the	  tight	  deadlines	  associated	  with	  the	  task,	  requiring	  extraordinary	  efforts—all	  of	  these	  factors	  contributed	  to	  ties	  which	  may	  previously	  have	  had	  thin	  bandwidth	  becoming	  thick,	  to	  ties	  previously	  based	  on	  minimal	  interdependence	  becoming,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  RS	  initiative,	  more	  interdependent.	  	  These	  factors	  stimulated	  many	  workgroup	  members	  to	  share	  their	  boundary-­‐spanning	  ties	  with	  each	  other	  when	  task	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  ambassadorial	  boundary	  spanning	  activities	  were	  required	  (not	  least	  when	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  workgroup	  prompted	  them	  to	  do	  so.)	  	  In	  a	  few	  cases,	  informants	  described	  how,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  “day	  jobs”,	  certain	  other	  members	  of	  the	  workgroup	  had	  tasks	  which	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  normally	  working	  at	  cross	  purposes	  or	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  informants,	  but	  that	  such	  tensions	  and	  conflicts	  were	  muted	  under	  the	  pressures	  of	  the	  innovation	  project.	  	  During	  RS1,	  a	  dense	  network	  cluster	  was	  formed,	  with	  a	  relatively	  large	  number	  of	  member	  components	  (compared	  for	  example	  to	  the	  classical	  “eight	  member	  team”)	  meaning	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  redundant	  ties	  and	  fewer	  gatekeepers,	  brokers	  and	  structural	  holes—particularly	  structural	  holes	  separating	  departments.	  	  When	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  took	  over	  responsibility	  for	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  idea	  or	  project,	  the	  RS	  workgroup	  as	  a	  whole	  almost	  certainly	  enjoyed	  greater	  centrality	  in	  the	  firm	  network—through	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  cross-­‐functional	  ‘super-­‐cluster’—than	  had	  the	  team	  previously	  working	  to	  develop	  the	  project.	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Many	  of	  these	  characteristics	  of	  the	  RS	  workgroup,	  which	  through	  greater	  connectivity	  in	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities,	  supported	  its	  success,	  were	  not	  present	  when	  the	  core	  team	  working	  on	  the	  project	  was	  reduced	  to	  eight	  people	  in	  the	  RS2	  phase	  of	  the	  project.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  a	  task	  was	  added	  to	  the	  process,	  parallel	  to	  the	  product	  requirements	  assessment	  and	  following	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off:	  	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  discussion	  with	  the	  sales	  teams,	  negotiating	  with	  each	  market	  vertical	  sales	  team	  the	  sales	  volume	  target	  that	  it	  would	  sign	  up	  to	  as	  and	  when	  the	  new	  value	  proposition	  was	  launched.	  	  The	  intention	  of	  this	  change	  in	  the	  process	  was	  to	  build	  on	  the	  success	  the	  RS1	  process	  had	  enjoyed	  in	  building	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  sales	  teams.	  	  This	  change	  had	  a	  second	  effect,	  which	  was	  that	  during	  the	  RS2	  process,	  there	  were	  no	  “push	  backs”	  from	  the	  product	  line	  managers	  to	  accepting	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  market	  requirements	  sign-­‐off.	  	  This	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  an	  intended,	  designed-­‐in	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  process	  change,	  but	  it	  is	  at	  least	  suggestive	  to	  note	  that	  in	  my	  interviews	  with	  product	  line	  managers,	  the	  point	  was	  raised	  several	  times	  that	  if	  the	  sales	  team	  was	  willing	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  a	  target,	  that	  it	  was	  much	  more	  contentious	  for	  a	  product	  line	  manager	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  value	  proposition	  would	  not	  find	  an	  audience.	  	  As	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  there	  were	  at	  least	  partially	  common	  exogenous	  reasons	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  innovations	  launched	  in	  RS2,	  it	  is	  speculative	  to	  consider	  the	  effect	  this	  may	  have	  had	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  RapidStart	  process	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  question	  is	  intriguing:	  	  was	  it	  helpful	  to	  the	  innovation	  process	  to	  use	  the	  apparent	  endorsement	  of	  sales	  teams	  to	  ‘push	  through’	  more	  innovations?	  	  Or	  did	  this	  represent	  the	  removal	  of	  an	  important	  quality	  filter	  in	  the	  process?	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It	  was	  observable	  that	  the	  smaller	  workgroup	  controlling	  RS2	  carried	  with	  it	  some	  negative	  implications.	  	  As	  well	  as	  the	  point	  which	  has	  already	  been	  noted,	  that	  the	  overall	  diversity	  of	  ties,	  and	  therefore	  the	  opportunity	  for	  boundary-­‐spanning	  using	  pre-­‐existing	  ties,	  was	  lower	  with	  a	  central	  group	  of	  eight	  than	  with	  a	  group	  of	  25,	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  designated	  controlling	  authors	  was	  also	  much	  smaller,	  with	  many	  controlling	  authors	  taking	  forward	  half	  a	  dozen	  proposals	  through	  the	  process	  rather	  than	  one	  or	  two.	  	  This	  led	  to	  prioritisation	  behaviours	  by	  the	  work	  group	  members	  (cf	  Hansen	  and	  Haas	  2001),	  who	  had	  to	  make	  choices	  about	  to	  which	  project	  to	  devote	  their	  time	  and	  pin	  their	  social	  capital-­‐building	  efforts.	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Propositions	  Some	  findings	  and	  resulting	  new	  theoretical	  propositions,	  to	  be	  tested	  through	  other	  studies	  and	  research	  methods,	  demonstrate	  the	  significance	  of	  examining	  micropractices	  and	  the	  innovation	  process	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time.	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Proposition	  1a.	  	  Innovation	  teams	  whose	  leader	  is	  identified	  with	  a	  different	  organisational	  domain	  than	  the	  domain	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  team’s	  idea,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  gain	  political	  support	  than	  those	  whose	  leader	  is	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  idea,	  or	  those	  whose	  leader	  is	  identified	  with	  the	  same	  organisational	  domain	  as	  is	  the	  team’s	  idea,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  Proposition	  1b.	  	  Innovation	  teams	  whose	  leader	  is	  identified	  with	  a	  different	  organisational	  domain	  than	  the	  domain	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  team’s	  idea	  are	  more	  able	  to	  successfully	  translate	  the	  knowledge	  from	  their	  own	  domain	  needed	  for	  the	  innovation	  to	  succeed,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  Proposition	  2.	  	  When	  multiple	  bridges	  from	  the	  innovation	  team	  to	  a	  particular	  organisational	  domain	  exist,	  it	  stimulates	  competitive	  behaviour	  between	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  team	  to	  provide	  useful	  access	  to	  information	  and	  resources,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  	  Proposition	  3a.	  	  Longer	  time	  for	  an	  innovation	  process	  allows	  more	  effective	  and	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  an	  innovation	  team	  identifying	  and	  building	  wholly	  new	  connections	  to	  needed	  resources	  and	  knowledge,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  Proposition	  3b.	  	  Longer	  time	  for	  an	  innovation	  process	  reduces	  urgency,	  which	  reduces	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  likelihood	  of	  an	  innovation	  team	  identifying	  and	  building	  wholly	  new	  connections	  to	  needed	  resources	  and	  knowledge,	  leading	  to	  less	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  Proposition	  3c.	  	  Shorter	  time	  for	  an	  innovation	  process	  increases	  urgency,	  which	  increases	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  likelihood	  of	  an	  innovation	  team	  using	  existing	  connections	  to	  needed	  resources	  and	  knowledge,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  	  Taken	  together,	  propositions	  2	  and	  3a-­‐3c	  support	  the	  “network	  component	  diversity	  theory”	  advanced	  by	  Fleming	  King	  and	  Juda	  as	  to	  why	  small	  world	  networks	  work,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  path	  length	  theory.	  	  Proposition	  2	  accords	  with	  what	  is	  known	  about	  the	  power	  of	  brokers	  and	  gatekeepers,	  but	  suggests	  that	  the	  countervailing	  effect	  of	  building	  multiple	  bridges	  to	  a	  domain	  does	  more	  than	  simply	  defuse	  the	  blocking	  power	  of	  a	  structural	  hole-­‐guarding	  gatekeeper,	  it	  actually	  promotes	  fruitful	  exchange	  with	  the	  domain.	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Proposition	  4a.	  	  Where	  innovation	  team	  members	  are	  working	  only	  part-­‐time	  on	  an	  innovation	  and	  have	  other	  job	  roles	  to	  perform,	  they	  will	  have	  more	  active	  network	  connections	  in	  other	  domains	  and	  will	  be	  able	  to	  call	  on	  these	  for	  needed	  information	  and	  resources	  more	  effectively,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  Proposition	  4b.	  	  Where	  innovation	  team	  members	  are	  working	  only	  part-­‐time	  on	  the	  innovation	  and	  have	  other	  job	  roles	  to	  perform,	  they	  will	  be	  less	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  perform	  needed	  boundary	  spanning	  actions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  team,	  leading	  to	  less	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  The	  effects	  described	  by	  Proposition	  4b	  are	  attributable	  both	  to	  the	  reduced	  time	  available	  (Hansen	  &	  Haas,	  2001)	  and	  to	  reduced	  willingness	  to	  “expend”	  social	  capital	  on	  the	  project	  (e.g.,	  by	  calling	  in	  past	  reciprocal	  obligations)	  when	  it	  is	  a	  part-­‐time,	  and	  likely	  a	  transient	  one.	  	  	  	  However,	  considering	  only	  the	  question	  of	  time	  and	  prioritisation,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  of	  the	  four	  types	  of	  boundary-­‐spanning	  behaviour	  for	  innovation	  teams	  identified	  by	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell,	  scouting	  and	  ambassador	  behaviours	  require	  less	  time	  than	  co-­‐ordinator	  and	  guard	  activities.	  	  In	  the	  observations	  made	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  the	  former	  two	  require	  single	  or	  occasional	  conversations,	  while	  the	  latter	  are	  ongoing	  tasks	  of	  negotiation	  and	  persistent	  discussions	  with	  alters.	  	  	  Therefore:	  Proposition	  5.	  	  Where	  innovation	  team	  members	  carry	  out	  ambassador	  and	  guard	  types	  of	  boundary-­‐spanning	  activities,	  it	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  success	  of	  their	  efforts	  if	  the	  contacts	  with	  whom	  they	  perform	  the	  activities	  are	  informal,	  relationally	  embedded	  contacts,	  leading	  to	  greater	  success	  for	  the	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  These	  two	  types	  of	  innovation	  team	  boundary	  spanning	  activities	  often	  require	  requests	  for	  exceptions	  from	  rules	  or	  normal	  procedures,	  and	  are	  therefore	  more	  effectively	  carried	  out	  with	  contacts	  where	  there	  is	  more	  than	  a	  formal,	  hierarchical	  or	  lateral	  relationship.	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  DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  	  The	  study	  of	  networks	  is	  flourishing.	  	  The	  study	  of	  behaviour	  in	  networks	  is	  much	  less	  developed.	  	  By	  considering	  the	  innovation	  team,	  its	  behaviour	  and	  the	  behaviour’s	  apparent	  consequences	  for	  success,	  this	  paper	  makes	  its	  most	  significant	  contribution	  through	  its	  effort	  to	  unveil	  relationships	  and	  mechanisms	  at	  work	  in	  organisations	  conditioned	  by	  networks	  and	  their	  constituent	  agents.	  	  The	  individual	  propositions	  advanced	  are	  of	  interest	  and	  make	  their	  own	  contributions—but,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  methodological	  difficulty,	  exploring	  the	  connections	  over	  time	  between	  individuals,	  teams,	  their	  (individual	  and	  team)	  networks	  and	  the	  success	  of	  their	  efforts	  is	  rarely	  tried.	  	  This	  is	  going	  to	  have	  to	  change	  if	  we	  are	  to	  develop	  theory	  to	  help	  practitioners	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  network	  context.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  	  A	  brief	  reflection	  on	  Chapter	  2:	  	  Not	  an	  Apologia	  	  As	  briefly	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  (extensive)	  fieldwork	  for	  Chapter	  2	  was	  carried	  out	  six	  years	  ago,	  at	  the	  very	  outset	  of	  my	  PhD	  studies.	  	  	  While	  I	  believe	  the	  propositions	  advanced	  above	  are	  well-­‐grounded	  in	  the	  data	  I	  was	  able	  to	  gather,	  the	  study	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  limited	  by	  three	  factors:	  	  -­‐-­‐the	  sudden	  and	  unanticipated	  end	  of	  the	  RS2	  process,	  shortly	  followed	  by	  my	  principal	  sponsor	  being	  reassigned,	  and	  then	  made	  redundant,	  limited	  my	  ability	  to	  follow	  up	  with	  team	  members	  to	  fill	  in	  “holes”	  in	  the	  data	  and	  reach	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  precision	  in	  my	  ability	  to	  compare	  and	  contrast	  the	  case	  data.	  	  Colleagues	  in	  the	  firm	  were	  warm	  and	  even	  kind	  in	  response	  to	  my	  requests	  for	  more	  data	  and	  additional	  interview	  time,	  but	  unconvinced	  of	  the	  value	  of	  providing	  retrospective	  data	  about	  a	  dead	  and	  “failed”	  project—many	  were	  keen	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  their	  involvement.	  	  -­‐-­‐I	  had	  not	  yet	  reviewed	  the	  innovation	  management	  literature	  or	  the	  networks	  literature	  in	  depth.	  	  Some	  review	  went	  on	  in	  parallel	  with	  the	  fieldwork.	  	  -­‐-­‐I	  was	  inadequately	  systematic	  about	  considering	  my	  level	  and	  unit	  of	  analysis	  before	  the	  study,	  and	  believed	  for	  a	  time	  that	  my	  primary	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  the	  innovations	  and	  their	  success	  or	  failure,	  rather	  than	  the	  people/teams	  and	  their	  behaviour.	  	  Early	  drafts	  of	  this	  study	  attempted	  a	  detailed	  matching	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  technologies	  involved	  in	  the	  value	  proposition	  innovation	  with	  the	  background	  of	  the	  team	  members,	  for	  example,	  and	  I	  placed	  a	  deal	  of	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significance	  on	  the	  data	  I	  had	  about	  sales	  figures,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  these	  data	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  generative.	  	  Based	  on	  this	  experience,	  I	  came	  to	  a	  view	  during	  2010-­‐11	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  do	  grounded	  theory	  had	  served	  me	  badly	  and	  that	  the	  study,	  despite	  the	  extensive	  and	  interesting	  data	  collected,	  had	  “failed”.	  	  	  I	  did	  not,	  at	  that	  time,	  advance	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  forming	  the	  propositions	  that	  close	  the	  study.	  	  However,	  over	  time	  I	  came	  to	  see	  that	  perhaps	  the	  study	  had	  been	  significantly	  generative,	  in	  three	  ways.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  contribution	  to	  the	  conceptual	  study	  (in	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  thesis)	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  exposure	  to	  a	  live	  innovation	  setting,	  and	  a	  continued	  circle	  of	  reflection	  on	  the	  data	  as	  I	  became	  fully	  immersed	  in	  the	  networks	  literature.	  	  Secondly,	  when	  I	  entered	  the	  field	  again	  (for	  the	  study	  which	  is	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  thesis)	  I	  had	  a	  much	  clearer	  view	  of	  how	  to	  iterate	  between	  theory	  and	  data	  than	  I	  would	  have	  had	  if	  I	  had	  never	  ‘failed’	  with	  this	  study,	  and	  I	  believe	  the	  resulting	  study	  and	  its	  propositions	  are	  much	  stronger	  as	  a	  result.	  	  Finally,	  when	  I	  returned	  to	  the	  data	  for	  Chapter	  2	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2013,	  listening	  to	  interview	  recordings	  again,	  revisiting	  the	  coding	  I	  had	  done	  in	  2009,	  and	  trying	  to	  understand	  where	  the	  data	  might	  still	  be	  generative	  for	  theory,	  I	  saw	  that	  in	  some	  significant	  ways,	  the	  data,	  however	  imperfect	  I	  had	  thought	  it	  in	  2010,	  was	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rich	  in	  context	  and	  would	  underpin	  some	  theoretically	  significant	  propositions	  that	  address	  a	  gap	  which	  still	  remains	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  action	  by	  teams	  intersects	  with	  their	  networks.	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Chapter	  4:	  	  BUSINESS	  MODEL	  INNOVATION:	  A	  TEAM-­‐BASED	  APPROACH	  	  An	  earlier	  draft	  was	  co-­‐authored	  by	  Barkema,	  H.G.;	  Coleridge,	  C.;	  Qin,	  F.;	  Smit,	  J;	  Stam,	  D.	  A.	  	  This	  has	  been	  updated	  by	  the	  present	  author	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  integration	  into	  this	  thesis.	  	  
Abstract	  	  This	  paper	  offers	  new	  theory	  on	  the	  rapidly	  emerging	  field	  of	  Business	  Model	  Innovation	  (BMI),	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  the	  responsible	  team.	  Specifically,	  we	  develop	  propositions	  on	  how	  and	  why	  leadership	  styles,	  in	  themselves	  and	  combined	  with	  the	  social	  networks	  of	  the	  team,	  influence	  performance,	  and	  how	  these	  mechanisms	  differ	  across	  the	  concept	  and	  development	  stages	  of	  BMI.	  Through	  our	  TIMOTI	  model,	  we	  go	  on	  to	  make	  our	  theory	  fully	  dynamic,	  conceptualizing	  how	  and	  why	  BMI	  team	  characteristics	  and	  performance	  at	  the	  concept	  stage	  influence	  similar	  variables	  at	  the	  development	  stage,	  implying	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  trajectory.	  As	  most	  current	  papers	  on	  business	  models	  examine	  
what	  influences	  performance	  and	  how,	  but	  not	  why	  (cf.	  Whetten,	  1989),	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  proposed	  new	  theoretical	  logic	  for	  studying	  BMI	  is	  both	  timely	  and	  adds	  to	  broader	  innovation	  management	  theory.	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Business	  model	  innovation	  is	  of	  rising	  importance	  in	  practice.	  For	  companies	  in	  the	  West,	  and	  those	  serving	  upper	  and	  middle	  classes	  in	  emerging	  economies,	  this	  is	  driven	  by	  more	  dynamic	  global	  competitive	  conditions,	  rapidly	  advancing	  technology,	  and	  increasingly	  knowledgeable	  customers.	  Senior	  executives	  of	  these	  companies	  increasingly	  appear	  to	  see	  business	  model	  innovation	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  competitive	  advantage,	  more	  so	  than	  product	  or	  process	  innovation	  (IBM,	  2008).	  Meanwhile,	  at	  the	  “economic	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid,”	  (Prahalad,	  2010),	  new	  business	  models	  are	  beginning	  to	  enable	  companies,	  social	  enterprises	  and	  NGOs	  to	  succeed	  economically	  while	  creating	  social	  value	  for	  new	  clients	  in	  sectors	  such	  as	  mobile	  banking,	  health	  care,	  and	  solar	  energy	  (George	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  	  The	  rise	  of	  a	  new	  management	  practice,	  such	  as	  earlier	  Total	  Quality	  Management,	  Business	  Process	  Outsourcing,	  or	  Six	  Sigma,	  is	  often	  marked	  by	  enthusiastic	  contributions	  aimed	  at	  practitioners,	  after	  which	  more	  neutral,	  research-­‐oriented	  publications	  emerge	  (Abrahamson,	  1996;	  Abrahamson	  &	  Fairchild,	  1999).	  Business	  model	  innovation	  (BMI)	  is	  no	  exception.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  early	  stages,	  where	  practical	  benefits	  are	  emphasized,	  with	  research	  gradually	  following.	  Practical	  and	  initial	  research	  contributions	  alike	  typically	  focus	  on	  the	  
design	  of	  new	  business	  models:	  	  on	  which	  components	  or	  activity	  systems	  contribute	  to	  success	  (for	  instance,	  a	  customer	  value	  proposition,	  a	  revenue	  model,	  resources,	  assets,	  distribution	  channels,	  and	  partners	  (Magretta,	  2002;	  Morris	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Mitchell	  &	  Coles,	  2004;	  Tikkanen	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Chesbrough,	  2007;	  Fiet	  &	  Patel,	  2008;	  Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Zott	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Baden-­‐Fuller	  &	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Morgan,	  2010;	  Casadesus-­‐Masanell	  &	  Ricart,	  2010;	  Chesbrough;	  2010;	  	  Teece,	  2010;	  George	  &	  Bock,	  2011.))	  	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  theoretical	  contribution	  (Whetten,	  1989),	  management	  researchers	  need	  not	  only	  to	  address	  the	  questions	  of	  “what?“	  (i.e.,	  which	  variables)	  influences	  BMI	  performance;	  and	  “how?”	  (i.e.,	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship),	  but	  also	  why?,	  i.e.,	  offer	  a	  theoretical	  logic	  for	  these	  relationships.	  While	  the	  above	  studies	  discuss	  what	  influences	  success	  (e.g.,	  a	  value	  proposition,	  a	  revenue	  model)	  and	  how	  (e.g.,	  a	  positive	  relationship;	  or,	  that	  multiple	  components	  are	  needed	  in	  combination	  for	  success,	  Morris	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  they	  typically	  do	  not	  extensively	  address	  the	  ‘why’.	  	  They	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  (new)	  theoretical	  logic	  for	  the	  relationships,	  which	  in	  Whetten’s	  terms	  means	  they	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  significant	  theoretical	  contribution.	  Furthermore,	  the	  analyses	  within	  the	  above	  papers	  are	  quite	  static;	  they	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  influences	  the	  outcomes	  of	  BMI,	  not	  the	  process	  of	  BMI.	  Our	  work	  aims	  to	  address	  these	  gaps.	  	  We	  examine	  the	  setting	  of	  an	  established	  organization,	  such	  as	  a	  multinational	  corporation,	  or	  an	  established	  social	  enterprise	  or	  NGO,	  developing	  a	  new	  business	  model.	  We	  adopt	  a	  micro-­‐approach	  to	  study	  the	  process	  of	  BMI,	  focusing	  on	  the	  team	  responsible	  for	  the	  BMI.	  Teams	  are	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  modern	  organizations	  (Kozlowski	  &	  Bell,	  2003).	  Our	  approach	  is	  anchored	  in	  –	  and	  combines	  insights	  of	  –	  innovation	  management	  (Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992),	  social	  psychology	  of	  teams	  and	  leadership	  (Ilgen	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Lord	  &	  Brown,	  2004;	  Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1993)	  and	  social	  network	  theory	  (Oh	  et	  al.,	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2004;	  Kilduff	  &	  Brass,	  2010).	  We	  develop	  new	  theory	  and	  propositions	  on	  which	  types	  of	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  styles	  contribute	  to	  BMI	  performance,	  and	  how	  this	  differs	  across	  stages	  (i.e.,	  concept	  and	  development	  stage)	  for	  successful	  BMI.	  We	  also	  make	  our	  theory	  dynamic,	  implying	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  trajectory	  where	  team	  characteristics	  (e.g.,	  leadership,	  social	  networks)	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  influence	  those	  same	  variables	  –	  and	  ultimately	  BMI	  performance	  –	  in	  the	  development	  stage	  in	  predictable	  ways.	  	  	  	  We	  believe	  we	  offer	  several	  theoretical	  contributions.	  First,	  we	  offer	  a	  novel	  theoretical	  approach	  for	  the	  emerging	  field	  of	  BMI	  by	  conceptualizing	  BMI	  as	  a	  team-­‐based,	  path-­‐dependent	  process.	  Given	  that	  the	  field	  is	  currently	  taking	  off,	  we	  believe	  offering	  such	  novel	  theory	  is	  quite	  timely	  (cf.	  Abrahamson,	  1996;	  Abrahamson	  &	  Fairchild,	  1999).	  	  We	  believe	  our	  theory	  adds	  to	  the	  broader	  innovation	  literature	  as	  well.	  Previously,	  researchers	  in	  corporate	  venturing	  (Galbraith,	  1982;	  Burgelman,	  1983a,	  b;	  Cornelissen	  &	  Clarke,	  2010)	  and	  the	  ambidexterity	  literature	  (O’Reilly	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  have	  also	  studied	  how	  new	  ventures	  emerge	  in	  established	  organizations,	  sometimes	  studying	  process	  and	  using	  rich	  case	  study	  analysis	  (Burgelman,	  1983a,	  b;	  Garud	  &	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  1992).	  The	  idea	  of	  process	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  ambidexterity	  literature	  (Gibson	  &	  Birkinshaw,	  2004;	  Raisch	  &	  Birkinshaw,	  2008;	  O’Reilly	  &	  Tushman,	  2008).	  	  None	  of	  these	  literatures	  however	  examined	  the	  micro-­‐processes,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  BMI	  team,	  of	  how	  and	  why	  internal	  team	  factors	  (e.g.,	  types	  of	  leadership)	  interact	  with	  external	  team	  factors	  (types	  of	  social	  networks,	  with	  whom,	  and	  for	  what)	  to	  influence	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performance,	  and	  how	  this	  varies	  across	  stages	  of	  BMI.	  Hence,	  our	  new	  theory	  complements	  these	  existing	  research	  streams.	  	  	  Our	  theory	  also	  builds	  new	  links	  between	  social	  network	  theory	  and	  social	  psychology.	  For	  instance,	  social	  network	  theorists	  earlier	  examined	  which	  types	  of	  networks	  facilitate	  innovation	  (Uzzi	  &	  Spiro,	  2005;	  Reagans	  &	  McEvily	  2003;	  Reagans	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  However,	  as	  Kilduff	  and	  Brass	  (2010)	  recently	  emphasized,	  social	  network	  theory	  tends	  to	  ignore	  “human	  agency.”	  Perhaps	  our	  new	  theory	  on	  how	  and	  why	  specific	  leadership	  styles	  motivate	  team	  members	  to	  better	  use	  their	  social	  networks,	  is	  one	  promising	  avenue	  to	  fill	  this	  gap.	  	  	  Our	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  We	  first	  discuss	  why	  leadership	  and	  social	  networks	  are	  important	  for	  BMI.	  Then	  we	  develop	  new	  theory	  and	  propositions	  on	  how	  and	  why	  different	  types	  of	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  influence	  BMI	  performance,	  and	  how	  this	  changes	  when	  moving	  from	  the	  concept	  stage	  to	  the	  development	  stage.	  Next	  we	  make	  the	  theory	  dynamic,	  on	  how	  and	  why	  team	  variables	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  (leadership,	  social	  networks,	  identity,	  etc.)	  influence	  those	  same	  variables	  in	  the	  development	  stage,	  conceptualizing	  BMI	  as	  a	  team-­‐based,	  path-­‐dependent	  process.	  We	  end	  with	  conclusions	  and	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research.	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SETTING	  THE	  STAGE	  
BMI	  Uncertainty	  and	  Complexity	  From	  a	  behavioural	  perspective,	  BMI	  means	  the	  act	  of	  designing	  and	  implementing	  a	  new	  business	  model.	  The	  business	  model	  literature	  focuses	  on	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  components	  which	  are	  argued	  to	  be	  important	  for	  success;	  however,	  recent	  convergence	  points	  to	  a	  business	  model	  requiring	  a	  value	  proposition,	  a	  revenue	  or	  profit	  model,	  key	  processes	  and	  resources,	  a	  distribution	  channel,	  and	  partners,	  where	  each	  component	  needs	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  with	  their	  combined	  functioning	  in	  mind	  (Magretta,	  2002;	  Morris	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Mitchell	  &	  Coles,	  2004;	  Tikkanen	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Chesbrough,	  2007;	  Fiet	  &	  Patel,	  2008;	  Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Zott	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Baden-­‐Fuller	  &	  Morgan,	  2010;	  Casadesus-­‐Masanell	  &	  Ricart,	  2010;	  Chesbrough;	  2010;	  Teece,	  2010;	  George	  &	  Bock,	  2011).	  Business	  model	  innovation	  occurs	  when	  a	  firm	  changes	  multiple	  components	  of	  its	  business	  model	  (often	  in	  combination),	  for	  instance,	  as	  compared	  to	  how	  business	  models	  have	  previously	  been	  used	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  	  Going	  beyond	  a	  company’s	  current	  activities	  implies	  substantial	  uncertainty	  (Daft	  &	  Lengel,	  1986;	  Garud	  &	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  1992;	  Stone	  &	  Brush,	  1996;	  Forbes,	  1999).	  Team	  members	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  the	  process	  will	  lead	  to	  success	  (March	  &	  Olsen,	  1976;	  Mintzberg	  et	  al.,	  1976;	  Weick,	  1979;	  Ghemawat,	  1991).	  They	  may	  be	  uncertain	  about	  what	  the	  value	  proposition	  will	  be,	  which	  technology	  should	  be	  used,	  whether	  there	  will	  be	  demand	  for	  the	  new	  product	  or	  service,	  and	  with	  whom	  to	  partner.	  There	  may	  also	  be	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  the	  tasks	  and	  roles	  of	  individual	  team	  members	  will	  be,	  and	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  work	  for	  each	  other,	  or	  whether	  conflict	  or,	  more	  subtly,	  giving	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priority	  to	  other,	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  is	  more	  likely.	  They	  may	  also	  be	  uncertain	  about	  whether	  the	  team	  will	  be	  get	  the	  necessary	  resources	  (information,	  money,	  people,	  technology)	  from	  the	  organization	  to	  develop	  the	  new	  business	  model	  and,	  at	  the	  earliest	  stages,	  whether	  there	  will	  be	  a	  capable	  team	  and	  leader	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  All	  of	  this	  is	  important	  for	  team	  members,	  as	  the	  eventual	  fate	  of	  the	  BMI	  may	  boost	  or	  blot	  individual	  careers.	  	  	  BMI	  is	  complex	  (Levinthal,	  2002)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  one	  component	  (e.g.,	  a	  value	  proposition,	  or	  revenue	  model,	  or	  alliance	  with	  partners,	  or	  distribution	  channels)	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  new	  venture,	  depends	  on	  other	  components.	  This	  interdependence	  sets	  BMI	  apart	  from	  other	  types	  of	  innovation,	  such	  as	  process	  or	  product	  innovations,	  which	  are	  typically	  more	  bounded	  within	  existing	  firm	  capacities.	  The	  contribution	  of	  one	  team	  member	  to	  BMI	  success	  depends	  on	  those	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  contribution	  of	  internal	  team	  members	  depends	  on	  external	  team	  members.	  This	  adds	  further	  uncertainty	  to	  the	  BMI	  process	  as	  well,	  as	  a	  non-­‐aligned	  team	  members	  may	  disproportionally	  hamper	  BMI	  performance.	  	  	  Below	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  are	  key	  under	  these	  conditions	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity.	  	  
	  
Social	  Networks	  BMI	  often	  includes	  financial,	  operational,	  technological,	  and	  marketing	  and	  sales	  aspects,	  which	  requires	  a	  multifunctional	  team.	  Team	  members	  are	  required	  to	  source,	  share	  and	  combine	  information	  and	  other	  resources	  from	  outside	  the	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team,	  in	  interaction	  with	  others	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization	  (e.g.,	  partners,	  suppliers,	  distributors).	  Typically,	  a	  variety	  of	  intangible	  (e.g.,	  information)	  and	  tangible	  resources	  are	  needed,	  for	  which	  political	  or	  “ambassadorial”	  support	  from	  within	  the	  organization	  is	  important	  (Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992).	  For	  all	  of	  this,	  a	  team’s	  social	  networks	  are	  vital	  (Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992;	  Oh	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  2006).	  	  	  Important	  intangible	  resources	  for	  innovators	  include	  information	  about	  new	  customers	  and	  markets	  (Slater	  &	  Narver,	  1995;	  Von	  Hippel,	  1986;	  Prahalad	  &	  Ramaswamy,	  2004);	  organisational	  and	  partner	  capabilities,	  technology	  and	  resource	  availability	  (Leonard-­‐Barton,	  1995;	  Prahalad	  &	  Krishnan,	  2008);	  ‘know	  how’	  or	  process	  information	  (Nonaka	  &	  Takeuchi,	  1995;	  Van	  de	  Ven	  et	  al.,	  1999);	  ‘know	  who’	  or	  contact	  knowledge	  for	  experts,	  influencers,	  brokers	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organisation	  (Nadler	  &	  Tushman,	  1997),	  as	  well	  as	  information	  about	  their	  priorities,	  allegiances	  and	  preferences	  (Tsai	  &	  Ghoshal,	  1998).	  	  Especially	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage,	  the	  group	  typically	  needs	  substantial	  tangible	  resources	  as	  well:	  money,	  staff	  and	  access	  to	  technology.	  These	  intangible	  and	  tangible	  resources	  may	  be	  obtained	  from	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  parties	  within	  the	  organization	  (from	  R&D,	  the	  marketing	  department,	  other	  businesses),	  and	  from	  outside	  (e.g.,	  partners	  or	  lead	  clients).	  	  	  The	  central	  role	  played	  by	  intangible	  resources	  in	  product	  and	  process	  innovation	  has	  meant	  that	  comparatively	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  in	  the	  innovation	  management	  literature	  to	  the	  flows	  of	  tangible	  resources	  to	  innovation	  projects	  (Bueno	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  an	  assumption	  of	  some	  of	  the	  few	  
62 of 191 
investigations	  that	  have	  been	  done	  (e.g.,	  Parthasarthy	  &	  Hammond,	  2002)	  is	  that	  resource	  investment,	  in	  R&D-­‐intensive	  innovation,	  is	  frontloaded.	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  true	  for	  BMI,	  which	  does	  not	  necessarily	  rely	  on	  basic	  R&D	  advances,	  while	  typically	  substantial	  tangible	  resources	  are	  needed	  for	  the	  development	  (e.g.,	  prototypes,	  pilots)	  of	  the	  new	  product	  or	  service,	  logistics,	  distribution	  channels,	  relationships	  with	  partners,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  These	  resources	  are	  easier	  to	  secure	  if	  these	  parties	  are	  aware	  of	  –	  or	  influenced	  by	  –	  political	  support	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  BMI	  team	  (March,	  1962;	  Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992;	  Van	  de	  Ven	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Kanter,	  2000).	  	  Political	  support	  is	  necessary	  to	  anchor	  the	  innovation	  in	  the	  organization:	  to	  open	  doors	  to	  its	  capabilities	  and	  tangible	  resources,	  to	  develop	  a	  legitimate	  place	  within	  the	  firm’s	  portfolio	  of	  activities	  (Anand	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  to	  withstand	  pressure	  from	  elements	  within	  the	  organization	  that	  are	  disrupted	  by	  the	  change	  the	  BMI	  represents.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  if	  the	  BMI	  goes	  against	  the	  dominant	  logic	  of	  an	  organization’s	  leading	  coalition	  (Prahalad	  &	  Bettis,	  1986,	  Covin	  &	  Miles,	  2007).	  In	  fact,	  all	  four	  of	  Prahalad	  and	  Bettis’	  original	  dimensions	  of	  dominant	  logic	  may	  be	  challenged	  by	  (successful)	  BMI:	  the	  firm’s	  competitive	  strategy	  and	  its	  measures	  of	  performance,	  and	  the	  values/expectations	  and	  reinforced	  behaviour	  of	  its	  managers.	  	  Thus,	  compared	  to	  ‘normal’	  product	  or	  service	  innovations,	  BMI	  is	  even	  more	  dependent	  on	  the	  explicit	  sponsorship	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  managers	  in	  order	  to	  legitimize	  its	  development	  and	  its	  effort	  to	  source	  intangible	  and	  tangible	  resources.	  The	  sponsorship	  of	  senior	  managers	  may	  be	  channelled	  through	  a	  champion	  (Burgelman,	  1983a,	  b;	  Nadler	  &	  Tushman,	  1997;	  Markham,	  2000,	  Howell	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  The	  champion	  may	  also	  be	  the	  workgroup	  leader,	  but	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as	  the	  name	  implies,	  the	  function	  of	  the	  champion	  is	  to	  canvass	  support	  and	  perform	  the	  ambassadorial	  (Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992)	  boundary	  spanning	  tasks	  required	  to	  build	  support	  beyond	  the	  organisational	  span	  of	  the	  project’s	  explicit	  sponsor,	  and	  so	  may	  include	  other,	  for	  instance,	  higher	  level	  managers	  in	  the	  organization	  as	  well.	  	  	  
Leadership	  The	  BMI	  task	  implies	  much	  uncertainty,	  especially	  at	  early	  stages.	  Moreover,	  multifunctional	  or	  diverse	  teams	  are	  needed,	  which	  are	  known	  to	  be	  conflict-­‐prone	  (Jehn,	  1995),	  yet	  due	  to	  the	  interdependency	  of	  tasks,	  success	  depends	  on	  team	  members’	  individual	  motivation	  and	  cooperation,	  for	  sourcing,	  sharing	  and	  combining	  information	  and	  other	  resources.	  Leadership	  is	  particularly	  effective	  if	  a	  task	  is	  challenging	  and	  if	  conditions	  or	  directions	  are	  uncertain,	  if	  short-­‐term	  results	  cannot	  be	  measured	  and	  monetized	  through	  financial	  rewards,	  or	  when	  faith	  or	  moral	  convictions	  of	  team	  members	  can	  be	  mobilized	  (Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  These	  are	  precisely	  the	  conditions	  that	  are	  present	  in	  the	  case	  of	  BMI.	  	  	  Leadership	  is	  a	  core	  function	  in	  innovation	  teams,	  and	  also	  in	  BMI	  teams.	  For	  instance,	  Clark	  and	  Wheelwright	  (1992)	  in	  their	  classical	  taxonomy	  of	  innovation	  team	  structures	  argued	  that	  in	  team	  structures	  most	  suitable	  for	  radical	  innovations	  –	  heavyweight	  team	  structures	  and	  autonomous	  team	  structures	  –	  leaders	  have	  a	  central	  role.	  Several	  scholars	  have	  indeed	  argued	  that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  innovation	  lies	  squarely	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  leaders	  (Jansen	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Smith	  &	  Tushman,	  2005).	  Considering	  the	  complex	  and	  uncertain	  nature	  of	  BMI,	  we	  believe	  that	  leadership	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  BMI	  process.	  	  
64 of 191 
	  Leaders	  may	  influence	  followers	  by	  what	  they	  say	  (e.g.,	  vision	  or	  goal	  communication)	  and	  by	  what	  they	  do	  (e.g.,	  role	  modelling	  or	  rewarding;	  Bass,	  1985;	  Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Howell	  &	  Higgins,	  1990).	  Both	  types	  of	  behaviours	  may	  reduce	  uncertainty	  by	  giving	  direction	  and	  cues	  about	  what	  is	  acceptable	  or	  desirable	  behaviour	  from	  followers.	  By	  clarifying	  (long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term)	  directions,	  leaders	  may	  help	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  choose	  which	  network	  ties	  to	  use,	  with	  whom,	  for	  what;	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  information	  and	  other	  resources	  need	  to	  be	  sourced,	  shared	  and	  combined	  within	  the	  team	  to	  design	  and	  implement	  the	  business	  model.	  What	  leaders	  communicate	  and	  what	  they	  do	  may	  also	  strengthen	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  group	  (van	  Knippenberg	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  van	  Knippenberg	  &	  Hogg,	  2003),	  motivating	  team	  members	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  its	  success.	  	  
Stages	  of	  BMI	  Initially,	  a	  core	  innovation	  group	  will	  often	  not	  be	  composed	  entirely	  of	  full-­‐time	  members	  (Edmondson	  &	  Nembhard,	  2009).	  	  Even	  a	  group	  with	  full	  time	  staff	  members	  will	  often	  rely	  on	  a	  fringe	  of	  part-­‐time	  resources	  for	  whose	  attention	  and	  priority	  they	  must	  compete.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  group	  members	  will	  prioritise	  (Hansen	  &	  Haas,	  2001)	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  they	  are	  able	  to	  devote	  to	  the	  innovation	  project	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  duties.	  	  However,	  at	  later	  stages	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  organization	  for	  the	  new	  business	  model	  may	  emerge.	  In	  fact,	  in	  many	  established	  organizations,	  the	  BMI	  process	  is	  broken	  down	  into	  smaller	  steps,	  stages,	  or	  milestones,	  often	  with	  deliverables	  at	  each	  stage.	  However,	  although	  the	  venturing	  literature	  suggests	  that	  multiple	  stages	  exist,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  lack	  of	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consensus	  regarding	  the	  terms	  or	  labels	  for	  stages,	  or	  indeed	  the	  number	  of	  stages.	  	  	  Burgelman	  (1983a,b),	  for	  instance,	  uses	  four	  stages	  of	  venture	  development:	  conceptual,	  pre-­‐venture,	  entrepreneurial,	  and	  organizational.	  Garud	  and	  van	  de	  Ven	  (1992)	  describe	  the	  agenda	  setting	  period,	  expansion	  period,	  and	  contraction	  period.	  Bhave	  (1994)	  outlines	  three	  stages	  as	  well:	  the	  opportunity	  stage,	  the	  technology	  step	  and	  the	  organizational	  creation	  phase.	  Kazanjian	  and	  Drazin	  (1990)	  viewed	  the	  progression	  of	  stages	  as	  reflections	  of	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  a	  venture	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  its	  development.	  In	  fact,	  stages,	  depending	  on	  the	  organization	  can	  be	  more	  discrete	  (Zaltman	  et	  al.,	  1973)	  or	  more	  fluid.	  	  The	  labels	  and	  delineation	  of	  stages	  of	  BMI	  differ	  from	  one	  organization	  to	  the	  next	  (Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987)	  and	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  from	  project	  to	  project.	  	  	  However,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  about	  the	  number	  of	  stages	  or	  how	  to	  delineate	  them,	  what	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  literature	  is	  that	  stages	  do	  exist,	  each	  with	  a	  different	  set	  of	  tasks,	  activities	  and	  challenges.	  Hence,	  below	  we	  will	  assume	  that	  at	  least	  two	  stages	  exist	  in	  BMI,	  which	  we	  will	  label	  the	  concept	  stage	  and	  the	  development	  stage,	  and	  we	  will	  show	  how	  and	  why	  leadership	  and	  social	  networks	  differently	  influence	  performance	  at	  these	  two	  stages.	  Identifying	  stages	  will	  also	  enable	  us	  later	  on	  to	  conceptualize	  BMI	  as	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  trajectory,	  where	  team	  variables	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  influence	  those	  same	  variables,	  and	  ultimately	  BMI	  performance,	  in	  the	  development	  stage,	  without	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making	  the	  analysis	  too	  complex.	  Later	  on	  we	  will	  also	  show	  how	  to	  extend	  our	  conceptual	  model	  to	  more	  stages.	  	  
	  
THEORY	  AND	  PROPOSITIONS	  
The	  Concept	  Stage	  The	  concept	  stage	  is	  the	  earliest	  stage	  of	  the	  BMI.	  The	  initiative	  is	  newly	  formed,	  the	  responsible	  team	  is	  small	  (in	  extreme	  cases	  it	  could	  consist	  of	  a	  single	  individual),	  status	  as	  a	  formal	  project	  may	  be	  tentative	  if	  at	  all	  granted	  (Kazanjian,	  1988),	  and	  the	  key	  concern	  is	  whether	  the	  opportunity	  that	  has	  been	  identified	  can	  be	  realistically	  and	  successfully	  pursued.	  Team	  members	  may	  be	  generalists	  rather	  than	  specialists	  (Galbraith,	  1982).	  The	  targeted	  outcome	  may	  be	  something	  like	  a	  business	  plan	  or	  similar	  deliverable	  (Galbraith,	  1982;	  Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987;	  Kazanjian	  &	  Drazin,	  1990),	  i.e.	  an	  object	  of	  judgment	  upon	  which	  the	  decision	  to	  continue	  development,	  kill	  the	  initiative,	  or	  go	  back	  to	  the	  drawing	  board	  is	  based.	  If	  successful,	  the	  project	  will	  move	  forward	  to	  the	  development	  phase.	  Below	  we	  will	  first	  examine	  social	  networks:	  which	  types	  of	  resources	  team	  members	  contribute	  to	  performance,	  and	  from	  whom,	  using	  which	  types	  of	  social	  networks,	  and	  how	  social	  networks	  may	  motivate	  team	  members	  to	  source	  and	  combine	  resources	  within	  the	  team.	  	  	  
Social	  Networks	  
	  
Networks	  and	  information.	  Intangible	  resources	  play	  a	  central	  role	  during	  the	  concept	  phase.	  Team	  members	  are	  typically	  building	  in	  a	  high-­‐uncertainty	  environment,	  together	  with	  others	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  team,	  through	  a	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process	  characterised	  by	  bricolage	  (Miner	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  or	  effectuation	  (Wiltbank	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  the	  BMI	  concept,	  which	  may	  win	  the	  innovating	  organisation’s	  approval	  and	  so	  be	  allocated	  resources	  for	  development.	  This	  highly	  uncertain	  task	  requires	  a	  range	  of	  non-­‐redundant	  sources	  of	  information	  (March,	  1991;	  Taylor	  &	  Greve,	  2006)	  and	  thus	  a	  high	  network	  range	  (Granovetter,	  1973.)	  	  As	  BMI	  is	  impelled	  by	  an	  organization’s	  need	  to	  reshape	  the	  basis	  of	  competition,	  it	  requires	  a	  wholly	  new	  approach,	  not	  simply	  a	  ‘problemistic	  search’	  (Cyert	  &	  March,	  1963)	  for	  a	  “me-­‐too”	  response	  to	  others’	  innovations	  or	  a	  simple,	  incremental	  change	  of	  course.	  	  The	  multi-­‐faceted	  nature	  of	  the	  desired	  innovation	  implies	  a	  need	  for	  a	  rich	  and	  varied	  range	  of	  information.	  The	  BMI	  group’s	  ability	  to	  source	  such	  intangible	  assets	  from	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  its	  members’	  connections	  and	  to	  recombine	  these	  in	  fruitful	  ways	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  group,	  especially	  in	  the	  first	  stage,	  and	  the	  success	  of	  this	  search	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  their	  chances	  of	  success	  (Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992;	  Brown	  &	  Eisenhardt,	  1995;	  Rosenkopf	  &	  Nerkar,	  2001).	  	  The	  central	  activity	  of	  the	  BMI	  team	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  is	  to	  generate	  innovative	  ideas	  and	  to	  screen	  and	  combine	  these	  ideas	  to	  design	  a	  business	  model.	  This	  requires	  exposure	  to	  new	  and	  diverse	  information,	  which	  comes	  from	  different	  functional	  groups	  in	  the	  organization,	  such	  as	  sales,	  marketing	  or	  R&D,	  and	  from	  outside	  the	  organization,	  such	  as	  customers,	  distributors,	  suppliers,	  or	  other	  partners.	  This	  requires	  the	  team	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization.	  	  This	  is	  the	  group’s	  network	  “range”:	  	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  network	  connections	  span	  institutional,	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organizational,	  or	  social	  boundaries	  (Burt,	  1992:	  148-­‐149).	  	  	  When	  team	  members’	  ties	  overlap,	  the	  group	  can	  access	  less	  non-­‐redundant	  information	  than	  if	  the	  same	  number	  of	  member	  ties	  are	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  	  	  In	  BMI,	  heterogeneous	  sources	  of	  information	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  provide	  conflicting	  information	  (leading	  to	  generative	  examination	  of	  the	  areas	  in	  doubt),	  various	  information	  (leading	  to	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  ideas	  and	  perspectives),	  and	  disparate	  information	  (leading	  to	  access	  to	  the	  ‘long	  tail’	  of	  people	  with	  unusual	  skill	  sets	  or	  backgrounds	  in	  an	  organisation,	  who	  know	  both	  about	  the	  organisation’s	  working	  and	  about	  some	  domain	  of	  knowledge)	  (Harrison	  &	  Klein	  2007).	  While	  actors	  with	  a	  mutually	  homogenous	  network	  are	  likely	  to	  view	  issues	  in	  a	  similar	  way,	  those	  with	  heterogeneous	  networks	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  things	  from	  multiple	  perspectives	  and	  hence	  are	  more	  able	  to	  understand	  and	  combine	  diverse	  information	  to	  (radically)	  new	  business	  models.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  following	  proposition,	  which,	  along	  with	  others,	  is	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  1.	  	  	  
Proposition	  1a:	  	  During	  the	  concept	  stage,	  teams	  with	  members	  connected	  with	  a	  
wider	  range	  of	  actors	  or	  groups,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization,	  are	  
more	  effective	  in	  sourcing	  informational	  resources	  than	  teams	  with	  a	  narrower	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FIGURE	  1	  Overview	  of	  propositions	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	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  BMI	  is	  an	  adaptation	  by	  the	  organization	  to	  new	  environmental	  realities	  (Almeida	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  thus	  requires	  boundary	  spanning	  ties,	  either	  directly	  into	  the	  environment	  to	  which	  the	  organization	  is	  adapting	  (for	  example,	  with	  a	  member	  of	  the	  client	  group	  the	  new	  business	  model	  intends	  to	  serve),	  or	  through	  ties	  to	  disparate	  parts	  of	  the	  organization	  which	  in	  turn	  have	  their	  own	  external	  sources	  of	  information.	  	  Boundary	  spanning	  ties	  may	  be	  formally	  constituted—as	  in	  a	  contractual	  or	  hierarchical	  relationship—or	  they	  may	  be	  ties	  embedded	  in	  a	  BMI	  team	  member’s	  network	  of	  connections.	  	  Embedded	  ties	  (Granovetter,	  1985)	  are	  characterised	  by	  actors’	  tendency	  to	  rely	  and	  call	  on	  them	  in	  preference	  to	  other	  potential	  counterparts,	  and	  their	  basis	  in	  trust	  and	  social	  obligation	  (Kilduff	  &	  Brass,	  2010).	  
	  
Embedded	  relationships	  in	  a	  network	  may	  originate	  from	  the	  current	  or	  former	  structure	  of	  that	  network:	  where	  two	  people	  have	  contacts	  in	  common,	  the	  consequent	  mutual	  monitoring	  can	  create	  trust	  and	  co-­‐operation	  (Coleman,	  1988;	  Tortoriello	  &	  Krackhardt,	  2010)	  or	  norms	  of	  cooperative	  conduct	  and	  mindfulness	  of	  reputation	  (Powell,	  1990;	  Moran,	  2005;	  Barden	  &	  Mitchell,	  2007).	  	  Other	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  development	  of	  embeddedness	  have	  also	  been	  proposed	  (Tushman	  &	  Scanlan,	  1981),	  such	  as	  liking	  (Zajonc,	  1968),	  or	  trust	  engendered	  by	  a	  positive	  history	  of	  interactions	  (Axelrod	  2006,	  Burt	  &	  Knez	  1995),	  or	  the	  development	  over	  time	  of	  a	  mutual	  understanding	  (Uzzi	  &	  Lancaster	  2003),	  the	  consequent	  mutual	  monitoring	  can	  create	  trust	  and	  co-­‐operation	  (Coleman	  1988,	  Tortoriello	  &	  Krackhardt	  2010)	  or	  norms	  of	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cooperative	  conduct	  and	  mindfulness	  of	  reputation	  (Powell	  1990,	  Moran	  2005,	  Barden	  and	  Mitchell	  2007).	  	  	  	  This	  trust	  and	  social	  obligation	  allows	  (Uzzi,	  1996)	  complex,	  fine-­‐grained	  information	  to	  be	  communicated	  and	  an	  increased	  capacity	  for	  problem-­‐solving.	  Developing	  a	  new	  business	  model	  means	  that	  an	  organization	  requires	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  needs,	  aspirations	  and	  dreams,	  habits	  and	  routines,	  and	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  opportunities	  and	  constraints	  of	  a	  new	  client	  group	  (London,	  2010).	  This	  is	  a	  creative	  process,	  where	  “new	  combinations”	  (Schumpeter,	  1912)	  	  –	  new	  to	  the	  organization	  and	  perhaps	  to	  the	  world	  –	  of	  value	  propositions,	  revenue	  models,	  structures,	  processes	  and	  systems,	  engagement	  of	  partners	  and	  entire	  ecosystems,	  may	  contribute	  to	  success.	  Sharing	  of	  complex	  information,	  and	  joint	  brainstorming	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  with	  parties	  with	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  of	  the	  client	  group	  and	  the	  local	  setting,	  will	  contribute	  to	  this	  outcome.	  	  	  Previous	  research	  (Uzzi,	  1997;	  Uzzi	  &	  Lancaster,	  2003)	  has	  suggested	  that	  such	  knowledge	  transfer	  and	  joint	  innovation	  do	  not	  occur	  automatically	  between	  two	  connected	  parties,	  such	  as	  between	  team	  members	  and	  external	  parties,	  especially	  when	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  is	  high	  and	  the	  relationship	  is	  at	  arm’s	  length	  (Centola	  &	  Macy,	  2007).	  The	  barriers	  come	  from	  the	  difficulty	  in	  communicating	  complex	  and	  tacit	  ideas	  (Levin	  &	  Cross,	  2004),	  some	  of	  which	  may	  be	  very	  different	  from	  the	  company’s	  dominant	  logic,	  and	  the	  possible	  reluctance	  or	  lack	  of	  motivation	  of	  one	  party	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  information.	  As	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  of	  the	  information	  needed	  rises,	  the	  process	  of	  information/	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knowledge	  transfer	  is	  less	  random	  and	  more	  effortful,	  requiring	  the	  source	  to	  devote	  time	  and	  effort	  in	  communicating	  the	  information	  about	  the	  new	  (for	  the	  organization)	  external	  environment	  to	  the	  team.	  This	  transfer	  is	  usually	  beneficial	  to	  the	  recipient	  but	  costly	  for	  the	  source,	  hence	  the	  source	  may	  not	  be	  motivated	  enough	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  transfer	  	  While	  an	  organisation	  may	  form	  a	  contract	  with	  a	  source	  of	  information	  in	  order	  to	  surmount	  the	  barrier	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  motivation	  for	  the	  information	  transfer,	  successful	  collaborations	  in	  uncertain	  contexts—i.e.,	  exploration	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  solutions—require	  closer	  than	  arm’s	  length	  relationships.	  If	  a	  team	  does	  not	  have	  such	  relationships,	  it	  may	  develop	  them.	  Collaborators	  will	  need	  to	  plan	  and	  enact	  episodes	  of	  social	  interaction,	  information	  sharing,	  and	  listening,	  encouraging	  participation	  and	  trust	  (Raes	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  creating	  an	  environment	  where	  it	  is	  attractive	  for	  parties	  to	  propose	  and	  “sell”	  ideas,	  especially	  if	  they	  perceive	  themselves	  to	  be	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  position	  or,	  at	  least	  initially,	  as	  outsiders	  to	  the	  process	  (Lave	  &	  Wenger	  1991;	  Dutton	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Such	  behaviour	  may	  be	  encouraged	  if	  an	  external	  party	  becomes	  a	  team	  member,	  as	  part	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations,	  or	  is	  invited	  to	  joint	  workshops	  with	  partners	  and	  develops	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  BMI’s	  eventual	  success.	  	  When	  the	  development	  of	  embedded	  relationships	  is	  successful,	  the	  benefits	  may	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  situations	  when	  team	  members	  ask	  for	  information;	  counterparts	  in	  the	  target	  domain	  may	  come	  to	  spontaneously	  and	  actively	  engage	  on	  behalf	  of	  core	  team	  members	  in	  the	  face	  of	  problems	  and	  opportunities	  for	  them,	  and	  persist	  even	  when	  there	  is	  no	  immediate	  “quid	  pro	  quo.”	  	  Such	  behaviour	  may	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has	  ended	  (Soda	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  or	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  specific	  BM,	  for	  future	  BMI	  in	  which	  the	  same	  team	  members	  are	  involved.	  The	  trust	  and	  co-­‐operation	  arising	  from	  a	  history	  of	  positive	  interactions	  to	  produce	  liking,	  trust	  and/or	  obligation	  between	  two	  people	  may	  survive	  when	  the	  context	  within	  which	  the	  embeddedness	  arose	  shifts—for	  example	  when	  a	  workgroup	  breaks	  up	  and	  its	  members	  move	  on	  to	  new	  projects.	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  development	  of	  embedded	  relationships	  with	  external	  counterparts	  may	  have	  taken	  place	  on	  past	  projects	  and	  these	  may	  already	  exist	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  focal	  BMI.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  we	  propose	  that	  having	  at	  least	  one	  embedded	  relationship	  with	  a	  key	  external	  information	  holder	  is	  important	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  BMI	  team	  in	  the	  concept	  stage.	  While	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  informational	  sources	  may	  be	  sufficient	  in	  more	  traditional	  innovation	  settings	  for	  creativity	  and	  innovation	  (Hansen,	  1999),	  we	  propose	  that	  in	  BMI	  settings,	  with	  the	  need	  for	  access	  to	  fine-­‐grained	  information	  from	  new	  contexts	  (about	  value	  propositions,	  local	  suppliers	  and	  distributors,	  other	  potential	  partners	  in	  the	  local	  ecosystem,	  etc.),	  an	  embedded	  relationship	  with	  at	  least	  one	  key	  information	  holder	  external	  to	  the	  organisation,	  for	  instance,	  with	  a	  local	  distributor,	  or	  a	  local	  NGO	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  company	  starting	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  emerging	  economy,	  contributes	  to	  performance.	  This	  also	  helps	  the	  BMI	  team	  to	  counter	  the	  firm’s	  dominant	  logic	  and	  the	  tendency	  to	  engage	  in	  incremental	  innovation,	  making	  it	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  a	  compelling,	  novel	  business	  model	  (London,	  2010).	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P1b:	  	  During	  the	  concept	  stage,	  BMI	  teams	  with	  embedded	  ties	  with	  at	  least	  one	  
key	  external	  information	  holder	  are	  more	  effective	  in	  the	  sourcing	  of	  information	  
than	  teams	  who	  do	  not	  have	  them,	  increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	   	  	  
Networks	  and	  political	  resources.	  While	  the	  sources	  of	  information	  are	  scattered	  in	  the	  team’s	  environment,	  both	  internal	  to	  the	  organization	  and	  external,	  political	  supporters	  are	  usually	  from	  inside	  the	  organization	  (Barden	  &	  Mitchell,	  2007)	  and	  they	  don’t	  distribute	  evenly	  across	  the	  hierarchical	  ladder	  of	  the	  organization	  (Eisenhardt	  &	  Bourgeois,	  1988).	  Whereas	  having	  diverse	  ties	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  people	  is	  important	  for	  informational	  resources	  at	  the	  concept	  stage,	  possessing	  ties	  to	  precisely	  those	  people	  who	  have	  the	  power	  to	  influence	  and	  support	  the	  focal	  group	  is	  more	  important	  for	  the	  sourcing	  of	  political	  support	  (Oh	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Therefore	  we	  expect	  connections	  to	  powerful	  actors	  in	  the	  organization’s	  dominant	  coalition	  (Thompson,	  1967)	  would	  enable	  the	  team	  to	  obtain	  necessary	  and	  timely	  political	  support	  for	  its	  initiatives.	  	  	  	  For	  political	  support,	  high	  network	  range	  is	  less	  relevant	  at	  the	  concept	  stage.	  It	  may	  even	  be	  detrimental.	  When	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  new	  business	  model	  has	  yet	  to	  come	  into	  shape,	  exposure	  to	  a	  wider	  and	  more	  diverse	  audience	  may	  invite	  challenges,	  hampering	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  idea	  at	  the	  seed	  stage	  and	  reducing	  the	  chance	  for	  its	  further	  development.	  More	  subtly,	  too	  broad	  a	  range	  of	  political	  ties	  at	  this	  stage	  may	  serve	  as	  conduits	  for	  a	  firm’s	  “dominant	  logic”	  creeping	  into	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  BMI,	  resulting	  in	  incremental	  innovation	  (London,	  2010).	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell	  (1992)	  noted	  that	  less	  effective	  development	  teams	  got	  ‘stuck’	  on	  the	  activity	  of	  scanning	  for	  and	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discussing	  possible	  variations	  to	  its	  idea,	  lacking	  “ambassadorial”	  support	  from	  politically	  higher-­‐ups—similarly,	  successful	  teams	  need	  to	  change	  their	  focus	  from	  being	  influenced	  by	  their	  environment	  to	  influencing	  it.	  	  Critical	  to	  this	  effort	  is	  the	  strong	  support	  of	  one	  or	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  advocates	  (Markham,	  2000),	  who	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  promote	  the	  BMI,	  are	  willing	  to	  put	  their	  reputation	  on	  the	  line	  to	  endorse	  the	  initiative	  and	  to	  give	  the	  BMI	  team	  the	  space	  to	  further	  develop	  the	  initial	  idea.	  	  	  BMI	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  may	  produce	  new	  business	  models	  that	  are	  quite	  or	  very	  different	  from	  the	  organization’s	  existing	  business	  models	  and	  dominant	  logic	  in	  terms	  of	  value	  propositions,	  revenue	  models,	  partners,	  structures,	  processes	  and	  (IT)	  systems.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  will	  argue	  later	  (in	  our	  theory	  on	  leadership),	  a	  team	  leader	  may	  want	  to	  position	  the	  new	  business	  model	  as	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  firm’s	  existing	  business.	  An	  embedded	  tie	  with	  a	  senior	  manager	  may	  provide	  important	  support.	  Such	  an	  embedded	  tie	  may	  have	  originated	  in,	  for	  instance,	  an	  otherwise	  hierarchical	  relationship	  with	  the	  team	  leader’s	  boss.	  Or,	  it	  may	  result	  from	  a	  previous	  embedded	  relationship,	  from	  former	  projects	  or	  experiences	  (Parise	  &	  Rollag,	  2010).	  Or	  it	  may	  be	  strategically	  developed	  by	  asking	  ‘advice’	  from	  a	  senior	  manager	  throughout	  the	  BMI	  process,	  leading	  over	  time	  through	  repeated	  patterns	  of	  interactions,	  to	  an	  embedded	  relationship	  on	  which	  the	  team	  leader	  (or	  other	  team	  members)	  can	  draw	  for	  support.	  	  	  Whatever	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  embedded	  tie,	  we	  propose	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  have	  an	  embedded	  tie	  with	  at	  least	  one	  powerful	  or	  resource-­‐holding	  (or	  influencing)	  figure	  in	  the	  organization.	  Where	  embedded	  ties	  exist,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  BMI	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team	  member	  being	  able	  to	  call	  in	  favours	  or	  even	  credibly	  to	  promise	  future	  favours	  in	  exchange	  for	  support	  is	  significantly	  enhanced	  (Moran,	  2005;	  Uzzi	  &	  Lancaster,	  2003).	  	  
P1c:	  At	  the	  concept	  stage,	  teams	  with	  members	  having	  an	  embedded	  tie	  with	  at	  
least	  one	  higher-­‐ranking	  individual	  inside	  the	  organization	  are	  more	  effective	  in	  
the	  sourcing	  of	  political	  support	  than	  teams	  lacking	  such	  connections,	  increasing	  
performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  
Networks	  and	  motivation.	  Moreover,	  we	  expect	  that	  teams	  with	  effective	  network	  structures	  for	  sourcing	  information	  and	  for	  gaining	  political	  support	  and	  tangible	  resources	  (i.e.,	  P1a-­‐c),	  are	  not	  only	  more	  effective	  in	  gathering	  the	  resources	  for	  successful	  BMI,	  they	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  together	  as	  a	  team.	  Group	  members	  will	  observe	  that	  the	  correct	  types	  of	  ties	  are	  in	  place	  to	  facilitate	  success	  since	  networks	  have	  reputational	  or	  signalling	  content	  (Stuart	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Shane	  &	  Cable,	  2002,	  Podolny	  2001).	  Observing	  a	  positive	  pattern	  of	  ties	  –	  for	  instance,	  a	  high	  range	  of	  ties,	  or	  embedded	  ties	  with	  external	  parties	  or	  politically	  important	  actors	  –	  may	  increase	  the	  willingness	  of	  team	  members	  to	  work	  for	  the	  BMI	  group.	  	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  BMI	  process,	  group	  members	  need	  to	  tap	  into	  the	  goodwill	  and	  call	  upon	  the	  obligations	  of	  their	  network	  contacts	  in	  order	  to	  source	  information	  and	  other	  resources—and	  the	  more	  complex	  the	  knowledge,	  the	  higher	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  so	  (Hansen,	  1999;	  Centola	  &	  Macy,	  2007).	  Increased	  belief	  in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  success,	  and	  hence	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  project	  will	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contribute	  to	  their	  reputation	  rather	  than	  be	  a	  blot	  on	  their	  careers,	  makes	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  BMI	  team	  members,	  but	  also	  senior	  managers	  and	  external	  partners	  of	  the	  BMI	  team,	  will	  tap	  into	  their	  contacts’	  knowledge	  and	  other	  resources,	  and	  to	  share	  and	  combine	  these	  resources	  with	  the	  team,	  as	  the	  expected	  returns	  for	  them	  will	  be	  higher,	  even	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  discharging	  past	  or	  creating	  new	  obligations	  (Coleman,	  1988).	  	  The	  increased	  belief	  in	  success	  also	  increases	  the	  belief	  that	  an	  individual’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  team’s	  success	  will	  be	  reciprocated	  by	  other	  team	  members,	  possibly	  in	  the	  future	  after	  the	  BMI	  project	  has	  ended.	  	  Only	  if	  the	  project	  continues	  to	  exist,	  accrues	  additional	  resources	  and	  is	  a	  credit	  to	  team	  members’	  careers	  rather	  than	  a	  blot	  on	  their	  records	  will	  it	  be	  likely	  that	  team	  members’	  contributions	  to	  the	  group	  will	  be	  reciprocated	  and	  that	  they	  will	  build	  their	  personal	  stock	  of	  social	  capital	  with	  other	  team	  members	  through	  working	  on	  the	  project.	  Hence	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  ‘right’	  ties	  (for	  success),	  we	  expect	  that	  team	  members	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  a	  group	  effort	  and	  share	  and	  combine	  information	  and	  other	  resources	  with	  other	  team	  members,	  enhancing	  BMI	  performance.	  	  	  The	  effective	  mobilization	  of	  the	  team	  with	  clear	  signals	  that	  it	  is	  an	  important	  priority	  for	  the	  managers	  surrounding	  the	  team,	  for	  instance	  having	  the	  support	  of	  at	  least	  one	  senior	  manager,	  leads	  to	  more	  effective	  team	  behaviour	  	  (Ericksen	  &	  Dyer,	  2004).	  	  Creating	  such	  an	  impetus	  for	  early	  belief	  in	  expected	  future	  reciprocation	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  uncertain	  and	  potentially	  contentious	  context	  of	  BMI.	  A	  BMI’s	  contradiction	  of	  the	  firm’s	  dominant	  logic	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means	  that	  group	  members	  may	  perceive	  that	  some	  in	  the	  firm	  may	  see	  the	  BMI	  as	  a	  threat	  or	  a	  needless	  distraction	  from	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  work,	  increasing	  the	  need	  to	  help	  group	  members	  perceive	  the	  positive	  potential	  of	  making	  full	  use	  of	  their	  network	  of	  connections	  and	  obligations,	  particularly	  if	  the	  new	  business	  model	  is	  positioned	  by	  the	  team	  leader	  as	  a	  new	  and	  different	  one.	  An	  embedded	  relationship	  with	  at	  least	  one	  senior	  manager	  is	  a	  clear	  and	  significant	  signal	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  In	  sum,	  each	  of	  the	  types	  of	  links	  proposed	  in	  P1a-­‐c	  contributing	  to	  sourcing	  of	  information	  and	  other	  resources,	  also	  adds	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  more	  effective	  ecosystem	  of	  the	  team,	  motivating	  team	  members	  and	  others	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  to	  source,	  share	  and	  combine	  information	  and	  other	  resources,	  increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  
P2:	  	  During	  the	  concept	  stage,	  teams	  having	  a)	  members	  connected	  with	  a	  wider	  
range	  of	  actors,	  b)	  an	  embedded	  tie	  with	  at	  least	  one	  key	  external	  information	  
holder,	  or	  c)	  an	  embedded	  tie	  with	  at	  least	  one	  higher-­‐ranking	  individual	  inside	  the	  
organization,	  will	  be	  more	  motivated	  to	  source,	  share,	  and	  combine	  information,	  
increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  
	  
Leadership	  In	  the	  concept	  stage	  of	  BMI,	  key	  obstacles	  for	  team	  functioning	  are,	  as	  mentioned,	  uncertainty	  (in	  terms	  of	  the	  purpose	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  team;	  what	  the	  new	  business	  model	  will	  look	  like;	  whether	  it	  will	  be	  successful)	  and	  complexity	  (contribution	  of	  elements	  of	  the	  business	  model,	  and	  of	  individual	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team	  members,	  to	  success	  depends	  on	  others).	  There	  may	  be	  conflicts	  in	  the	  (diverse)	  team	  (Jehn,	  1995),	  role	  and	  task	  uncertainty,	  social	  loafing	  of	  team	  members,	  and	  pressure	  from	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities	  of	  the	  core	  business.	  As	  argued	  above,	  team	  members	  may	  already	  be	  motivated	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  effective	  social	  networks,	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  BMI	  success	  and	  future	  rewards.	  However,	  as	  we	  discuss	  below,	  we	  expect	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  scope	  for	  leaders	  to	  additionally	  motivate	  team	  members	  through	  leadership	  behaviours	  such	  as	  vision	  communication	  and	  role	  modelling,	  which	  help	  to	  align	  the	  team	  around	  a	  common	  direction	  and	  purpose,	  stimulating	  (complex)	  coordination	  around	  the	  joint	  task	  and	  reducing	  uncertainty.	  	  	  The	  team’s	  main	  focus	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  of	  BMI	  is	  addressing	  uncertainty	  by	  way	  of	  sourcing	  information.	  In	  order	  to	  allow	  teams	  to	  deal	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  not	  be	  inundated	  by	  it,	  leaders	  should	  intervene	  and	  provide	  direction	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  leaders	  should	  not	  limit	  search	  activities	  or	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  team	  members’	  focus.	  Hence,	  in	  this	  phase	  of	  BMI,	  leaders	  should	  guide	  the	  team	  but	  not	  limit	  it.	  	  Transformational	  and	  charismatic	  leadership	  theories	  (Bass,	  1985;	  Beyer	  &	  Browning,	  1999;	  Burns,	  1978;	  Conger	  &	  Kanungo,	  1987)	  may	  inform	  leaders	  how	  to	  direct	  but	  not	  limit	  group	  members.	  Transformational	  and	  charismatic	  leaders	  aim	  to	  inspire	  and	  motivate	  employees	  to	  perform	  beyond	  even	  their	  own	  expectations	  (Bass,	  1985).	  They	  do	  so	  by	  tapping	  into	  –	  or	  even	  transforming	  –	  employees’	  needs,	  values,	  and	  norms,	  providing	  long	  term	  guidance	  for	  employees’	  daily	  work.	  An	  important	  process	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  
80 of 191 
increased	  (psychological)	  empowerment	  of	  employees	  (Avolio	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Dvir	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  Psychological	  empowerment	  is	  a	  motivational	  construct	  originating	  in	  an	  employee’s	  perception	  of	  having	  a	  choice	  in	  initiating	  and	  regulating	  actions,	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  the	  job	  well	  (i.e.,	  self-­‐efficacy),	  being	  able	  to	  impact	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  the	  job	  (Spreitzer,	  1995;	  Thomas	  &	  Velthouse,	  1990).	  Thus,	  by	  increasing	  feelings	  of	  psychological	  empowerment	  of	  team	  members,	  charismatic	  and	  transformational	  leaders	  may	  direct	  and	  guide	  employees	  without	  compromising	  their	  freedom.	  	  	  By	  displaying	  charismatic	  leadership	  behaviour,	  leaders	  may	  increase	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  effort,	  accomplishment	  expectations,	  and	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  goal	  accomplishment	  as	  well	  as	  instilling	  faith	  in	  a	  better	  future	  and	  creating	  personal	  commitment	  to	  the	  vision	  (Howell	  &	  Shamir,	  2005;	  Mio	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Emrich	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1993,	  1994).	  Charismatic	  and	  transformational	  leader	  behaviours	  can	  be	  separated	  into	  two	  classes:	  role	  modelling	  and	  vision	  communication	  (Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  Below	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  vision	  communication	  and	  role	  modelling	  are	  key	  leadership	  behaviors	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  of	  BMI,	  and	  refine	  this	  idea	  further	  by	  specifying	  the	  messages	  that	  leaders	  should	  communicate	  through	  their	  charismatic	  behaviors.	  	  
	  
Vision	  communication.	  Vision	  communication	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  positioning	  of	  a	  leader’s	  interpretive	  framework	  within	  that	  of	  followers	  (Shamir	  et	  al,	  1993).	  Vision	  communication	  refers	  to	  communicating	  images	  of	  the	  future	  of	  a	  collective	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  convincing	  others	  of	  the	  merit	  of	  the	  images	  (Stam	  et	  al.,	  2010a,	  b).	  Visions	  are	  similar	  to	  (task)	  goals,	  but	  they	  are	  more	  abstract	  and	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long	  term	  and	  need	  not	  be	  accomplishable	  to	  be	  inspiring	  (Kirkpatrick	  &	  Locke,	  1996).	  By	  communicating	  a	  long-­‐term	  vision,	  leaders	  provide	  team	  members,	  and	  others	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  organization,	  with	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  purpose	  and	  long-­‐term	  task	  for	  the	  BMI	  process,	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose	  and	  direction	  for	  those	  involved	  (Berson	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  	  Hence,	  vision	  communication	  can	  improve	  performance	  (Kirkpatrick	  &	  Locke,	  1996;	  Stam	  et	  al.,	  2010a,	  b)	  and	  even	  lead	  to	  venture	  growth	  (Baum	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  and	  more	  positive	  media	  attention	  (Bligh	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Vision	  communication	  may	  also	  reduce	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  BMI	  and	  motivate	  the	  BMI	  team	  to	  perform	  better.	  By	  providing	  an	  image	  of	  what	  to	  aim	  for,	  team	  members	  are	  provided	  with	  a	  common	  purpose	  for	  their	  work.	  Although	  such	  an	  image	  is	  abstract	  and	  vague	  enough	  to	  not	  restrict	  team	  members	  in	  their	  activities	  (seeing	  that	  in	  this	  phase	  of	  BMI	  team	  members	  may	  be	  as	  knowledgeable	  as	  leaders,	  or	  even	  more	  so)	  it	  does	  provide	  some	  direction	  and	  therefore	  reduces	  the	  uncertainty	  that	  team	  members	  may	  experience	  and	  motivate	  them.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  leaders’	  ideas	  about	  BMI	  are	  not	  always	  superior	  to	  those	  of	  other	  team	  members.	  Therefore,	  these	  ideas	  should	  not	  be	  dominant	  in	  the	  team	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  restrict	  expression	  of	  other	  ideas.	  In	  sum,	  a	  sense	  of	  common	  purpose	  is	  important	  because	  it	  reduces	  uncertainty	  and	  may	  increase	  the	  motivation	  to	  cooperate	  for	  a	  common	  purpose,	  reducing	  problems	  of	  complexity	  as	  well.	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P3a:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  vision	  communication	  by	  leaders	  enhances	  motivation	  of	  
those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  therefore	  increases	  performance	  at	  this	  
stage.	   	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  BMI	  individuals	  are	  not	  only	  uncertain	  about	  the	  project	  and	  their	  common	  and	  individual	  tasks,	  but	  also	  about	  themselves	  and	  the	  group	  in	  which	  they	  have	  to	  work.	  Leaders	  may	  address	  these	  issues	  of	  complexity	  (and	  implied	  need	  for	  cooperation	  of	  people	  around	  a	  common	  task)	  and	  uncertainty	  (Hogg	  &	  Terry,	  2000;	  Pratt,	  1998)	  by	  creating	  a	  shared	  identity	  and	  feelings	  of	  cohesion	  (Van	  Knippenberg	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Research	  shows	  that	  identifying	  with	  a	  group	  or	  organization	  may	  indeed	  enhance	  performance	  (Millward	  &	  Postmes,	  2010;	  Van	  Knippenberg,	  2000),	  organizational	  citizenship	  behavior	  (Barreto	  &	  Ellemers,	  2002;	  Dukerich	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  O’Reilly	  &	  Chatman,	  1986),	  and	  boost	  self-­‐esteem	  (Hogg	  &	  Terry,	  2000).	  	  Vision	  communication	  may	  be	  critical	  to	  such	  identity	  work.	  Many	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  leaders	  may	  create	  a	  common	  social	  identity	  (Lord	  and	  Brown,	  2004;	  van	  Knippenberg	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  leading	  Reicher,	  Haslam	  and	  Hopkins	  (2005)	  to	  call	  (charismatic/	  transformational)	  leaders	  “entrepreneurs	  of	  identity”.	  Vision	  communication	  may	  be	  an	  important	  tool	  to	  influence	  identities	  of	  followers	  (Lord	  &	  Brown,	  2004;	  Stam	  et	  al.,	  2010a).	  For	  instance,	  Jansen	  and	  colleagues	  (2009)	  and	  Smith	  and	  Tushman	  (2005)	  argued	  that	  visions	  are	  crucial	  for	  innovation	  projects,	  because	  they	  create	  a	  common	  identity	  amongst	  employees.	  Shamir,	  Arthur,	  and	  House	  (1993)	  state	  that	  a	  way	  to	  strengthen	  the	  engagement	  of	  employees	  is	  discussing	  the	  collective	  identity	  of	  the	  company,	  and	  to	  address	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the	  common	  history	  of	  the	  company,	  to	  spell	  out	  company	  norms	  and	  values,	  and	  to	  emphasize	  that	  both	  employees	  and	  management	  are	  members	  of	  the	  same	  team	  in	  vision	  communication.	  These	  effects	  have	  been	  confirmed	  by	  both	  qualitative	  (Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1994)	  and	  quantitative	  research	  (Kark	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  In	  sum,	  emphasizing	  the	  collective	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  (team	  members,	  other	  participants	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization)	  through	  vision	  communication	  will	  help	  to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  and	  problems	  of	  complexity,	  and	  motivate	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process,	  increasing	  performance	  at	  the	  concept	  stage.	  	  
P3b:	  In	  the	  concept	  phase,	  emphasizing	  the	  collective	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  
process	  in	  vision	  communication	  enhances	  their	  identification	  and	  hence	  increases	  
performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  	  	  Charismatic	  and	  transformational	  leadership	  theories	  suggest	  that	  emphasizing	  a	  crisis	  in	  vision	  communication	  may	  be	  important	  to	  open	  individuals	  up	  for	  the	  ideas	  of	  a	  charismatic	  leader	  (Beyer	  &	  Browning,	  1999;	  Conger	  and	  Kanungo,	  1987;	  Shamir	  &	  Howell,	  1999).	  Crises	  come	  with	  distress,	  negative	  emotions,	  and	  feelings	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  negativity	  (Dutton,	  1986;	  Madera	  &	  Smith,	  2009;	  Pearson	  &	  Clair,	  1998;	  Pearson	  &	  Mitroff,	  1993;	  Stubbart,	  1987).	  As	  a	  result,	  followers	  are	  particularly	  open	  to	  leadership	  (Shamir	  &	  Howell,	  1999),	  and	  especially	  to	  those	  leaders	  that	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  motivation,	  inspiration	  and	  a	  purpose	  (Bass,	  1985;	  Conger	  &	  Kanungo,	  1988).	  Hence	  vision	  communication	  calling	  attention	  to	  problems	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  how	  a	  new	  business	  model	  might	  be	  different	  from	  the	  current	  situation	  (discrepancy),	  and	  how	  it	  can	  help	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mitigate	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  entire	  organization,	  can	  help	  to	  establish	  the	  needed	  BMI.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  potential	  new	  business	  model	  (or	  the	  vision	  for	  it)	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  current	  practices	  and	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  much-­‐preferable	  alternative	  to	  the	  problematic	  current	  practices.	  	  	  Such	  urgency	  and	  discrepancy	  can	  be	  a	  major	  influence	  for	  team	  members	  and	  others,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  team	  leader,	  a	  small	  number	  of	  power	  holders	  in	  the	  company	  may	  be	  crucially	  important	  for	  the	  BMI	  team	  to	  access	  tangible	  and	  political	  resources	  in	  the	  concept	  stage.	  It	  helps	  if	  these	  people	  are	  utterly	  convinced	  of	  the	  usefulness	  of	  a	  new	  and	  different	  business	  model.	  Engaging	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  senior	  managers	  at	  this	  stage,	  perhaps	  only	  one,	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  mobilizing	  resistance	  and	  ‘novelty	  creep,’	  i.e.,	  the	  business	  model	  losing	  its	  radical	  newness,	  implying	  more	  incremental	  innovation.	  By	  emphasizing	  in	  their	  vision	  communication	  how	  a	  new	  business	  model	  might	  be	  different	  from	  current	  practices,	  and	  why	  it	  is	  urgently	  needed,	  leaders	  can	  give	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  both	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  direction	  and	  motivate	  them	  to	  contribute	  to	  it.	  	  	  
P3c:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  leadership	  emphasizing	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  BMI	  
and	  current	  practices	  in	  vision	  communication	  enhances	  the	  identification	  for	  
those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process,	  increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  
Role	  Modelling.	  Leaders	  may	  not	  only	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  direction	  by	  what	  they	  say	  –	  through	  vision	  communication	  –	  but	  also	  by	  what	  they	  do.	  Role	  modelling	  is,	  simply	  put,	  the	  leader	  showing	  exemplary	  behaviour.	  Through	  social	  comparison	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processes,	  employees	  relate	  their	  own	  behaviours	  to	  the	  role	  model	  and	  are	  inspired	  to	  mimic	  these	  behaviours	  (Lockwood,	  2006;	  Lockwood	  &	  Kunda,	  1997).	  This	  inspiration	  may	  extend	  to	  others	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization,	  as	  well.	  	  	  Through	  role	  modelling,	  the	  leader	  provides	  a	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  in	  terms	  of	  behaviour	  for	  followers	  to	  refer	  to	  and	  display.	  Role	  modelling	  provides	  participants	  with	  an	  example	  of	  how	  to	  act	  and	  communicates	  norms,	  values,	  and	  expectations	  to	  team	  members.	  This	  lowers	  feelings	  of	  uncertainty	  about	  how	  to	  behave	  in	  the	  team,	  demonstrates	  a	  common	  purpose	  and	  motivates	  team	  members	  to	  work	  for	  the	  team	  (Conger	  &	  Kanungo,	  1988;	  De	  Cremer	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  reducing	  problems	  due	  to	  complexity	  and	  the	  implied	  need	  for	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  as	  well.	  Importantly,	  and	  similar	  to	  vision	  communication,	  the	  purpose	  communicated	  by	  role	  modelling	  is	  abstract	  and	  vague	  enough	  to	  give	  only	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  direction	  without	  restricting	  or	  limiting	  members	  in	  their	  work	  activities.	  Nonetheless	  it	  does	  provide	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  purpose	  that	  helps	  the	  team	  to	  come	  together	  around	  the	  BMI	  task,	  motivating	  the	  team,	  and	  contributing	  to	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  
P3d:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  role	  modelling	  by	  leaders	  motivates	  those	  involved	  in	  
the	  BMI	  process	  and	  therefore	  increases	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  Role	  modelling	  and	  especially	  self-­‐sacrificing	  behaviour	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  enhanced	  identification	  with	  the	  group.	  Self-­‐sacrificing	  leadership	  is	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defined	  as	  “an	  abandonment	  of	  or	  postponement	  of	  personal	  interests	  and	  privileges	  for	  the	  collective	  welfare”	  (Choi	  &	  Yoon,	  2005,	  p.	  52).	  By	  putting	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  group	  above	  their	  own,	  leaders	  can	  signal	  that	  the	  group	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  individual	  and	  that	  the	  leader	  deems	  the	  group	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process,	  as	  a	  whole,	  very	  important.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  organizational	  identification,	  resulting	  in	  better	  follower	  performance	  (van	  Knippenberg	  &	  van	  Knippenberg,	  2005).	  As	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  collective	  identity	  is	  an	  important	  goal	  for	  leaders	  in	  the	  early	  phases	  of	  BMI,	  we	  expect	  self-­‐sacrificing	  role	  modelling	  to	  positively	  affect	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  
P3e:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  self-­‐sacrificing	  role	  modelling	  enhances	  identification	  of	  
those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  therefore	  increases	  performance	  at	  this	  
stage.	  	  
Leadership	  and	  social	  networks.	  Leadership	  may	  also	  promote	  a	  better	  use	  of	  a	  team’s	  social	  networks	  by	  giving	  a	  common	  purpose	  to	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  for	  how	  to	  use	  these	  networks.	  As	  visioning	  by	  leaders	  specifies	  direction	  and	  purpose,	  charismatic	  leadership	  can	  enhance	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  sourcing	  activities.	  These	  leadership	  behaviours	  may	  guide	  a	  team	  members’	  sourcing	  activities	  (suggesting	  where	  to	  go	  and	  what	  to	  do),	  without	  limiting	  them.	  Visioning	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  uncertain	  and	  complex	  contexts,	  when	  the	  leader	  cannot	  possibly	  guide	  all	  activities	  of	  subordinates	  (Uhl-­‐Bien	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Shamir	  &	  Howell,	  1999).	  In	  situations	  such	  as	  BMI,	  leaders	  cannot	  possibly	  oversee	  all	  details	  of	  the	  operations	  and	  should	  decentralize	  decision-­‐making,	  empowering	  employees	  as	  opposed	  to	  explicitly	  directing	  them	  (Galbraith,	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1982).	  Charismatic	  leadership	  behaviours,	  however,	  guide	  and	  align	  follower	  behaviour	  on	  a	  high	  level,	  without	  explicitly	  interfering	  with	  the	  daily	  practice	  of	  employees.	  Indeed,	  (transformational	  and)	  charismatic	  leadership	  is	  strongly	  related	  to	  empowerment	  (Avolio	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Dvir	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  seems	  to	  work	  better	  as	  empowerment	  of	  followers	  is	  higher	  (Pieterse	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  or	  the	  distance	  between	  leader	  and	  follower	  increases	  (Shamir	  &	  Howell,	  1999).	  	  	  	  We	  expect	  that	  leaders	  can	  motivate	  team	  members	  to	  use	  their	  social	  networks	  as	  well.	  As	  argued	  earlier,	  these	  people	  may	  already	  to	  some	  extent	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  perceived	  presence	  of	  effective	  social	  relationships,	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  trust/liking	  or	  reputation.	  However,	  the	  potential	  incentive	  problems	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  BMI:	  from	  conflict,	  social	  loafing,	  and	  the	  pressure	  arising	  from	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activity	  of	  the	  existing	  business,	  are	  very	  significant.	  Potentially	  beneficial	  exchange	  relations	  within	  the	  team,	  needed	  for	  successfully	  designing	  and	  implementing	  a	  new	  business	  model,	  may	  also	  break	  down	  due	  to	  internal	  conflict	  and	  the	  high	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity	  associated	  with	  BMI.	  Hence,	  we	  expect	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  additional	  scope	  for	  leaders	  to	  motivate	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  to	  enhance	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  BMI	  team	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  	  Group	  identity	  work	  may	  diminish	  the	  problems	  of	  conflict	  and	  social	  loafing,	  and	  enhance	  the	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  social	  networks	  on	  sourcing	  success.	  As	  team	  members	  identify	  with	  the	  team,	  they	  are	  motivated	  to	  cooperate	  and	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  team	  (Ashforth	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Riketta,	  2005).	  Charismatic	  leadership,	  as	  an	  antecedent	  of	  identification,	  can	  therefore	  improve	  the	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effectiveness	  of	  sourcing	  and	  sharing	  activities.	  For	  instance,	  Beyer	  and	  Browning	  (1999)	  discuss	  how	  Robert	  Noyce,	  through	  vision	  communication,	  was	  able	  to	  create	  cohesion	  in	  the	  American	  semi-­‐conductor	  industry	  and	  lead	  different	  American	  companies	  to	  cooperate	  and	  unite	  against	  an	  invasion	  of	  Japanese	  companies	  in	  their	  home	  market.	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  argued	  earlier,	  emphasizing	  how	  a	  new	  business	  model	  might	  be	  different	  from	  other	  practices	  in	  the	  organization	  and	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  around	  it,	  can	  create	  an	  additional	  sense	  of	  direction	  and	  motivation	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process,	  which	  may	  reinforce	  the	  effectiveness	  with	  which	  team	  members	  draw	  on	  their	  social	  networks	  as	  well.	  	  	  The	  same	  effects	  that	  arise	  from	  vision	  communication	  arise	  from	  role	  modelling.	  Role	  modelling,	  like	  vision	  communication,	  helps	  to	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  direction	  and	  may	  additionally	  motivate	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process.	  For	  instance,	  self-­‐sacrificing	  behaviours	  are	  strongly	  related	  to	  cooperation	  in	  teams	  (De	  Cremer	  &	  van	  Knippenberg,	  2005)	  and	  to	  helping	  behaviors	  in	  teams	  (De	  Cremer	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  All	  of	  this	  may	  contribute	  to	  effective	  use	  of	  a	  team’s	  social	  networks,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  team	  members	  contributing	  to	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  their	  counterparts	  (those	  they	  seek	  to	  cooperate	  with,	  such	  as	  senior	  managers	  and	  external	  partners)	  who	  may	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  vision	  and	  role	  modelling	  of	  the	  team	  leader	  as	  well,	  contributing	  to	  BMI	  success.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  a	  range	  of	  ties	  of	  the	  BMI	  team	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  organization,	  including	  (possibly	  weak)	  political	  ties,	  may	  enable	  a	  firm’s	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dominant	  logic	  to	  creep	  in,	  promoting	  incremental	  rather	  than	  successful	  BMI	  (London,	  2010).	  However,	  if	  the	  team	  has	  a	  strong	  identity	  and	  vision	  and	  a	  charismatic	  leader,	  these	  ties	  can	  be	  actively	  used	  to	  influence	  others	  rather	  than	  be	  influenced	  and	  to	  build	  support	  for	  the	  novel	  business	  model,	  mitigating	  the	  “dark	  forces”	  in	  the	  organization	  and	  perhaps	  getting	  them	  on	  board,	  enabling	  more	  resources	  to	  flow	  to	  the	  BMI	  team	  and	  increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  
	  
P4a:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  vision	  communication	  by	  leaders	  strengthens	  the	  
influence	  of	  the	  range	  of	  networks,	  of	  the	  embedded	  ties	  to	  external	  information	  
holders,	  and	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  higher-­‐ranking	  individuals	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  
stage.	  	  
	  
P4b:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  emphasizing	  the	  collective	  in	  vision	  communication	  
strengthens	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  range	  of	  networks,	  the	  existence	  of	  embedded	  ties	  
to	  external	  information	  holders,	  and	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  higher-­‐ranking	  
individuals	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  
	  
P4c:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  leadership	  emphasizing	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  BMI	  
and	  current	  practices	  in	  vision	  communication	  strengthens	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
range	  of	  networks,	  the	  existence	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  external	  information	  holders,	  
and	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  higher-­‐ranking	  individuals	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  
P4d:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  role	  modelling	  by	  leaders	  strengthens	  the	  influence	  of	  
the	  range	  of	  networks,	  the	  existence	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  external	  information	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holders,	  and	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  higher-­‐ranking	  individuals	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  
stage.	  	  	  
	  
P4e:	  In	  the	  concept	  stage,	  self-­‐sacrificing	  role	  modelling	  strengthens	  the	  influence	  
of	  the	  range	  of	  networks,	  the	  existence	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  external	  information	  
holders,	  and	  of	  embedded	  ties	  to	  higher-­‐ranking	  individuals	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  
stage.	  	  Depending	  on	  an	  organization’s	  decisions	  (if	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  formal	  decision),	  the	  project	  may	  go	  on	  to	  the	  next	  stage,	  or	  be	  killed,	  stalled,	  or	  “sent	  back”	  for	  improvement.	  	  	  
The	  Development	  Stage	  At	  the	  development	  stage,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  initiative	  is	  now	  clearer	  (Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987)	  and	  the	  project	  has	  likely	  been	  formalized	  (Bhave,	  1994).	  The	  outline	  of	  the	  project	  has	  been	  approved	  (for	  instance,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  business	  plan)	  (Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987)	  and	  the	  team’s	  task	  is	  to	  execute	  and	  launch	  the	  initiative	  successfully.	  Performance	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  subjective,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  organization’s	  perspective.	  Ultimately,	  performance	  is	  based	  on	  the	  success	  of	  launch	  and	  the	  value	  created	  as	  a	  result.	  Tasks	  at	  this	  stage	  may	  include	  the	  development	  of	  an	  IT	  platform	  (if	  part	  of	  the	  business	  model),	  or	  an	  in-­‐depth	  market	  study	  to	  gauge	  potential	  demand,	  developing	  or	  testing	  a	  prototype	  for	  the	  new	  product	  or	  service,	  or	  one	  or	  more	  pilots,	  either	  as	  a	  BMI	  team	  or	  together	  with	  internal	  or	  external	  partners.	  At	  this	  stage,	  the	  team	  grows	  larger,	  hierarchy	  and	  formalization	  of	  tasks	  is	  introduced	  (Galbraith,	  1982;	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Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987).	  With	  the	  overall	  direction	  now	  clearer,	  the	  roles	  of	  individual	  team	  members	  in	  the	  overall	  project	  now	  need	  to	  be	  clarified	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
Social	  Networks	  
Networks	  and	  information.	  When	  BMI	  moves	  to	  the	  development	  stage,	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  needed	  for	  BMI	  success	  changes	  as	  well.	  A	  diversity	  of	  sources	  of	  information	  becomes	  less	  important	  than	  depth	  of	  knowledge	  in	  selected	  domains.	  Where	  at	  the	  first	  stage	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  what	  may	  be	  possible,	  now	  the	  emphasis	  shifts	  to	  how	  the	  innovation	  may	  be	  created	  (Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987).	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  project	  shifts	  from	  sourcing	  and	  trying	  out	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  information	  to	  the	  effective	  transfer	  of	  complex	  and	  tacit	  knowledge	  to	  solve	  emerging	  issues,	  problems,	  and	  constraints	  in	  the	  development	  (Bhave,	  1994).	  Fine-­‐grained	  information	  transfer	  is	  necessary	  once	  the	  task	  of	  the	  innovation	  team	  makes	  a	  transition	  from	  synthesis	  of	  others'	  diverse	  information	  to	  developing	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  pools	  of	  information	  necessary	  to	  the	  project	  (e.g.,	  marketing,	  technical,	  financial,	  possible	  supply	  and	  distribution	  issues)	  (Galbraith,	  1982),	  while	  joint	  problem-­‐solving	  arrangements	  facilitate	  the	  'plugging	  in'	  of	  the	  innovation	  team's	  efforts	  to	  draw	  on	  and	  where	  necessary	  alter	  the	  existing	  firm	  capabilities.	  	  As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  embedded	  ties	  facilitate	  such	  information	  transfer	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  arrangements.	  	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  specific	  business	  model,	  these	  embedded	  ties	  may	  connect	  with	  various	  functional	  units,	  departments,	  or	  business	  units	  within	  the	  organization,	  for	  instance,	  R&D	  if	  a	  new	  technology	  or	  product	  needs	  to	  be	  developed,	  marketing	  if	  in-­‐depth	  market	  research	  is	  needed,	  the	  IT	  department	  if	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a	  new	  IT	  platform	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  business	  model.	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  external	  parties;	  for	  instance,	  in-­‐depth	  relationships	  with	  partners	  (e.g.,	  suppliers,	  distributors,	  or	  in	  manufacturing)	  and	  the	  implied	  potential	  fine-­‐grained	  information	  transfer	  and	  joint	  problem	  solving	  help	  the	  BMI	  team	  to	  adequately	  address	  emerging	  problems	  and	  constraints	  in	  the	  development	  process.	  Depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  business	  model,	  the	  BMI	  process	  may	  benefit	  from	  embedded	  ties	  with	  local	  community	  partners	  with	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  of	  the	  local	  social	  and	  economic	  context	  and	  with	  local	  customers	  engaged	  in	  prototyping	  and	  piloting	  as	  well.	  	  	  While	  embedded	  ties	  take	  more	  time	  and	  effort	  for	  team	  members	  to	  develop	  or	  to	  maintain,	  they	  also	  enable	  the	  transfer	  of	  complex	  knowledge,	  to	  identify	  and	  jointly	  work	  on	  emerging	  problems	  and	  constraints,	  and	  to	  co-­‐innovate	  new	  solutions	  (Nahapiet	  &	  Ghoshal,	  1998;	  Capaldo,	  2007),	  all	  of	  which	  is	  important	  at	  this	  stage.	  This	  proposition	  and	  others	  about	  the	  development	  stage	  are	  also	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  2.	  	  	  
P5a:	  	  During	  the	  development	  stage,	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  embedded	  ties	  with	  
internal	  and	  external	  contacts	  holding	  information	  resources	  about	  the	  new	  BM	  
are	  more	  beneficial	  for	  the	  sourcing	  of	  informational	  resources	  into	  the	  team,	  
improving	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	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FIGURE	  2	  Overview	  of	  propositions	  in	  the	  development/launch	  stage	  	  
	  	  	  
Networks	  and	  political	  resources.	  The	  required	  political	  support	  to	  obtain	  the	  needed	  tangible	  resources	  also	  shifts	  at	  this	  stage;	  typically	  substantially	  larger	  investments	  in	  terms	  of	  people	  and	  funding	  are	  needed.	  Where	  the	  support	  of	  a	  single	  champion	  may	  have	  been	  sufficient	  during	  the	  concept	  stage,	  the	  development	  stage	  requires	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  support	  (Burgelman,	  1983a,	  b),	  including	  possibly	  from	  more	  senior	  levels	  of	  the	  organisation,	  especially	  if	  the	  BMI	  is	  going	  to	  sit	  at	  the	  ‘top	  table’	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  activities	  (Anand,	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Accordingly,	  the	  network	  features	  that	  are	  required	  to	  source	  intangible	  and	  tangible	  resources	  and	  to	  develop	  political	  support	  must	  also	  change.	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As	  a	  BMI	  project	  develops,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  threats	  to	  its	  existence	  or	  eventual	  success	  is	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  a	  single	  source	  of	  tangible	  or	  political	  support.	  	  A	  single	  sponsor	  or	  financial	  supporter	  may	  be	  working	  under	  exogenous	  deadlines	  or	  resource	  restraints	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  accord	  with	  the	  development	  needs	  or	  life	  cycle	  of	  the	  project	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  	  A	  single	  sponsor	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  able	  or	  willing	  to	  devote	  all	  his	  access	  to	  other,	  valuable	  higher-­‐ranked	  individuals	  to	  evangelising	  for	  the	  project,	  so	  having	  multiple	  sponsors	  may	  be	  the	  only	  route	  to	  these	  valuable	  individuals	  and	  the	  opportunities	  to	  leverage	  resources	  and	  relationships	  to	  which	  they	  have	  access.	  	  	  	  Even	  if	  a	  project	  survives	  the	  concept	  stage	  under	  the	  protective	  guard	  of	  a	  single	  sponsor,	  when	  it	  reaches	  the	  development	  stage	  it	  will	  require	  assistance	  from	  departments	  or	  divisions	  of	  the	  company	  beyond	  the	  sponsor’s	  direct	  control.	  Projects	  that	  are	  overly	  identified	  as	  coming	  from	  a	  particular	  organisational	  context	  may	  meet	  resistance	  from	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  company.	  A	  project	  that	  goes	  on	  too	  long	  without	  attracting	  the	  patronage	  of	  others	  besides	  its	  founding	  sponsor	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “pet	  project”	  rather	  than	  a	  broadly	  supported	  initiative.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  cohort	  of	  patrons	  or	  sponsors	  may	  lead	  to	  helpful	  consensus	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  particular	  innovation	  as	  well.	  	  	  The	  benefits	  of	  having	  embedded	  ties	  with	  political	  sponsors	  extend	  to	  external	  organizations	  as	  well.	  Embedded	  ties	  with	  senior	  managers	  of	  partner	  organizations	  (ranging	  from	  partner	  organizations	  in	  R&D,	  supply	  and	  distribution,	  manufacturing,	  etc.)	  may	  facilitate	  their	  devoting	  enough	  staff,	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financial	  resources,	  and	  priority	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  BMI	  process,	  and	  support	  people	  in	  their	  own	  organization	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  BMI	  team	  in	  fine-­‐grained	  information	  sharing	  and	  co-­‐innovating	  of	  solutions	  around	  emerging	  problems.	  In	  some	  contexts,	  embedded	  links	  with	  leaders	  of	  local	  communities	  are	  important	  for	  access,	  support,	  and	  learning	  (prototyping,	  pilots,	  developing	  local	  distribution	  and	  sales)	  and	  for	  trust	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  its	  new	  product(s)	  as	  well.	  Formally,	  	  
P5b:	  	  During	  the	  development	  stage,	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  embedded	  ties,	  with	  a	  
wider	  range	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  contacts	  holding	  political	  and	  tangible	  
resources	  is	  more	  beneficial	  for	  the	  sourcing	  of	  such	  resources	  into	  the	  team,	  
enhancing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
Networks	  and	  motivation.	  More	  embedded	  ties	  of	  the	  team,	  both	  internal	  in	  the	  organization	  and	  externally,	  will	  also	  increase	  perceptions	  of	  success	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  who	  are	  therefore	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  their	  contributions	  will	  be	  reciprocated	  or	  rewarded.	  The	  team	  becomes	  more	  attractive	  to	  remain	  or	  become	  part	  of,	  as	  there	  is	  more	  scope	  for	  building	  links	  with	  team	  members	  having	  valuable	  social	  ties.	  More	  embedded	  ties	  with	  politically	  higher-­‐ups	  are	  also	  a	  clear	  signal	  of	  (more)	  likely	  success.	  All	  of	  this	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  team	  members	  are	  inclined	  to	  remain	  or	  become	  part	  of	  the	  BMI	  team,	  that	  people	  participating	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  source	  (core	  team	  members)	  or	  supply	  (their	  counterparts)	  to	  support	  the	  process,	  and	  to	  devote	  effort	  to	  sharing	  and	  combining	  information	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and	  resources	  within	  the	  team,	  improving	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  This	  implies,	  in	  combination,	  that:	  	  
P6:	  During	  the	  development	  phase,	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  embedded	  ties	  with	  a	  
wider	  range	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  contacts	  holding	  a)	  key	  information	  sources,	  
and	  b)	  political,	  and	  tangible	  resources,	  increases	  the	  motivation	  of	  those	  involved	  
in	  the	  BMI	  process,	  increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  	  	  
Leadership	  As	  the	  BMI	  project	  moves	  from	  the	  conceptual	  stage	  to	  the	  development	  stage,	  several	  elements	  become	  more	  established:	  more	  people	  get	  involved,	  more	  information	  needs	  to	  be	  processed.	  Indeed,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  network	  changes	  and	  requirements,	  BMI	  teams	  are	  likely	  become	  bigger	  and	  change	  in	  composition	  over	  time	  and	  across	  phases	  of	  development	  (Galbraith,	  1982;	  Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987;	  Kazanjian,	  1988;	  Kazanjian	  &	  Drazin,	  1990).	  As	  more	  people	  get	  involved,	  the	  overall	  complexity	  of	  the	  BMI	  project	  increases;	  as	  more	  parties	  get	  involved	  and	  need	  to	  coordinate	  roles,	  the	  project	  itself	  becomes	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  and	  is	  divided	  into	  smaller	  constituent	  pieces.	  A	  more	  formal	  hierarchy	  needs	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  and	  the	  leader	  will	  have	  to	  start	  managing	  people	  more	  formally	  and	  directly.	  	  
	  
Leader	  goal	  communication.	  As	  tasks	  become	  more	  formalized	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  team	  becomes	  clearer,	  leaders	  should	  display	  more	  individually-­‐oriented	  behaviours	  (House,	  1971).	  	  As	  more	  members	  join	  the	  team	  and	  individual	  tasks	  are	  more	  detailed	  and	  structured,	  uncertainty	  diminishes.	  Hence,	  the	  need	  for	  
97 of 191 
high-­‐level	  abstract	  leadership	  behaviours	  (like	  charismatic	  behaviours)	  becomes	  less	  pronounced	  (although	  not	  completely	  disappearing).	  Leaders	  have	  more	  leeway	  to	  individually	  direct	  members’	  efforts,	  and	  the	  same	  applies	  to	  (sub-­‐)	  projects	  with	  other	  parties,	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  organization.	  We	  use	  path-­‐goal	  theory	  and	  transactional	  leadership	  theory	  to	  provide	  insight	  into	  how	  BMI	  leaders	  can	  offer	  such	  more	  direct	  guidance.	  	  	  Path-­‐goal	  leadership	  theory	  promotes	  leadership	  behaviours	  such	  as	  directive	  path-­‐goal	  clarification,	  supportiveness,	  participation,	  and	  achievement	  orientation	  (House,	  1971,	  1996).	  These	  behaviours	  provide	  structure	  for	  followers,	  clarifying	  expectations,	  guiding	  work,	  and	  creating	  a	  supportive	  and	  friendly	  work	  environment.	  Path-­‐goal	  leadership	  behaviours	  empower	  followers	  and	  encourage	  them	  to	  strive	  for	  performance	  excellence	  (House,	  1996).	  Clear	  goals	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  reach,	  yet	  not	  impossible	  to	  attain,	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  goal	  accomplishment	  (Locke	  &	  Latham,	  1994,	  2006).	  The	  most	  important	  effect	  in	  the	  developmental/launch	  phase	  is	  the	  clarification	  of	  expectations	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  the	  guidance	  of	  their	  specific	  efforts	  toward	  BMI	  success.	  Transactional	  leadership	  is	  oriented	  to	  rewarding	  (or	  punishing)	  members	  based	  on	  their	  accomplishment	  of	  task	  and	  task	  goals	  (Bass,	  1985;	  Burns,	  1978).	  	  	  Similarly	  to	  path-­‐goal	  theory,	  transactional	  leadership	  emphasizes	  that	  leaders	  should	  carefully	  explain	  task-­‐goals	  to	  BMI	  team	  members	  and	  those	  they	  cooperate	  with,	  both	  within	  the	  organization	  and	  externally,	  guiding	  them	  to	  accomplish	  these	  goals.	  By	  providing	  specific	  individual	  and	  (sub-­‐)	  group	  task	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goals	  and	  helping	  team	  members	  to	  reach	  these	  goals,	  task	  uncertainty	  is	  reduced,	  while	  complexity	  (e.g.,	  how	  to	  cooperate	  with	  others	  in	  the	  BMI	  process)	  is	  explicitly	  dealt	  with.	  Interestingly,	  such	  explanations	  of	  tasks	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  tasks	  and	  the	  greater	  BMI	  goals	  give	  team	  members	  a	  sense	  of	  collective	  effort	  that	  motivates	  them	  to	  excel	  in	  their	  tasks	  (cf.	  Shamir	  et	  al.	  1993).	  	  
P7a:	  In	  the	  development	  phase,	  leadership	  that	  provides	  concrete	  task	  goals	  and	  
paths	  to	  accomplish	  these	  goals	  enhances	  motivation	  and	  hence	  increases	  
performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  As	  the	  team	  grows	  and	  its	  structure	  and	  tasks	  become	  more	  formalized	  (Bhave,	  1994,	  Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987),	  motivating	  people	  becomes	  more	  of	  an	  individual	  issue.	  As	  the	  group’s	  identity	  becomes	  clearer	  and	  leaders	  manage	  members	  more	  directly,	  leaders	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  motivate	  team	  members	  and	  others	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  organization	  through	  other	  means.	  As	  the	  number	  of	  tasks	  increases	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  task	  on	  the	  overall	  projects	  becomes	  smaller,	  it	  becomes	  more	  important	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  to	  understand	  how	  their	  relatively	  small	  task	  influences	  overall	  performance	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  experience	  feelings	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  (i.e.	  general	  positive	  feelings	  about	  the	  self,	  Campbell	  &	  Lavallee,	  1993;	  for	  a	  meta-­‐analytic	  review,	  see	  Judge	  and	  Bono	  (2001.))	  	  Interestingly,	  self-­‐evaluation	  may	  also	  concern	  one’s	  place	  in	  and	  relation	  with	  the	  group.	  For	  instance,	  self-­‐evaluative	  aspects	  of	  identity	  also	  refer	  to	  feelings	  of	  respect,	  the	  belief	  that	  one’s	  status	  in	  the	  group	  is	  high	  (Tyler	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&	  Blader,	  2003),	  which	  is	  critical	  for	  individual	  and	  team	  functioning	  (Ellemers	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  	  	  As	  more	  people	  join,	  it	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  understand	  one’s	  unique	  contributions	  relative	  to	  others’.	  This	  is	  important	  since,	  if	  team	  members	  and	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  are	  to	  successfully	  perform	  tasks,	  they	  will	  need	  to	  believe	  in	  their	  capabilities	  to	  do	  so	  (i.e.	  self-­‐efficacy	  –	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  is	  able	  to	  perform	  a	  specific	  task,	  Bandura,	  1997;	  For	  a	  meta-­‐analysis,	  see	  Stajkovic	  and	  Luthans	  (1998)).	  Both	  of	  these	  issues,	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  self-­‐efficacy,	  deal	  with	  individual	  self-­‐evaluative	  aspects	  of	  identity	  –	  how	  one	  evaluates	  the	  self	  –	  and	  leaders	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  managing	  these	  issues	  (van	  Knippenberg	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  Interestingly,	  self-­‐evaluation	  may	  also	  concern	  one’s	  place	  in	  and	  relation	  with	  the	  group.	  For	  instance,	  self-­‐evaluative	  aspects	  of	  identity	  also	  refer	  to	  feelings	  of	  respect,	  the	  belief	  that	  one’s	  status	  in	  the	  group	  is	  high	  (Tyler	  &	  Blader,	  2003),	  which	  is	  critical	  for	  individual	  and	  team	  functioning	  (Ellemers	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  We	  argue	  that	  leaders	  may	  influence	  self-­‐evaluations	  of	  team	  members	  and	  others	  involved	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  through	  several	  practices	  related	  to	  path-­‐goal	  leadership	  and	  transactional	  leadership.	  By	  specifying	  the	  relationship	  between	  individual	  tasks	  and	  overall	  group	  goals,	  leaders	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  impact	  and	  meaningfulness	  that	  is	  important	  for	  individuals’	  self-­‐esteem	  (Spreitzer,	  1995;	  Thomas	  &	  Velthouse,	  1990)	  and	  a	  team’s	  effectiveness	  (Kirkman	  &	  Rosen,	  1999).	  In	  addition,	  setting	  high	  goals	  signals	  that	  the	  leader	  believes	  in	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  team	  member	  and	  external	  participants,	  strengthening	  their	  sense	  of	  self-­‐efficacy	  and	  of	  goal	  commitment	  (Locke	  &	  Latham,	  2002;	  Klein	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  Finally,	  providing	  feedback	  and	  rewards	  about	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goal	  attainment	  shows	  people	  that	  they	  are	  taken	  seriously,	  enhancing	  their	  feelings	  of	  being	  respected	  (Branscombe	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Simon	  &	  Stürmer,	  2003;	  Williams	  &	  DeSteno,	  2008).	  	  	  Interestingly,	  group	  identity	  development	  (see	  the	  concept	  stage)	  is	  also	  related	  to	  self-­‐evaluations,	  as	  feeling	  part	  of	  a	  group	  may	  relate	  to	  feelings	  of	  pride	  (Tyler	  &	  Blader,	  2003).	  The	  difference	  here	  is	  that	  leaders	  focus	  on	  individuals	  (rather	  than	  on	  groups)	  to	  foster	  self-­‐evaluative	  aspect	  of	  identity.	  These	  behaviours	  are	  all	  individualized	  behaviours	  related	  to	  goal	  attainment	  and	  as	  such	  are	  strongly	  related	  to	  path-­‐goal	  leadership	  (House,	  1971;	  House,	  1996)	  and	  transactional	  leadership	  (Bass,	  1985).	  
	  
P7b:	  In	  the	  development	  stage,	  leadership	  that	  provides	  challenging	  task	  goals,	  
positive	  feedback	  about	  task	  performance,	  and	  positive	  rewards	  upon	  task	  
accomplishments	  enhances	  self-­‐evaluations	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  
subsequently	  increases	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  We	  argued	  earlier	  that	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  BMI	  process,	  leaders	  should	  emphasize	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  BMI	  and	  current	  practices	  in	  the	  company.	  There	  is	  a	  caveat	  however.	  Solely	  identifying	  problems	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  risks	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  insecurity	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  importantly,	  individuals’	  place	  in	  the	  future	  organization.	  As	  the	  project	  enters	  the	  development	  stage,	  the	  team	  grows,	  and	  it	  requires	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  intangible	  and	  especially	  tangible	  resources,	  involving	  a	  greater	  number	  and	  diversity	  of	  politically	  heavyweights,	  higher	  up	  in	  the	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organization.	  Bigger	  investments	  are	  involved	  and	  more	  external	  parties.	  This	  forces	  the	  team	  to	  legitimize	  its	  existence	  to	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  constituents	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization.	  Only	  emphasizing	  how	  the	  BMI	  differs	  from	  problematic	  current	  practices	  may	  be	  important	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  but	  may	  not	  be	  optimal	  as	  the	  project	  moves	  forward.	  As	  the	  project	  formalizes	  and	  increases	  in	  scope,	  size,	  and	  reach	  towards	  higher	  levels	  in	  the	  organization,	  it	  becomes	  more	  important	  to	  show	  how	  the	  project	  links	  to	  the	  overall	  organization	  as	  well.	  	  	  Specifically,	  it	  becomes	  more	  important	  that	  leaders	  present	  a	  consistent	  identity	  of	  their	  organization	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  followers	  (van	  Knippenberg	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  Shamir	  et	  al.,	  1993)	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  organization.	  	  Indeed,	  consistency	  in	  leader	  communication	  is	  found	  to	  be	  highly	  important	  in	  the	  strategy	  literature	  (Smith	  &	  Tushman,	  2005)	  and	  the	  innovation	  literature	  (Lynn	  &	  Akgun,	  2001).	  	  It	  becomes	  more	  important	  to	  show	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new.	  By	  showing	  how	  the	  project	  fits	  within	  a	  larger	  picture,	  the	  broader	  narrative	  of	  an	  organization’s	  overall	  strategy	  and	  identity,	  and	  how	  the	  new	  business	  model	  helps	  to	  reinvent	  and	  reinvigorate	  this	  for	  the	  future,	  the	  insecurity	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  an	  outsider	  is	  diminished.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  development	  stage	  of	  the	  BMI	  process	  as	  more	  individuals	  are	  involved	  in	  sourcing	  tangible	  and	  political	  resources	  and	  these	  individuals	  need	  to	  be	  convinced	  of	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  BMI	  not	  only	  in	  changing	  the	  current	  situation	  of	  the	  company,	  but	  also	  in	  fitting	  within	  the	  company’s	  overall	  scope.	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P7c:	  In	  the	  development	  phase,	  leadership	  that	  emphasizes	  continuity	  or	  
commonality	  between	  the	  BMI	  and	  current	  practices	  strengthens	  members’	  
common	  identity	  in	  turn	  increasing	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
Leadership	  and	  networks.	  By	  showing	  transactional	  leadership	  and	  path-­‐goal	  leadership,	  and	  specifying	  which	  goals	  to	  reach	  and	  how,	  leaders	  can	  also	  enhance	  the	  direction	  and	  incentives	  of	  sourcing	  activities	  through	  a	  team’s	  social	  networks.	  	  Leaders	  who	  help	  team	  members	  formulate	  clear	  task	  goals	  and	  specify	  a	  path	  for	  goal	  attainment	  leaders	  can	  help	  team	  members,	  and	  those	  they	  cooperate	  with	  through	  their	  networks,	  to	  optimally	  source	  information.	  Path-­‐goal	  leadership	  and	  transactional	  leadership	  may	  provide	  both	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose	  and	  direction	  and	  bolster	  the	  incentives	  to	  reach	  those	  goals.	  Moreover,	  by	  emphasizing	  how	  the	  BMI	  process	  fits	  the	  overall	  agenda	  and	  identity	  of	  the	  organization,	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  BMI	  process	  from	  different	  departments,	  functional	  units,	  and	  at	  all	  levels	  required,	  may	  feel	  more	  motivated	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  provide	  the	  required	  information	  rather	  than	  mobilize	  the	  dark	  forces	  working	  behind	  the	  scenes	  to	  sabotage	  the	  new	  initiative	  or,	  more	  subtly,	  not	  contributing	  to	  its	  success.	  	  	  
P8a:	  In	  the	  development	  stage,	  leadership	  that	  provides	  concrete	  task	  goals	  and	  
paths	  to	  accomplish	  these	  goals	  strengthens	  the	  influence	  of	  members’	  embedded	  
network	  ties	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  
P8b:	  In	  the	  development	  stage,	  leadership	  that	  provides	  challenging	  task	  goals,	  
positive	  feedback	  about	  task	  performance,	  and	  positive	  rewards	  upon	  task	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accomplishments	  enhances	  self-­‐evaluations	  of	  team	  members,	  increasing	  the	  
influence	  of	  members’	  embedded	  network	  ties	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  
P8c:	  In	  the	  development	  stage,	  leadership	  that	  emphasizes	  continuity	  or	  
commonality	  between	  the	  BMI	  and	  current	  practices	  strengthens	  members’	  
common	  identity	  and	  consequently	  the	  influence	  of	  members’	  embedded	  network	  
ties	  on	  performance	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  
	  
A	  Dynamic	  Model	  of	  BMI	  	  So	  far	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  two-­‐stage	  model,	  where	  theory	  and	  propositions	  about	  BMI	  performance	  were	  built	  on	  assumptions	  about	  different	  team	  and	  task	  characteristics	  at	  the	  concept	  and	  development	  stage,	  as	  implied	  by	  innovation	  management.	  	  However,	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  BMI	  teams	  is	  possible	  by	  generalizing	  our	  conceptual	  model	  to	  a	  dynamic	  model,	  where	  team	  variables	  in	  the	  second	  period	  –	  so	  far	  treated	  as	  independent	  variables	  in	  the	  propositions	  above,	  e.g.,	  leadership	  style,	  the	  team’s	  social	  networks	  –	  depend	  on	  these	  same	  variables	  in	  the	  first	  period	  in	  predictable	  ways,	  implying	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  trajectory	  in	  terms	  of	  BMI	  team	  characteristics	  and	  performance.	  	  A	  useful	  starting	  point	  for	  our	  theory	  is	  Ilgen	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  Input-­‐Mediator-­‐Output-­‐Input	  (IMOI)	  model	  for	  teams.	  In	  our	  setting,	  BMI	  teams	  start	  in	  the	  first	  period	  with	  an	  initial	  composition	  and	  size,	  tasks	  (e.g.,	  business	  model	  design)	  and	  roles	  (e.g.,	  leadership	  behaviours	  such	  as	  charismatic	  or	  transformational	  leadership),	  and	  in-­‐built	  access	  to	  social	  networks	  (characterized	  by	  range	  of	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networks,	  with	  whom,	  with	  what	  tie	  characteristics).	  These	  factors	  facilitate	  the	  flow	  of	  intangible	  (information)	  and	  tangible	  (money,	  people,	  technologies)	  resources	  into	  the	  team,	  comprising	  the	  inputs	  (I).	  As	  in	  Ilgen’s	  model,	  these	  inputs	  cue	  mediational	  factors	  (M)	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  team	  processes	  (such	  as	  sharing	  of	  resources,	  building	  of	  networks),	  behavioural	  processes	  (such	  as	  conflict	  and	  internal	  politics),	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  identity	  and	  motivation	  (Marks	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  This	  leads	  to	  team	  outputs	  (O),	  which	  depend	  on	  the	  specific	  task	  of	  the	  team	  but	  may	  be	  some	  form	  of	  resource	  utilization,	  e.g.	  a	  business	  plan	  (Galbraith,	  1982;	  Ruhnka	  &	  Young,	  1987;	  Kazanjian,	  1988;	  Kazanjian	  &	  Drazin,	  1990).	  In	  established	  organizations,	  these	  outputs	  are	  typically	  subjected	  to	  higher-­‐level	  decision-­‐making,	  e.g.,	  reject,	  hold,	  or	  fund	  the	  initiative	  for	  the	  next	  stage.	  These	  outcomes,	  in	  turn,	  influence	  the	  starting	  conditions	  or	  inputs	  (I)	  for	  the	  development	  stage,	  together	  with	  additional	  resources	  implied	  by	  a	  positive	  decision	  in	  terms	  of	  funding	  and	  staff.	  These	  starting	  conditions	  (in	  terms	  of	  team	  composition,	  tasks	  and	  roles,	  team	  identity,	  etc.),	  together	  with	  mediating	  factors	  (M)	  in	  the	  form	  of	  team	  processes	  (such	  as	  conflicts	  and	  internal	  politics),	  will	  again	  influence	  team	  motivation,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  Interestingly,	  IMOI	  models	  don’t	  distinguish	  between	  changes	  in	  work	  input	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  team	  itself.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  BMI,	  not	  only	  do	  outputs	  in	  terms	  of	  work	  activities	  (e.g.,	  information,	  funding,	  more	  or	  different	  people,	  technologies)	  provide	  inputs	  for	  the	  next	  stage	  but	  also,	  for	  various	  reasons,	  the	  
team	  itself	  will	  change	  over	  time:	  the	  number	  and	  type	  of	  members,	  their	  roles	  and	  tasks,	  the	  type	  of	  networks	  of	  the	  team,	  with	  whom	  and	  for	  what.	  First,	  as	  the	  project	  develops,	  a	  broadening	  scope	  and	  size	  may	  create	  a	  need	  for	  more	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tangible	  and	  human	  resources,	  requiring	  a	  change	  in	  the	  composition	  and	  size	  of	  the	  team.	  Second,	  as	  more	  human	  resources	  need	  to	  be	  managed,	  team	  members	  are	  likely	  to	  experience	  a	  shift	  from	  conducting	  search	  to	  more	  managerial	  tasks.	  Third,	  members	  may	  develop	  new	  ties	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  organization,	  or	  weak	  ties	  can	  ‘thicken’	  into	  embedded	  ties,	  or	  new	  team	  members	  may	  add	  ties.	  Finally,	  team	  members	  may	  leave	  due	  to	  illness,	  shifting	  priorities,	  or	  differences	  of	  opinion.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  an	  adequate	  modelling	  of	  our	  setting	  requires	  adding	  a	  “T”	  (team	  size	  and	  composition,	  including	  member	  roles,	  such	  as	  leadership	  characteristics,	  social	  networks	  of	  team	  members)	  to	  Ilgen	  et	  al’s	  (2005)	  model.	  Hence,	  we	  propose	  for	  settings	  like	  ours,	  a	  model	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  team	  changes	  and	  work	  input	  changes:	  a	  Team-­‐Input-­‐Mediator-­‐Output-­‐Team-­‐Input-­‐model,	  or	  TIMOTI.	  Our	  dynamic,	  behavioural	  team	  model	  of	  BMI	  is	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  3.	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  FIGURE	  3	  Overview	  of	  the	  dynamic	  model	  of	  BMI	  teams	  (TIMOTI)	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information	  and	  other	  resources	  within	  the	  team,	  when	  developing	  a	  business	  plan.	  This	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  high-­‐quality	  business	  plan	  which	  gets	  approved,	  but	  also	  forms	  an	  excellent	  start	  for	  the	  development	  stage,	  with	  a	  core	  team	  with	  a	  common	  identity	  and	  purpose	  and	  networks	  that	  may	  still	  be	  intact,	  supplemented	  with	  new	  team	  members	  (as	  part	  of	  the	  additional	  support),	  all	  of	  which	  may	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  success	  in	  the	  development	  stage.	  In	  contrast,	  an	  ineffective	  leader	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  with	  a	  poorly	  motivated	  team	  may	  deliver	  a	  weak	  business	  plan.	  If	  at	  all	  approved,	  this	  team	  will	  start	  the	  development	  phase	  weakened	  in	  terms	  of	  size,	  networks,	  identity	  and	  purpose,	  and	  with	  a	  sub-­‐optimal	  plan,	  all	  of	  which	  may	  contribute	  to	  failure	  during	  the	  development	  phase.	  	  	  This	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  trajectory.	  The	  TIMOTI	  theoretical	  framework	  may	  be	  used	  to	  develop	  additional	  theory	  and	  propositions	  on	  how	  and	  why	  given	  team	  characteristics	  (T)	  at	  the	  concept	  stage,	  including	  team	  tasks	  and	  roles,	  such	  as	  leadership	  characteristics,	  produce	  inputs	  (intangible	  and	  tangible	  resources)	  which,	  through	  mediating	  factors	  (M)	  like	  identity	  and	  motivation	  produce	  outputs	  (O),	  which	  in	  turn	  influence	  team	  characteristics	  (T)	  at	  the	  development	  stage	  (new	  tasks	  and	  roles,	  including	  new	  leadership	  roles).	  In	  other	  words,	  TIMOTI	  offers	  a	  new	  theoretical	  platform	  for	  studying	  BMI,	  i.e.,	  for	  developing	  new	  theory	  and	  propositions	  on	  the	  path-­‐dependent	  process	  of	  how	  and	  why	  BMI	  teams	  contribute	  to	  performance.	  We	  hope	  our	  new	  theory	  will	  inspire	  others	  to	  develop	  such	  work.	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DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  We	  developed	  new	  team-­‐based	  theory	  on	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  performance,	  synthesizing	  insights	  from	  innovation	  management,	  social	  psychology	  of	  leaders	  and	  teams,	  and	  social	  network	  theory.	  We	  went	  on	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  theoretical	  framework,	  TIMOTI,	  conceptualizing	  BMI	  as	  a	  team-­‐based	  path-­‐dependent	  process.	  Given	  that	  the	  field	  of	  BMI	  is	  currently	  taking	  off,	  we	  believe	  it	  is	  particularly	  timely	  to	  heed	  Whetten’s	  (1989)	  call	  to	  offer	  a	  new	  theoretical	  approach	  for	  studying	  not	  only	  what	  influences	  BMI	  performance	  and	  how,	  but	  also	  why	  (i.e.,	  a	  new	  theoretical	  logic).	  	  	  We	  believe	  our	  theory	  also	  adds	  to	  the	  corporate	  venturing	  literature	  and	  to	  the	  ambidexterity	  literature.	  Previously,	  researchers	  in	  corporate	  venturing	  (Galbraith,	  1982;	  Burgelman,	  1983a,	  b;	  Garud	  &	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  1992;	  Bhave,	  1994;	  Archdivili	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Cornelissen	  &	  Clarke,	  2010)	  and	  the	  ambidexterity	  literature	  (O’Reilly	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  have	  also	  studied	  how	  new	  ventures	  emerge	  in	  established	  organizations.	  Some	  studies	  examined	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  new	  ventures	  using	  rich	  case	  study	  analysis	  (Burgelman,	  1983a,	  b;	  Garud	  &	  Van	  de	  Ven,	  1992).	  Burgelman	  (1983a,	  b),	  for	  instance,	  studied	  where	  new	  ventures	  come	  from	  in	  a	  large	  corporation	  such	  as	  Intel	  and	  how	  they	  get	  funded	  and	  ultimately	  legitimized	  as	  part	  of	  the	  corporate	  strategy.	  Other	  studies	  examined	  conditions	  for	  successfully	  developing	  new	  businesses	  away	  from	  a	  firm’s	  core	  business,	  such	  as	  the	  vision	  of	  corporate	  leaders	  or	  CEOs	  (Smith	  &	  Tushman,	  2005;	  Jansen	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  or	  effective	  alliances	  or	  networks	  with	  external	  partners	  (Lin	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  idea	  of	  process	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  ambidexterity	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literature	  (Gibson	  &	  Birkinshaw,	  2004;	  Raisch	  &	  Birkinshaw,	  2008;	  O’Reilly	  &	  Tushman,	  2008)	  although	  this	  (firm-­‐level)	  research	  typically	  reduces	  the	  entire	  BMI-­‐process	  to	  a	  single	  concept,	  i.e.,	  exploration.	  None	  of	  these	  literatures	  however	  developed	  theory	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  how	  and	  why	  external	  team	  factors	  (types	  of	  social	  networks,	  with	  whom,	  and	  for	  what)	  and	  internal	  team	  factors	  (e.g.,	  types	  of	  leadership)	  interact	  to	  influence	  BMI	  performance,	  and	  how	  this	  varies	  across	  different	  stages	  of	  BMI.	  Hence,	  we	  believe	  our	  new	  theory	  adds	  to	  these	  existing	  research	  streams.	  	  	  In	  the	  new	  product	  development	  literature,	  a	  qualitative	  study	  by	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell	  (1992)	  observed	  that	  “ambassadorial”	  activities	  of	  new	  product	  development	  teams,	  information	  seeking,	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  activities	  and	  ‘guarding’	  of	  the	  innovation	  process	  within	  a	  team	  were	  key	  to	  success.	  However,	  these	  researchers	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  interaction	  of	  team	  processes	  and	  these	  ambassadorial	  activities.	  Although	  NPD	  teams	  generally	  do	  not	  experience	  the	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty	  that	  BMI	  teams	  experience,	  we	  hope	  our	  theory	  will	  inspire	  new	  team-­‐based	  theory	  of	  radical	  product	  innovation	  (i.e.,	  NPD	  that	  is	  relatively	  uncertain)	  as	  well.	  	  We	  believe	  our	  work	  also	  contributes	  to	  social	  network	  theory.	  Social	  network	  theorists	  have	  already	  examined	  which	  types	  of	  networks	  facilitate	  innovation	  (Uzzi	  &	  Spiro,	  2005)	  and	  even	  focused	  on	  teams	  (Reagans	  &	  McEvily,	  2003).	  However,	  as	  Kilduff	  and	  Brass	  said	  in	  their	  recent	  (2010)	  overview	  of	  social	  network	  theory,	  “(p)erhaps	  the	  most	  frequent	  criticism	  of	  social	  network	  research	  is	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  human	  agency.	  (italics	  added)...	  and	  to	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show	  how	  “intentional,	  creative	  human	  action	  serves	  in	  part	  to	  constitute	  those	  very	  social	  networks	  that	  so	  powerfully	  constrain	  actors	  in	  turn.”	  New	  theory	  as	  developed	  in	  our	  paper	  on	  how	  and	  why	  specific	  leadership	  styles	  strengthen	  a	  team’s	  common	  identity	  and	  purpose,	  motivating	  team	  members	  to	  better	  use	  their	  existing	  social	  networks,	  is	  perhaps	  one	  promising	  opportunity	  to	  begin	  to	  fill	  this	  gap.	  	  	  Likewise,	  social	  psychologists	  have	  studied	  team	  creativity	  and	  innovation	  as	  output	  variables,	  but	  did	  not	  examine	  how	  and	  why	  a	  team’s	  internal	  processes	  (e.g.,	  team	  leadership	  and	  identity	  formation)	  interact	  with	  external	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  and	  other	  resources	  through	  its	  external	  networks.	  We	  developed	  such	  new	  theory	  for	  the	  context	  of	  BMI:	  on	  how	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  styles	  interact	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  influence	  on	  performance	  and	  why,	  as	  teams	  move	  from	  BMI	  concept	  to	  development.	  	  More	  fundamentally,	  we	  believe	  TIMOTI	  offers	  a	  new	  theoretical	  platform	  for	  studying	  how	  and	  why	  BMI	  teams	  contribute	  to	  performance,	  and	  perhaps	  when	  and	  where	  (i.e.,	  under	  which	  conditions,	  cf.	  Whetten,	  1989).	  TIMOTI	  could,	  for	  instance,	  inspire	  new	  theory	  and	  propositions	  on	  additional	  team	  tasks	  and	  roles	  such	  as	  shared	  leadership	  (Pearce	  &	  Conger,	  2002)	  or	  additional	  mediating	  factors	  such	  as	  team	  development	  and	  learning.	  The	  model	  could	  be	  expanded	  to	  stages	  such	  as	  “launch”	  and	  “scaling	  up.”	  Insights	  from	  other	  disciplines	  than	  innovation	  management,	  social	  psychology	  of	  teams	  and	  leadership,	  and	  social	  network	  theory,	  could	  be	  added	  as	  well,	  expanding	  the	  model	  in	  fundamental	  ways.	  We	  hope	  our	  theoretical	  framework	  will	  inspire	  such	  new	  theory.	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  We	  hope	  our	  new	  theory	  will	  inspire	  empirical	  work	  as	  well,	  theoretically	  extending	  and	  empirically	  testing	  the	  theory	  and	  propositions	  developed	  in	  this	  paper.	  We	  strongly	  encourage	  qualitative	  work	  as	  well.	  We	  think	  we	  argue	  on	  good	  grounds	  that	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  are	  important	  in	  BMI	  settings;	  however,	  qualitative	  research	  may	  reveal	  other,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  more	  important	  drivers	  of	  the	  BMI	  process	  and	  performance	  at	  the	  various	  stages.	  	  	  Such	  qualitative	  research	  is	  particularly	  important	  when	  studying	  non-­‐traditional	  settings	  for	  management,	  i.e.,	  other	  than	  the	  West	  where	  most	  of	  our	  theories	  come	  from,	  including	  our	  theories	  on	  teams,	  leadership	  and	  social	  networks.	  Qualitative	  work	  on	  BMI	  in	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  South	  America	  would	  add	  much	  to	  our	  study	  (Barkema	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Particularly,	  if	  such	  work	  extended	  to	  examining	  BMI	  in	  organizations	  which	  are	  currently	  virtually	  ignored	  by	  management	  researchers,	  such	  those	  serving	  the	  4	  billion	  people	  at	  the	  “economic	  base	  of	  the	  pyramid”	  (George	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Qualitative	  work	  on	  BMI,	  including	  ethnographic	  studies,	  on	  how	  new	  businesses	  evolve	  over	  time	  in	  congruence	  with	  social	  impact	  (and	  what	  this	  means	  for	  recipients)	  might	  potentially	  offer	  important	  new	  insights	  to	  the	  field	  of	  BMI,	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  management,	  to	  the	  social	  psychology	  of	  teams	  and	  leadership	  and	  to	  social	  network	  theory	  as	  well.	  	  	  




How	  Projective	  Agency	  Influences	  Action	  in	  Social	  Networks	  	  
	  
Abstract:	  	  This	  study	  of	  37	  London-­‐based	  venture	  capital	  partners	  and	  associates	  (VCs)	  inductively	  examines	  their	  espoused	  ‘networking	  strategies’.	  	  	  By	  examining	  the	  changes	  in	  these	  strategies	  from	  VCs’	  entry	  into	  the	  field	  across	  their	  career,	  and	  by	  considering	  these	  trajectories	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  VC’s	  firm,	  I	  develop	  grounded	  theory	  about	  actor	  behavior	  in	  networks.	  	  The	  derived	  theories	  are	  novel,	  in	  part	  because	  they	  are	  concerned	  with	  ‘projective	  agency’	  (Emirbayer	  &	  Mische	  1998):	  how	  actors’	  plans,	  beliefs	  and	  attributions	  about	  the	  future	  influence	  their	  choice	  of	  networking	  actions.	  	  Where	  actors’	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  diverge,	  I	  find	  and	  posit	  three	  logics	  underlying	  their	  choices:	  	  a	  logic	  of	  reputation	  diffusion,	  a	  logic	  of	  “right	  conduct”	  and	  a	  logic	  of	  differentiation	  from	  peers.	  	  I	  also	  examine	  VC’s	  network-­‐related	  cognition,	  by	  considering	  the	  metaphors	  through	  which	  they	  conceive	  of	  their	  networks.	  	  Efforts	  to	  ‘put	  the	  agent	  back	  in’	  to	  network	  theory	  are	  argued	  to	  be	  advanced	  when	  researchers	  focus	  on	  questions	  of	  the	  actor’s	  motivation	  for	  selecting	  a	  particular	  networking	  action	  and	  in	  particular	  on	  ‘projective	  agency’.	  	  	  	  When	  Mark	  Granovetter	  published	  his	  seminal	  “Getting	  a	  Job”	  in	  1974,	  his	  intention	  was	  to	  socialize	  the	  way	  we	  understood	  the	  search	  for	  employment.	  	  He	  found	  that	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  for	  professional,	  technical	  and	  managerial	  staff,	  previous,	  economically	  derived	  models	  of	  search	  by	  jobseekers	  were	  inadequate:	  	  people	  and	  jobs	  were	  matched	  through	  a	  mutual	  search	  process	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engaged	  in	  by	  would-­‐be	  employer	  and	  jobseeker,	  a	  process	  shaped	  by	  the	  actors’	  pre-­‐existing	  networks	  and	  chance	  as	  much	  as	  or	  more	  than	  any	  actor	  agency.	  	  He	  found	  that	  those	  jobseekers	  whose	  search	  patterns	  were	  less	  deliberate	  were	  more	  successful—in	  essence,	  that	  higher	  status	  actors	  had	  less	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  active	  search,	  and	  that	  when	  they	  did	  decide	  to	  change	  jobs,	  they	  secured	  better	  outcomes.	  	  	  In	  the	  intervening	  40	  years,	  this	  model	  of	  a	  socialized	  matching	  process,	  arising	  when	  there	  is	  both	  egocentric	  uncertainty	  for	  the	  seeker	  and	  altercentric	  uncertainty	  for	  the	  sought	  (Walker	  et	  al,	  1997,	  Podolny,	  1993,	  1994,	  2005)	  has	  assumed	  greater	  significance	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  organisations	  and	  change.	  	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  aspects	  of	  economic	  life	  inside	  (Tsai,	  2001,	  2002;	  Kilduff	  &	  Tsai,	  2003;	  Reagans	  &	  McEvily,	  2003;	  Burt,	  2000,	  2004;	  Oh	  et	  al,	  2004;	  Obstfeld,	  2005;	  Kleinbaum,	  2012)	  organisations	  have	  moved	  away	  from	  hierarchy	  to	  networks;	  it	  is	  partly	  because	  often,	  relations	  between	  (Cook,	  1977;	  Powell	  et	  al,	  1996;	  Zaheer	  et	  al,	  2000;	  Prahalad	  &	  Krishnan,	  2008,	  Baum	  et	  al,	  2005,	  Ahuja	  et	  al,	  2012)	  organisations	  have	  moved	  away	  from	  a	  market	  basis	  to	  a	  network	  basis;	  it	  is	  partly	  because	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  networks	  which	  always	  existed	  alongside	  both	  types	  of	  relationships	  has	  become	  clearer	  (Padgett	  &	  Powell,	  2012).	  	  	  Both	  inside	  firms	  and	  between	  them,	  innovation	  activity’s	  interaction	  with	  networks	  (Ancona	  &	  Caldwell,	  1992;	  Ahuja,	  2000;	  von	  Hippel,	  2005;	  Birkinshaw,	  2006)	  has	  been	  much	  studied,	  as	  the	  challenge	  of	  navigating	  the	  uncertainty	  that	  always	  accompanies	  innovative	  activity	  is	  often	  addressed	  by	  participants’	  use	  of	  social	  cues	  to	  evaluate	  and	  determine	  potential	  future	  value.	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  However,	  a	  structural	  model	  showing	  how	  matching	  takes	  place,	  and	  its	  antecedents,	  leaves	  many	  questions	  of	  agentic	  action	  unanswered.	  	  Powell	  &	  Padgett	  (2012)	  epigrammatically	  argue	  that	  “in	  the	  short	  run,	  actors	  create	  relations;	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  relations	  create	  actors.”	  	  A	  socialized	  matching	  model	  helps	  us	  see	  how	  relations	  constrain	  and	  thus	  “create”	  actors:	  	  but	  rounding	  out	  a	  theory	  of	  action	  in	  networks	  requires	  that	  we	  develop	  a	  rich	  understanding	  of	  the	  short-­‐run	  side	  of	  this	  divide.	  	  After	  fully	  allowing	  for	  structure’s	  influence	  on	  initial	  network	  position,	  what	  choices,	  decisions	  and	  behaviors	  by	  actors	  lead	  to	  variance	  in	  outcomes?	  	  How	  does	  the	  high-­‐status	  seeker	  trigger	  approaches	  by	  desirable	  would-­‐be	  employers,	  or	  ensure	  her	  reputation	  for	  high-­‐quality	  work	  is	  known	  and	  understood	  by	  the	  relevant	  part	  of	  her	  network?	  	  How	  (and	  under	  what	  circumstances)	  does	  the	  low-­‐status	  seeker	  successfully	  compensate	  for	  gaps	  in	  or	  blots	  on	  his	  credentials	  or	  reputation?	  	  As	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  structural	  antecedents	  of	  network	  outcomes	  grows,	  the	  clamour	  of	  those	  who	  ask	  that	  we	  incorporate	  an	  understanding	  of	  agentic	  action	  back	  into	  our	  theory	  of	  networks	  has	  also	  grown.	  	  Individuals	  and	  firms	  ask	  ‘how	  can	  I	  achieve	  a	  position	  of	  network	  advantage’	  (Burt,	  Kilduff	  &	  Tasselli,	  2013)?	  	  Managers	  ask,	  ‘how	  can	  I	  facilitate	  emergence	  from	  my	  network,	  or	  orchestrate	  collaboration,	  beneficial	  to	  my	  firm’	  (Greve	  et	  al,	  2013)?	  	  Scholars	  ask	  which	  aspects	  of	  agents’	  choices	  and	  behaviours	  are	  significant	  enough	  to	  surmount	  the	  structural	  constraints	  of	  the	  networks	  in	  which	  they	  are	  enacted	  (Burt,	  Merluzzi	  &	  Burrows,	  2013;	  Gargiulo	  &	  Ertug	  2014),	  and	  how	  actors	  can	  shape	  networks	  and	  through	  them	  influence	  outcomes	  (Baum	  et	  al,	  2000;	  Smith	  &	  Autio,	  2011;	  Hallen	  &	  Eisenhardt,	  2012).	  	  	  As	  we	  try	  to	  increase	  our	  understanding	  of	  change	  and	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dynamics	  in	  networks,	  the	  temporal	  embeddedness	  of	  agency—in	  the	  actor’s	  past	  and	  in	  her	  past	  network	  connections	  (Soda	  et	  al,	  2004),	  and	  in	  the	  future	  the	  actor	  sees	  for	  herself—has	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  make.	  	  	  The	  pursuit	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  individual	  differences,	  leading	  in	  turn	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  short	  run	  agency	  in	  network	  contexts,	  is	  in	  its	  relatively	  early	  stages.	  	  It	  is	  a	  challenge,	  not	  least	  because	  network	  scholars	  are	  using	  tools	  and	  theories	  derived	  from	  a	  structuralist	  understanding	  of	  the	  world;	  using	  such	  tools	  to	  flush	  out	  individual	  action	  and	  choice	  is	  sometimes	  an	  awkward	  fit:	  	  if	  a	  study’s	  dependent	  variable	  is	  network	  structure,	  then	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  effects	  of	  individual	  choices	  within	  the	  structure,	  one	  must	  ‘peer	  through’	  the	  deterministic	  aspects	  of	  the	  structure	  (such	  as	  the	  stratification	  of	  the	  network	  and	  thus	  of	  tie	  formation	  opportunities	  through	  status	  ordering)	  and	  of	  generalized	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  homophily,	  preferential	  attachment,	  reciprocity,	  imitation,	  balance,	  transitivity,	  and	  the	  repeated	  activation	  of	  embedded	  ties,	  to	  find	  the	  indeterminate	  moments	  when	  choice	  influences	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	  prior	  work	  on	  individuals	  in	  networks	  has	  taken	  one	  of	  three	  approaches.	  	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  a	  group	  of	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Burt	  et	  al,	  1998;	  Kalish	  &	  Robins,	  2006)	  that	  take	  some	  aspect	  of	  relatively	  stable	  individual	  difference,	  such	  as	  personality,	  and	  extrapolate	  the	  influence	  it	  has	  on	  network	  outcomes.	  	  Notable	  findings	  from	  this	  thread	  are	  those	  suggesting	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  achieve	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advantageous	  network	  positions	  (Mehra	  et	  al,	  2001;	  Kilduff	  &	  Krackhardt	  2008;	  Sasovova	  et	  al	  2010)	  and	  that	  they	  have	  superior	  network	  acuity/perception	  (Casciaro,	  1998).	  	  Some	  research	  examines	  stable	  individual	  endowments	  such	  as	  sex	  (Brass,	  1985;	  Ibarra,	  1992)	  and	  draws	  strong	  inferences	  about	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  individual	  difference	  leads	  to	  outcomes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  network	  structure.	  	  Recently,	  Burt	  (2013)	  proposed	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “network	  personality”	  which	  leads	  actors	  to	  create	  similar	  networks	  in	  each	  ab	  novo	  setting	  in	  which	  they	  find	  themselves.	  	  This	  research,	  unpicking	  the	  influence	  of	  individual	  difference	  on	  network	  outcomes,	  has	  been	  vital	  in	  establishing	  the	  case	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  such	  difference,	  presumed	  to	  drive	  divergent	  behavior	  in	  otherwise	  structurally	  equivalent	  situations.	  	  But	  it	  does	  not	  uncover	  the	  short	  run	  behavior	  itself:	  	  while	  the	  post-­‐analytical	  theorizing	  as	  to	  the	  mechanisms	  involved	  may	  be	  well-­‐reasoned	  and	  convincing	  in	  this	  work,	  it	  does	  not	  examine	  agency	  directly.	  	  Emirbayer	  and	  Mische	  (1998)	  propose	  that	  scholars	  examining	  agency	  should	  consider	  three	  distinctive	  (and	  empirically	  linked)	  dimensions	  of	  the	  construct.	  	  In	  their	  conception,	  these	  are	  “iterational”,	  “practical-­‐evaluative”	  and	  “projective”	  agency.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these,	  “iterational”	  agency,	  consists	  of	  the	  routines	  which,	  given	  an	  agent’s	  social	  situation,	  she	  selects	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  her	  ends,	  “sustaining	  identities,	  interactions	  and	  institutions	  over	  time”	  (p971).	  	  One	  could	  consider	  that	  these	  routines	  have	  been	  established	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  their	  persistence	  or	  diminuition/extinction	  in	  the	  present	  reveals	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  iterational	  agent	  to	  her	  environment	  (cf	  Garud	  &	  Rappa,	  1994).	  	  The	  second	  constituent	  dimension,	  “practical-­‐evaluative”	  agency,	  relates	  to	  the	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normative	  judgments	  and	  decisions	  “in	  response	  to	  the	  emerging	  demands,	  dilemmas	  and	  ambiguities	  of	  presently	  evolving	  situations.”	  (Emirbayer	  &	  Mische,	  1998,	  emphasis	  applied.)	  	  Finally,	  “projective”	  agency	  is	  the	  “imaginative	  generation	  by	  actors	  of	  possible	  future	  trajectories	  of	  action,	  in	  which	  received	  structures	  of	  thought	  and	  action	  may	  be	  creatively	  reconfigured	  in	  relation	  to	  actors’	  hopes,	  fears	  and	  desires	  for	  the	  future.”	  (ibid,	  emphasis	  applied.)	  	  	  	  The	  second	  strand	  of	  research	  on	  individuals	  in	  networks,	  which	  “search	  for	  agency”	  by	  directly	  examining	  individual	  behavior,	  are	  substantially	  based	  on	  a	  search	  for	  the	  “iterational”	  dimension	  of	  agency.	  	  	  	  Exemplifying	  research	  that	  identifies	  iterational	  network	  routines	  is	  Bensaou	  et	  al	  (2013),	  which	  examines	  networking	  behavior	  among	  employees	  in	  a	  firm	  of	  accountants,	  and	  through	  cluster	  analysis	  finds	  that	  some	  consider	  networking	  a	  critical	  ongoing	  part	  of	  their	  roles,	  some	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  to	  be	  employed	  as	  necessary,	  and	  that	  some	  eschew	  overt	  networking	  behavior.	  	  The	  authors	  argue	  that	  this	  divergence	  results	  from	  the	  employees’	  schema	  and	  values	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  such	  behaviour.	  	  Vissa	  (2012),	  in	  a	  study	  of	  entrepreneurs’	  networking	  behavior,	  discovers	  a	  divide	  between	  networkers	  who	  attempt	  to	  make	  direct	  contacts	  with	  potential	  customers	  and	  those	  who	  build	  referral	  networks,	  and	  examines	  how	  the	  choice	  dynamically	  affects	  the	  shape	  of	  their	  network	  and	  the	  ties	  they	  seek	  to	  form.	  	  Illuminating	  divergent	  behavior	  in	  networks	  can	  provide	  an	  important	  jumping-­‐off	  point	  for	  examining	  the	  interplay	  of	  individual	  behavior	  and	  structural	  forces.	  	  And,	  routines	  that	  are	  artefacts	  of	  social	  pressures	  may	  possess	  a	  certain	  stability	  that	  makes	  them	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persist	  and	  be	  visible	  to	  the	  researcher	  as	  apparent	  evidence	  of	  agency	  through	  the	  deterministic	  cloud	  of	  contextual	  factors.	  But	  a	  focus	  on	  identifying	  and	  considering	  the	  impacts	  of	  routines	  established	  by	  actors	  in	  itself	  does	  not	  do	  much	  to	  advance	  the	  search	  for	  how	  individual	  action	  leads	  to	  network	  change.	  	  Routines	  established	  in	  the	  past,	  however	  divergent	  among	  a	  population	  of	  actors,	  have	  been	  constituted	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  structural	  conditions	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  their	  path	  dependency,	  far	  from	  helping	  establish	  the	  role	  of	  individual	  action,	  demonstrates	  the	  opposite:	  	  how	  agency	  is	  submerged	  by	  its	  context.	  	  Granovetter	  (1974)	  opens	  his	  study	  by	  identifying	  the	  paths	  available	  to	  actors	  for	  job	  hunting:	  	  applications	  in	  response	  to	  advertisement,	  speculative	  direct	  applications,	  and	  personal	  contacts.	  	  But	  fundamental	  to	  the	  socialized	  matching	  model	  he	  depicts	  is	  that	  the	  choice	  between	  these	  paths,	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  modelled	  by	  various	  labour	  market	  economists	  as	  one	  of	  rational	  evaluation	  of	  the	  direct	  and	  opportunity	  cost	  and	  likely	  utility	  of	  each	  approach,	  is	  in	  fact	  driven	  principally	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  one’s	  contacts	  and	  the	  search	  behavior	  of	  the	  employing	  counterparts.	  	  	  	  The	  third	  strand	  of	  research	  into	  individual	  behavior	  in	  networks	  examines	  individual	  problem-­‐solving	  in	  networks,	  and	  uncovers	  divergence	  in	  how	  actors	  deal	  with	  present	  ambiguities—in	  other	  words,	  questions	  of	  practical-­‐evaluative	  agency.	  	  Hallen	  (2008)	  proposes	  that	  there	  are	  periods	  of	  relatively	  “low	  network	  determinism”,	  in	  which	  dichotomous,	  network-­‐shaping	  outcomes	  are	  possible	  as	  a	  result	  of	  more	  or	  less	  effective	  or	  efficient	  individual	  action.	  	  Studies	  that	  seek	  to	  pinpoint	  such	  moments,	  and	  highlight	  ineffective	  or	  effective	  action	  in	  the	  crisis,	  typically	  focus	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  of	  network	  actors	  and	  
119 of 191 
their	  consequences.	  	  Such	  studies	  often	  derive	  from	  the	  entrepreneurship	  literature:	  	  Santos	  &	  Eisenhardt	  (2009)	  show	  entrepreneurs	  in	  nascent	  fields	  forming	  alliances	  with	  their	  future	  potential	  rivals	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  slowing	  down	  their	  rivals’	  competitive	  response;	  Hallen	  &	  Eisenhardt	  (2012)	  show	  entrepreneurs	  forming	  relational	  ties	  with	  a	  range	  of	  potential	  investors	  and	  using	  an	  event	  in	  the	  development	  of	  their	  venture	  to	  ‘trigger’	  an	  auction	  among	  them.	  	  Ancona	  &	  Caldwell	  (1992)	  introduce	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  network	  behaviors	  by	  innovation-­‐team	  boundary	  spanners	  which	  they	  argue	  are	  most	  effective	  in	  certain	  configurations.	  	  Lingo	  and	  O’Mahony	  (2012)	  show	  network	  brokers	  (Nashville	  music	  producers)	  navigating	  and	  adjudicating	  ambiguous	  claims	  regarding	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  actions	  in	  their	  purview	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  complete	  projects	  in	  which	  they	  are	  engaged.	  	  	  	  	  Of	  the	  three	  strands	  of	  research	  discussed,	  examinations,	  such	  as	  these,	  of	  how	  experts	  induce	  catalysis	  (the	  metaphor	  is	  Hallen	  and	  Eisenhardt’s)	  in	  their	  networks,	  are	  most	  direct	  in	  investigating	  “how”	  (cf	  Whetten,	  1989)	  individuals	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  their	  context	  and	  thus,	  I	  argue,	  advance	  us	  furthest	  in	  understanding	  how	  to	  tackle	  endogeneity	  problems	  in	  studying	  networks.	  	  The	  present	  study	  sits	  closest	  to	  the	  third	  strand	  of	  investigation	  and	  seeks	  to	  uncover	  network	  problem-­‐solving,	  practical-­‐evaluative	  action.	  	  Through	  its	  approach,	  it	  also	  exemplifies	  how	  the	  projective	  dimension	  of	  agency	  could	  be	  actively	  considered	  in	  individual-­‐focused	  network	  research	  and	  the	  benefits	  this	  could	  bring	  in	  richer	  theory.	  	  Whetten’s	  (ibid)	  call	  for	  theory	  to	  consider	  “why”,	  when	  applied	  to	  Emirbayer	  and	  Mische’s	  conception	  of	  agency,	  suggests	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researchers	  could	  consider	  not	  only	  why	  past	  iterational	  routines	  have	  developed,	  and	  why	  particular	  actions	  or	  configurations	  of	  actions	  are	  selected	  to	  attack	  present	  challenges,	  but	  also	  why	  actors	  make	  certain	  future-­‐oriented	  strategic	  choices	  in	  network	  development	  and	  shaping1.	  	  Questions	  about	  how	  goals,	  preferences,	  beliefs,	  emotions,	  interpretive	  schemas,	  aspirations	  to	  influence	  connections	  and	  attributions	  about	  enabling	  and	  constraining	  aspects	  of	  ego	  networks,	  may	  lead	  to	  differential	  behavior	  and	  superior	  performance,	  and	  to	  advantageous	  changes	  in	  network	  position	  and	  advantage,	  would	  all	  be	  salient	  in	  such	  an	  approach.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  such	  attributions	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  behaviors	  could	  also	  become	  important	  objects	  of	  study.	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  continued	  need	  in	  a	  “networked	  world”	  for	  an	  improved	  theory	  of	  action	  in	  networks,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “social	  capital”	  into	  non-­‐academic	  currency	  (Putnam,	  2000),	  and	  the	  advent	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years	  of	  online	  social	  networks	  have	  arguably	  (Fraser	  &	  Dutta,	  2010)	  have	  made	  the	  notion	  of	  strategic,	  future-­‐oriented	  management	  or	  shaping	  of	  one’s	  overall	  social	  networks	  more	  salient	  in	  managers’	  minds—so	  such	  theory	  may	  also	  be	  timely	  (Abrahamson	  &	  Fairchild,	  1999).	  	  	  	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  examine	  behavior	  in	  networks	  and	  to	  extend	  thinking	  about	  agentic	  action	  in	  networks	  beyond	  the	  current	  view,	  which	  
                                                
1	  There	  are	  a	  few	  studies	  examining	  firm	  strategic	  action	  in	  networks:	  	  Baum	  et	  al	  (2003)	  proposes	  
strategies	  of	  ‘insurgent	  partnering’	  by	  low	  status	  banks	  and	  ‘control	  partnering’	  by	  high	  status	  ones;	  
Gompers	  (1996)	  proposes	  VC	  firms	  with	  a	  limited	  track	  record	  and	  low	  network	  centrality	  take	  a	  
more	  short-­‐termist	  approach	  to	  their	  invested	  firms,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  reputation	  on	  which	  to	  
trade	  (though	  see	  discussion	  of	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  this	  study	  in	  ‘Settings’	  below.)	  	  Few	  (if	  
any)	  studies	  in	  the	  field	  of	  management	  directly	  examine	  individual	  strategic	  action	  in	  a	  network	  
context.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  many—possibly	  even	  the	  majority—of	  serious	  academic	  
investigations	  of	  strategic	  action	  by	  firms	  in	  networks	  have	  been	  produced	  in	  the	  form	  of	  conceptual	  
papers	  (Ibarra,	  1993;	  Gnyawali	  &	  Madhawan,	  2001;	  Koka	  et	  al,	  2006;	  Dhanaraj	  &	  Parkhe,	  2006.)	  	  This	  
is	  perhaps	  a	  telling	  indicator	  both	  of	  the	  ongoing	  significance	  of	  untangling	  choice	  and	  context,	  and	  of	  
the	  practical	  difficulties	  of	  investigating	  the	  phenomenon	  directly.	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focuses	  primarily	  on	  identifying	  routines,	  to	  consider	  future-­‐focused,	  strategic	  thinking	  and	  acting	  by	  networked	  individuals.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  explore	  how	  VCs,	  employed	  by	  firms	  of	  variable	  status:	  1. Allocate	  time	  between	  different	  ties	  and	  different	  categories	  of	  ties,	  selecting	  whether	  to	  “hunt”	  for	  new	  ties	  or	  to	  “nurture”	  or	  “harvest”	  the	  existing	  ones?	  	  When	  “hunting”,	  how	  do	  brokers	  2. Decide	  upon	  particular	  alters	  as	  potentially	  fruitful	  connections?	  3. Approach	  new	  prospective	  alters:	  	  what	  tactics	  are	  selected	  for	  forming	  relationships,	  and	  what	  efforts	  are	  made	  to	  influence	  or	  determine	  the	  basis	  (e.g.,	  social,	  quasi-­‐social,	  transactional,	  multiplex)	  of	  the	  relationship?	  	  When	  “harvesting”,	  how	  do	  brokers	  4. Select	  the	  desired	  content	  and	  affect	  of	  their	  communications	  with	  their	  ongoing	  alters?	  	  Once	  I	  had	  begun	  to	  analyse	  the	  data,	  an	  additional	  question	  emerged	  from	  the	  analysis.	  	  How	  do	  brokers	  5. Take	  the	  time	  horizon	  of	  their	  activities	  (the	  cycle	  speed	  of	  the	  types	  of	  transactions	  they	  conduct)	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  appropriate	  action?	  
These	  choices	  are	  constrained	  (Gulati	  and	  Srivastava,	  2014)	  by	  the	  information	  and	  other	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  actor,	  by	  the	  norms	  and	  expectations	  derived	  from	  the	  actor’s	  social	  position,	  by	  the	  actor’s	  skill	  in	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taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  choices,	  and	  her	  beliefs	  about	  the	  likely	  outcomes	  of	  the	  potential	  network-­‐altering	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  	  
Hunting	  and	  Harvesting	  The	  first	  of	  these	  five	  questions:	  	  the	  selection	  of	  “harvesting”	  strategies	  (exploiting	  opportunities	  from	  current	  network	  ties)	  or	  “hunting”	  strategies	  (reaching	  to	  new	  ties)	  is	  a	  significant	  puzzle	  in	  the	  existing	  literature.	  	  	  	  	  Powerful	  forces	  drive	  ‘hunting’	  behaviour	  by	  brokers.	  	  Greve	  et	  al	  (2013)	  show	  the	  pull	  of	  ‘greener	  pastures’	  in	  decisions	  to	  terminate	  ties,	  and	  Baum	  et	  al	  (2012)	  show	  the	  decline	  over	  time	  in	  returns	  to	  bridging,	  suggesting	  moving	  on	  is	  fruitful.	  	  Burt	  (2010)	  fingers	  social	  comparison	  and	  the	  need	  to	  have	  and	  refresh	  status	  in	  order	  to	  exercise	  brokerage	  as	  the	  motive	  force,	  suggesting	  moving	  on	  is	  necessary.	  	  Vissa	  (2012)	  highlights	  the	  search	  for	  complementary	  resources,	  suggesting	  moving	  on	  is	  driven	  by	  task	  contingency.	  	  Burt	  (2004)	  and	  McEvily	  et	  al	  (2012)	  point	  to	  accumulating	  knowledge	  and	  brokerage	  skill,	  suggesting	  brokers	  can	  enjoy	  a	  ‘return	  to	  knowledge’	  from	  moving	  on.	  	  Levin	  et	  al	  (2011)	  show	  how	  brokers	  build	  trust	  dyadically	  rather	  than	  through	  closure,	  and	  Sasovova	  et	  al	  (2010)	  how	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  can	  make	  appropriate	  self-­‐presentations,	  so	  they	  can	  move	  on	  without	  paying	  the	  full	  liabilities	  of	  new	  relationships	  lacking	  triadic	  connections.	  Mariotti	  and	  Delbridge	  (2012)	  show	  how	  potential	  and	  former	  ties	  make	  up,	  with	  existing	  ties,	  a	  portfolio	  (cf	  Ozcan	  and	  Eisenhardt,	  2009)	  of	  options,	  suggesting	  the	  right	  strategy	  is	  to	  optimise	  that	  portfolio.	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Yet	  we	  know	  brokers	  sometimes	  ‘stick	  around’.	  	  Obstfeld	  (2005)	  and	  Lingo	  and	  O’Mahony	  (2010)	  provide	  different	  stories	  about	  an	  orientation	  and	  a	  task	  contingency	  basis	  for	  boundary-­‐spanners	  to	  create	  closure	  rather	  than	  moving	  on.	  	  Knowing	  that	  brokers	  can	  sometimes	  see	  benefits	  from	  enriching	  their	  local	  structure	  instead	  of	  ‘hunting’	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  organisations,	  which	  require	  brokers	  not	  to	  be	  selfish	  or	  anti-­‐social	  but	  collaborative	  and	  co-­‐operative.	  	  Burt’s	  work	  highlights	  that	  the	  opportunity	  of	  brokerage	  is	  rent	  extraction–	  some	  of	  the	  rent	  is	  extracted	  from	  the	  organisation;	  cf	  Fleming	  et	  al’s	  (2007)	  concerns	  about	  problematic	  gatekeepers	  preventing	  innovation.	  	  Ancona	  and	  Caldwell	  (1992)	  note	  that	  to	  be	  successful,	  innovation	  teams	  need	  reach	  a	  point	  where	  they	  stop	  scanning	  and	  start	  building.	  	  Uzzi	  and	  Spiro	  (2005)	  and	  Uzzi	  (1996)	  point	  to	  the	  role	  of	  embeddedness	  and	  medium-­‐density	  local	  structure	  in	  successful	  collaboration.	  	  Fleming	  and	  Marx	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  brokers	  are	  poor	  at	  executing	  and	  diffusing	  the	  ideas	  they	  work	  on,	  because	  of	  their	  locally	  thin	  social	  capital.	  	  Centola	  and	  Macy	  (2007)	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  high	  bandwidth	  to	  diffusion	  of	  complex	  information.	  	  Reagans	  and	  McEvily	  (2008)	  show	  how	  local	  density	  provides	  the	  venue	  for	  diversity’s	  benefits	  to	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  execution.	  	  In	  all	  cases,	  the	  actions	  taken	  may	  or	  may	  not	  contribute	  to	  collective	  outcomes	  (Coleman	  1988)	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  objectives	  (Burt	  2000).	  	  I	  also	  consider	  how	  these	  behaviors	  change	  according	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  VC’s	  career	  and	  how	  the	  progress	  of	  that	  career	  influences	  the	  chosen	  behaviors.	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The	  setting	  is	  the	  venture	  capital	  industry	  in	  London.	  	  It	  is	  an	  attractive	  industry	  for	  this	  study,	  because	  VCs	  believe	  that	  their	  success	  depends	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  form	  connections	  with	  the	  right	  ventures	  for	  investment,	  the	  right	  syndication	  partners	  with	  whom	  to	  co-­‐invest	  in	  ventures,	  and	  the	  right	  complementary	  service	  providers	  and	  advisers	  who	  can	  add	  value	  not	  only	  to	  their	  own	  efforts	  but	  to	  those	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  which	  they	  invest.	  	  So,	  I	  expected	  to	  find	  the	  theoretically	  interesting	  activity	  being	  carried	  out	  at	  a	  high	  level	  of	  intensity;	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  I	  expected	  to	  find	  sophisticated	  networking	  strategists,	  who	  viewed	  their	  ability	  to	  manage	  and	  shape	  their	  networks	  as	  a	  core	  skill	  for	  success.	  	  It	  is	  notable,	  however,	  that,	  just	  as	  Granovetter	  was	  surprised	  when	  many	  of	  the	  professional,	  managerial	  and	  technical	  workers	  he	  studied	  did	  not,	  in	  practice,	  have	  a	  sophisticated	  story	  to	  relate	  about	  their	  career	  development	  and	  job	  search	  practices,	  so	  I	  found	  that	  just	  under	  half	  of	  the	  informants	  to	  this	  research	  either	  expressed	  considerable	  anxiety	  about	  whether	  what	  they	  had	  to	  say	  about	  how	  they	  approached	  networking	  approached	  the	  level	  of	  a	  “strategy”,	  or	  simply	  stated	  that	  they	  did	  not	  consider	  that	  they	  had	  a	  networking	  strategy.	  	  	  The	  underlying	  logic	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  develop	  grounded	  theory	  (Glaser	  and	  Strauss,	  1967)	  based	  on	  insights	  derived	  from	  the	  identified	  networking	  behaviours.	  	  Informants	  were	  asked	  to	  discuss	  their	  networking	  activity	  when	  they	  first	  entered	  the	  VC	  field	  (which	  in	  all	  cases	  followed	  a	  previous	  career	  in	  another	  industry)	  and	  their	  more	  recent	  or	  current	  networking	  activity.	  	  	  The	  major	  results	  from	  the	  study	  are	  theoretical	  insights	  concerning	  the	  choices	  actors	  made	  about	  their	  networking	  activities.	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Firstly,	  I	  found	  that	  actors	  of	  middle	  status,	  who	  faced	  ‘fear	  of	  missing	  out’,	  faced	  greater	  uncertainty	  and	  followed	  more	  divergent	  approaches	  to	  building	  their	  networks	  than	  those	  of	  highest	  and	  lowest	  status.	  	  	  
Secondly,	  I	  found	  that	  when	  actors	  entered	  new	  domains,	  they	  either	  followed	  associates	  of	  theirs	  who	  had	  moved	  more	  aggressively	  and	  who	  could	  provide	  them	  with	  reputation,	  information	  and	  resources	  in	  the	  new	  domain,	  or	  made	  sure	  to	  enter	  as	  early	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  domain	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  act	  as	  “pioneers”	  of	  the	  domain	  and	  avoid	  damage	  to	  their	  status	  from	  being	  perceived	  as	  a	  bandwagon-­‐jumper.	  	  
Thirdly,	  I	  found	  that,	  as	  expected,	  status	  ordering	  constrained	  both	  available	  network	  opportunities	  and	  shaped	  actors’	  view	  of	  their	  best	  opportunities—but	  that	  responses	  to	  these	  constraints	  varied	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  networking	  “venues”,	  choice	  of	  partners	  were	  selected.	  	  These	  divergent	  responses	  arose	  from	  three	  “logics”:	  	  a	  logic	  of	  spreading	  the	  actor’s	  reputation;	  a	  logic	  of	  initiating	  effective	  relationships	  with	  alters	  through	  signalling	  “right	  conduct”;	  and	  a	  logic	  of	  differentiation.	  	  	  
Fourthly,	  I	  found	  that	  actors	  engaged	  in	  “threshold	  thinking”—building	  towards	  a	  desired	  networking	  goal	  through	  a	  set	  of	  sequential	  steps.	  	  	  
Fifthly,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  cycle	  speed	  of	  deal	  identification	  and	  consummation	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  VC	  industry	  influenced	  the	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  chosen	  by	  individuals.	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The	  primary	  contributions	  of	  the	  paper	  are:	  *to	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  platform	  through	  which	  to	  enable	  future	  empirical	  testing	  of	  effective	  networking	  tactics	  and	  strategies	  by	  individuals.	  	  By	  providing	  a	  partial	  typology	  of	  short	  run	  networking	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  used	  by	  actors	  who	  ‘network	  for	  a	  living’,	  and	  proposing	  contingencies	  regarding	  the	  links	  between	  these	  strategies,	  actors’	  network	  setting	  and	  actors’	  attributions	  and	  beliefs,	  I	  hope	  to	  advance	  the	  “search	  for	  agency”	  in	  networks.	  	  *to	  propose	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  ‘projective	  agency’	  and	  its	  link	  to	  behavior	  is	  a	  potentially	  valuable	  way	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  hunt	  for	  theoretically	  and	  practically	  significant	  findings	  in	  this	  arena.	  	  Next,	  I	  describe	  the	  setting,	  and	  what	  is	  known	  about	  the	  setting	  from	  the	  venture	  capital	  literature.	  	  Then,	  as	  normal	  with	  inductive	  research,	  I	  discuss	  the	  qualitative	  method	  used	  and	  its	  utility	  in	  theory-­‐building.	  	  I	  then	  describe	  the	  data	  and	  the	  insights	  derived	  from	  that	  data,	  and	  conclude	  by	  tying	  back	  these	  findings	  to	  the	  broader	  theory-­‐development	  effort.	  	  
SETTING—The	  Venture	  Capital	  Industry	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  industry	  is	  densely	  connected	  and	  relies	  extensively	  on	  referrals	  and	  strong	  social	  ties	  between	  its	  investors	  (Fried	  &	  Hisrich,	  1994).	  	  Network	  centrality	  is	  linked	  both	  with	  portfolio	  performance	  and	  the	  likely	  survival	  of	  portfolio	  firms	  (Hochberg	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  Its	  dense	  clusters	  raise	  barriers	  to	  entry:	  	  Hochberg	  et	  al	  (2010)	  show	  how	  tightly	  networked	  geographic	  VC	  clusters	  impede	  entry	  by	  other	  firms	  into	  their	  geographical	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markets,	  and	  show	  that	  entry	  by	  outsider	  firms	  is	  only	  normally	  possible	  through	  reciprocity:	  	  an	  outsider	  allows	  and	  establishes	  links	  with	  a	  multi-­‐sited	  firm	  in	  its	  home	  market	  (often	  with	  difficulty	  and	  while	  experiencing	  temporary	  sanctions	  from	  its	  local	  counterparts),	  and	  is	  then	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  reciprocity	  in	  entering	  a	  foreign	  market.	  	  In	  such	  densely	  clustered	  markets,	  startups	  get	  worse	  terms.	  	  Inderst	  and	  Muller	  (2004)	  show	  how	  ‘passing	  deals	  around’	  among	  central	  VC	  players	  limit	  a	  venture’s	  search	  time	  and	  effort,	  reducing	  the	  likelihood	  they	  will	  ever	  approach	  outsiders	  for	  funding	  and	  thus	  competition	  to	  provide	  funds.	  	  	  	  	  Yet	  within	  this	  density,	  the	  industry	  is	  also	  stratified	  (Elango	  et	  al,	  1995,	  Casamatta	  &	  Haritchabalet,	  2007)	  and	  characterized	  by	  status	  ordering	  (Podolny,	  2005)—	  the	  track	  record	  of	  firms	  and	  their	  partners	  determines	  their	  ability	  to	  raise	  money	  from	  Limited	  Partners	  (LPs)	  (Gompers	  &	  Lerner,	  2001)	  and	  thus,	  in	  functional	  terms,	  the	  size	  of	  their	  investment	  pots.	  	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  cleavages	  is	  between	  investing	  firms	  which	  specialize	  in	  early	  stage	  investments,	  when	  ventures	  have	  not	  yet	  secured	  market	  traction	  with	  customers	  and	  require	  relatively	  small	  investments	  to	  progress	  their	  ventures	  to	  further	  milestones,	  and	  those	  firms	  which	  specialize	  in	  later	  stage	  investments	  in	  which	  the	  market	  potential	  of	  new	  ventures’	  offerings	  are	  proven	  to	  some	  extent	  (Elango	  et	  al	  1995)	  and	  larger	  sums	  are	  needed	  to	  “roll	  out”	  the	  venture’s	  business	  model.	  	  The	  networking	  and	  relational	  behavior	  of	  small	  and	  early	  stage-­‐focused	  VC	  investors	  and	  large,	  later	  stage-­‐focused	  investors	  differs	  markedly	  (Gompers,	  1995,	  Hochberg	  et	  al	  2011),	  as	  one	  might	  expect	  and	  indeed	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as	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  present	  study	  confirm.	  	  Newcomer	  firms	  who	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  remain	  small/early-­‐stage	  (some	  claim	  they	  intend	  to	  remain	  specialists	  in	  the	  early	  stage)	  engage	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  behaviours	  designed	  to	  build	  their	  reputations.	  	  One	  example	  is	  the	  	  ‘grandstanding’	  described	  by	  Gompers	  (1996),	  bringing	  their	  invested	  firms	  to	  an	  IPO	  (initial	  public	  offering	  in	  the	  stockmarket)	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible2.	  	  Such	  a	  track	  record	  is	  needed	  not	  only	  to	  attract	  more	  deep-­‐pocketed	  LPs,	  but	  (Hochberg	  et	  al	  2007)	  to	  build	  the	  future	  ability	  to	  invite	  counterparts	  into	  joint	  investment/syndication	  deals	  (rather	  than	  only	  to	  await	  others’	  invitations),	  and	  to	  improve	  more	  generally	  the	  VC	  firm’s	  network	  centrality.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  describing	  what	  we	  already	  know	  about	  the	  networking	  behaviours	  and	  context	  of	  venture	  capital	  partners	  and	  associates,	  we	  break	  the	  investment	  process	  down	  into	  three	  partly	  overlapping	  phases	  of	  activity:	  	  scanning	  for	  opportunities;	  matching	  and	  negotiating	  with	  an	  entrepreneurial	  team	  over	  a	  desired	  investment;	  and,	  syndicating	  investment	  rounds	  with	  fellow	  VC	  firms.	  	  	  	  	  
Scanning—how	  do	  VCs	  select	  investment	  targets?	  	  VCs	  are	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  portfolio	  of	  investments,	  in	  the	  knowledge	  and	  expectation	  that	  only	  some	  will	  yield	  a	  positive	  return.	  	  The	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  venture	  development	  process	  is	  profound—VCs	  do	  not	  know	  
                                                
2	  The	  paper	  positing	  this	  ‘grandstanding’	  phenomenon	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  cited	  in	  the	  entire	  VC	  
literature;	  however,	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  VC-­‐venture	  market	  a	  matching	  process,	  and	  one	  driven	  by	  
omnidirectional	  status	  signals,	  we	  must	  also	  at	  least	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  negative	  status	  
marker	  associated	  with	  early-­‐stage	  investment	  from	  a	  smaller,	  younger	  VC	  firm	  creates	  a	  path	  
dependence:	  	  that	  the	  costs	  for	  a	  venture	  which	  has,	  early	  on,	  accepted	  ‘low	  status	  money’,	  to	  later	  
trade	  up	  to	  ‘high	  status	  money’	  compare	  unfavourably	  with	  the	  costs	  of	  achieving	  an	  IPO,	  albeit	  on	  
average	  a	  smaller	  one	  than	  might	  have	  been	  achieved	  by	  ventures	  who	  followed	  the	  royal	  road	  from	  
the	  beginning	  of	  their	  journey.	  	  As	  always	  in	  markets	  where	  socialized	  matching	  takes	  place,	  one	  must	  
be	  careful	  to	  avoid	  the	  fallacy	  of	  considering	  that	  either	  side	  is	  the	  principal	  driver	  of	  the	  process.	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the	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  ventures	  they	  are	  evaluating	  and	  seeking	  to	  back.	  	  This	  is	  not	  primarily	  an	  informational	  asymmetry—founding	  teams	  may	  know	  the	  truth	  or	  falsehood	  of	  some	  of	  the	  claims	  they	  make	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  support	  (Amit	  et	  al	  1998,	  Cable	  &	  Shane	  1997),	  but	  like	  the	  VCs,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  model	  the	  likelihood	  of	  their	  own	  success	  (Cooper	  et	  al	  1988,	  Cassar	  2010,	  Dushnitsky	  2010).	  	  While	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight	  we	  can	  discern	  evidence	  of	  “sorting”	  skill	  among	  VCs	  (Sorensen,	  2007),	  through	  which	  ‘smart	  money’	  evidences	  itself	  by	  choosing	  good	  ventures	  to	  invest	  in,	  the	  knowledge	  of	  smart	  money’s	  theoretical	  post	  hoc	  existence	  is	  not	  of	  much	  practical	  help	  to	  the	  VC	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  be	  smart.	  	  Nor,	  indeed,	  is	  experience	  in	  the	  market	  a	  guaranteed	  positive—Shepherd	  et	  al	  (2003)	  show	  that	  beyond	  14	  years	  of	  experience,	  typical	  individual	  VC	  performance	  actually	  declines	  overall.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  three	  principal	  factors	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  influencing	  the	  fit	  with	  a	  particular	  investment	  target:	  	  reputation,	  beliefs	  about	  the	  value	  of	  certain	  traits	  and	  behaviours,	  and	  expertise.	  	  
	  
Fit	  with	  reputation.	  	  As	  the	  “pipes	  and	  prisms”	  (Podolny,	  2001)	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  of	  network	  ties	  in	  markets	  suggests,	  in	  situations	  of	  profound	  uncertainty,	  investors	  rely	  on	  and	  place	  great	  importance	  on	  the	  network	  ties,	  human	  capital	  and	  affiliations	  (as	  proxies	  for	  network	  ties)	  of	  the	  founding	  team	  (Higgins	  &	  Gulati,	  2003;	  Shane	  &	  Cable	  2002)	  in	  deciding	  which	  teams	  to	  back.	  	  This	  emphasis	  may	  be	  particularly	  marked	  at	  the	  earliest	  stage	  of	  firm	  development,	  when	  the	  team	  has	  yet	  achieved	  relatively	  little	  beyond	  the	  act	  of	  forming	  itself,	  although	  this	  has	  been	  so	  far	  examined	  primarily	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	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wooing	  venture	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  the	  evaluating	  VC	  (Hallen,	  2008,	  Hallen	  &	  Eisenhardt	  2012).	  	  	  It	  is	  unclear	  (Baum	  &	  Silverman	  2004)	  how	  much	  the	  functional	  pipes	  weigh	  in	  such	  decisions,	  relative	  to	  those	  of	  the	  status-­‐marking	  prisms.	  	  The	  pipes—the	  connections	  themselves—may	  enable	  the	  team	  to	  effect	  their	  operational	  aims	  of	  securing	  needed	  resources	  and	  information,	  and	  of	  diffusing	  the	  news	  of	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  venture.	  	  The	  prisms—through	  which	  the	  reflected	  status	  of	  alters	  are	  perceived—serve	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  underlying	  social	  capital	  quality,	  i.e.,	  their	  likely	  ability	  to	  form	  new	  high-­‐status	  connections,	  and	  of	  the	  past	  inclination	  and	  skill	  of	  founding	  team	  members	  in	  building	  valuable	  network	  connections.	  	  Some	  evidence	  that	  the	  prisms	  are	  the	  critical	  discriminator	  is	  provided	  by	  VC’s	  expectations	  that	  once	  they	  invest,	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  replace	  members	  and	  augment	  the	  team	  (Sapienza	  &	  Timmons,	  1989)	  and	  to	  bring	  their	  own	  network	  ties	  to	  the	  service	  of	  the	  venture	  (Elango	  et	  al	  1995,	  Pratch	  2005);	  thus,	  they	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  more	  neutral	  about	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  team’s	  functional	  ties	  and	  more	  concerned	  about	  the	  implications	  for	  status	  of	  the	  team’s	  track	  record	  and	  reputation.	  	  
Fit	  with	  values,	  attributions	  and	  relationship	  preferences.	  	  Matusik	  et	  al	  (2008)	  find	  that	  VCs	  rate	  founders	  more	  highly	  when	  there	  is	  a	  match	  between	  their	  own	  pre-­‐existing	  values	  about	  the	  relative	  significance	  for	  success	  in	  business	  of	  various	  personality	  traits	  or	  behaviours	  (e.g.,	  extraversion,	  sales	  experience,	  academic	  orientation,	  past	  achievement,	  management	  experience)	  and	  the	  traits	  exhibited	  by	  the	  founder.	  	  	  
131 of 191 
Fit	  with	  expertise.	  	  Sorensen	  (2008)	  demonstrates	  that	  individual	  VCs	  who	  evaluate	  new	  opportunities	  in	  part	  through	  a	  learning	  model	  achieve	  superior	  returns:	  	  new	  opportunities	  which	  present	  ways	  to	  apply	  learning	  acquired	  from	  the	  VC’s	  past	  investments	  are	  on	  average	  more	  attractive	  and	  more	  generative.	  	  Kaplan	  et	  al	  (2009)	  show	  the	  influence	  of	  whether	  the	  VC	  envisages	  an	  expertise-­‐based	  relationship	  with	  the	  firm	  post-­‐investment.	  	  Though	  the	  evidence	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	  advice	  from	  VCs	  post-­‐investment	  is	  mixed,	  (MacMillan	  et	  al	  1989;	  Barney	  et	  al	  1996),	  Knockaert	  and	  Vanacker	  (2013)	  show	  that	  VCs	  who	  intend	  to	  support	  their	  invested	  venture	  through	  involving	  themselves	  in	  value-­‐added	  activities	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  select	  ventures	  (and	  founding	  teams)	  which	  they	  judge	  require	  assistance	  of	  this	  kind,	  whereas	  those	  who	  intend	  to	  provide	  little	  such	  involvement	  will	  select	  ventures	  and	  teams	  they	  perceive	  to	  be	  competent	  to	  progress	  the	  venture	  without	  their	  close	  involvement.	  	  Kanniainen	  &	  Keuschnigg	  (2003)	  propose,	  in	  modelling	  the	  optimal	  portfolio	  size	  for	  a	  given	  VC	  to	  manage,	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  support	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  the	  VC	  form	  part	  of	  the	  negotiation	  over	  financial	  terms	  of	  the	  investment,	  and	  that	  venture	  teams	  expect	  superior	  investment	  terms	  from	  VCs	  who	  do	  not	  offer	  hands-­‐on	  involvement	  with	  the	  business	  (irrespective	  of	  whether	  such	  advice	  is	  actually	  value-­‐adding,	  it	  appears	  both	  VCs	  and	  founders	  expect	  it	  to	  be	  so.)	  	  	  
	  
Matching	  and	  Negotiation	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  entrepreneurial	  team,	  the	  choice	  of	  an	  initial	  connection	  into	  the	  financial	  domain	  through	  the	  identity	  of	  their	  first	  investor	  is	  a	  vital	  one.	  	  Those	  who	  are	  able	  to	  form	  a	  connection	  with	  a	  high	  status	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investment	  partner	  see	  a	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  future	  higher	  status	  (Milanov	  &	  Shepherd	  2013)	  and	  progress	  to	  an	  initial	  public	  offering	  or	  other	  exit	  (Sorensen	  2007,	  Hochberg	  et	  al	  2010,	  Pollock	  et	  al	  2009).	  	  Further,	  those	  firms	  which	  are	  able	  to	  form	  such	  ties	  through	  their	  founders’	  ties	  are	  more	  likely	  able	  to	  achieve	  investment	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  of	  their	  development,	  rather	  than	  having	  to	  leverage	  proof	  of	  executing	  early	  milestones	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  business	  in	  order	  to	  form	  investment	  ties	  (Hallen,	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  Those	  founding	  teams	  whose	  high-­‐status	  first	  connection	  has	  a	  history	  of	  collaboration	  with	  its	  local	  VC	  network	  are	  blessed	  with	  even	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  eventual	  IPO	  success	  (Hochberg	  et	  al,	  2007).	  
Conversely,	  those	  who	  affiliate	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  with	  a	  lower	  status	  VC	  may	  experience	  an	  ‘illegitimacy	  discount’	  (Zuckerman,	  1999,	  Podolny,	  2005)	  and	  thus	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  ‘climb	  the	  ladder’	  to	  higher-­‐status	  investors	  when	  later	  raising	  investment.	  	  To	  some	  extent,	  low	  reputation	  is	  also	  a	  marker	  of	  low	  quality,	  and	  thus	  firms	  with	  low-­‐status	  investment	  partners	  may	  expect	  to	  be	  less	  able	  to	  access	  good	  advice	  and	  useful	  connections	  through	  this	  conduit.	  	  Venture	  founders	  well	  understand	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  high	  status	  initial	  investor:	  Hsu	  (2004)	  found,	  during	  the	  first	  dot-­‐com	  boom,	  during	  which	  a	  surplus	  of	  investable	  funds	  broke	  down	  some	  stratification	  and	  saw	  high-­‐reputation	  VCs	  making	  more	  early	  stage	  investments,	  that	  such	  firms	  were	  able	  to	  secure	  10-­‐14%	  better	  terms	  than	  others	  and	  to	  have	  their	  offers	  of	  investment	  accepted	  three	  times	  as	  often.	  	  	  	  The	  path	  dependencies	  created	  by	  status	  ordering	  are	  beginning	  to	  be	  well	  understood	  by	  scholars	  of	  market	  sociology	  (White,	  2008,	  Podolny,	  2005);	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Podolny	  argues	  that	  when	  an	  alliance	  is	  struck	  between	  two	  parties,	  there	  is	  a	  forced	  transfer	  of	  status	  between	  the	  two,	  implying	  a	  cost	  and	  risk	  associated	  with	  any	  exchange	  relations	  with	  a	  lower-­‐status	  alter.	  	  In	  situations	  of	  high	  uncertainty	  among	  the	  evaluative	  participants,	  this	  cost	  is	  heightened	  and	  the	  cleavage	  between	  low	  and	  high	  status	  market	  participants,	  Podolny	  argues,	  is	  therefore	  expected	  to	  be	  lasting.	  	  As	  discussed	  below,	  the	  progression	  of	  early	  stage	  ventures,	  usually	  (though	  not	  always)	  working	  with	  relatively	  lower	  status	  investors,	  to	  later	  stage,	  less	  uncertain	  ventures	  working	  with	  higher	  status	  investors,	  takes	  place	  through	  a	  mechanism	  of	  investment	  syndication.	  	  	  
Syndication	  The	  existence	  of	  syndication	  processes	  allows	  high	  status	  VCs	  to	  avoid	  much	  direct	  involvement	  with	  nascent	  ventures.	  	  They	  thus	  avoid	  potential	  “status	  leakage”;	  they	  are,	  through	  their	  high	  status,	  deep	  pockets	  and	  the	  repeated-­‐game	  reciprocity	  of	  the	  syndication	  process	  (Lerner,	  1994,	  Abell	  &	  Nisar,	  2007),	  able	  to	  achieve	  visibility	  of	  the	  most	  promising	  deals	  as	  they	  develop,	  without	  directly	  investing	  in	  them.	  Gompers	  et	  al	  (2009)	  found	  that	  specialist	  VC	  firms	  tended	  to	  outperform	  generalist	  ones,	  and	  that	  within	  generalist	  firms,	  specialization	  by	  individual	  VCs	  mitigated	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  the	  firm	  being	  generalist	  to	  some	  extent.	  	  	  	  	  Young	  and	  early	  stage	  firms	  also	  engage	  in	  a	  reciprocal	  game	  with	  larger,	  more	  well-­‐established	  firms,	  in	  which	  they	  seek	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  join	  syndicates	  in	  later	  stage	  investments.	  	  Like	  the	  ‘grandstanding’	  phenomenon	  in	  which	  low-­‐status	  VCs	  bring	  firms	  to	  the	  public	  markets	  quickly	  in	  order	  to	  build	  track	  record,	  
134 of 191 
‘window	  dressing’	  (Lerner,	  1994)	  involves	  joining	  syndicated	  later-­‐stage	  investments,	  closer	  to	  exit,	  on	  financial	  terms	  slightly	  less	  favourable	  than	  the	  higher-­‐status	  members	  enjoy,	  in	  order	  to	  later	  advertise	  to	  their	  LPs	  and	  other	  counterparts	  that	  it	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  a	  successful	  deal	  and	  exit.	  	  	  	  The	  avoidance	  of	  status	  leakage	  combined	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  “window	  dress”	  means	  that	  in	  the	  earliest	  rounds	  of	  investment	  in	  a	  venture,	  VCs	  with	  low	  status	  are	  likely	  to	  work	  with	  other	  low	  status	  VCs,	  and	  established	  firms	  with	  other	  established	  peers	  (Casamatta	  &	  Haritchabalet,	  2004).	  	  But	  in	  later	  rounds,	  as	  the	  venture	  is	  more	  developed,	  the	  uncertainty	  recedes,	  the	  costs	  of	  status	  leakage	  fall,	  and	  the	  most	  typical	  pattern	  of	  co-­‐investment	  is	  smaller	  VCs	  investing	  in	  deals	  initiated	  by	  the	  most	  experienced.	  	  Brander	  et	  al	  (2002)	  show	  that	  syndicated	  deals	  have	  higher	  returns;	  they	  advance	  the	  proposal	  that	  this	  derives	  from	  complementarity	  in	  skills,	  and	  their	  data	  appears	  to	  support	  this	  hypothesis,	  instead	  of	  a	  risk-­‐sharing	  logic	  (which	  should	  show	  up	  in	  lower	  returns	  compared	  to	  “unshared”	  deals,	  if	  syndication	  was	  primarily	  a	  form	  of	  hedge.)	  	  Overall,	  reciprocity	  pays	  off	  handsomely	  (Abell	  &	  Nisar,	  2007).	  	  	  This	  reciprocal	  game	  preserves	  stratification.	  	  Inexperienced	  VCs	  will	  syndicate	  whenever	  they	  can,	  while	  experienced	  ones	  will	  only	  syndicate	  with	  other	  experienced	  ones	  (Cestone	  et	  al	  2006.)	  	  Chahine	  et	  al	  (2011)	  show	  that	  in	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  a	  venture’s	  development	  prior	  to	  and	  just	  post-­‐exit,	  “messy”	  syndicates,	  i.e.,	  those	  with	  greater	  VC	  diversity	  in	  experience	  levels,	  have	  less	  effective	  corporate	  governance	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  more	  earnings	  management,	  higher	  underpricing,	  and	  lower	  after-­‐exit	  performance;	  they	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suggest	  that	  this	  arises	  from	  the	  difficulty	  of	  managing	  power	  imbalances	  within	  a	  group	  of	  VCs	  and	  the	  temptation	  for	  the	  higher	  status,	  better	  connected	  VCs	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  lower	  status	  VCs,	  by,	  for	  example,	  underpricing	  shares	  at	  IPO	  and	  allowing	  their	  contacts	  privileged	  access	  to	  the	  share	  offer.	  	  Effectively	  more	  diversity	  of	  status	  in	  the	  group	  reduces	  the	  penalty	  for	  anti-­‐social	  behavior	  by	  the	  highest-­‐status	  members,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  shareholders’	  collective	  interests.	  	  Another	  source	  of	  challenges	  for	  “mixed-­‐status”	  syndicates	  is	  hinted	  at	  by	  Clarysse	  et	  al	  (2012),	  who	  note	  that	  early	  stage	  investors	  lack	  an	  international	  perspective,	  making	  syndication	  difficult,	  as	  late-­‐stage	  money	  tends	  to	  come	  from	  the	  USA.	  	  	  	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  other	  rationales	  for	  syndication	  have	  been	  argued:	  	  most	  pervasively	  that	  syndication	  allows	  the	  correlation	  of	  multiple	  opinions	  about	  deal	  quality	  (Wilson,	  1968);	  less	  often,	  but	  persistently,	  that	  syndicates	  allow	  diverse	  value-­‐adding	  capabilities	  and	  diverse	  information	  flows	  residing	  in	  various	  VC	  firms	  to	  complement	  each	  other	  (Bygrave,	  1988)	  and	  that	  syndication	  creates,	  effectively,	  a	  “deep	  pocketed”	  investor	  to	  ensure	  resources	  can	  be	  provided	  on	  a	  timely	  basis	  to	  the	  venture	  as	  needed,	  reducing	  failure	  risk	  (Lockett	  &	  Wright,	  2001).	  	  However,	  scholars	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  repeated-­‐game	  reciprocation,	  and	  network	  phenomena	  such	  as	  homophily	  (Gompers	  et	  al	  2012)	  drive	  the	  composition	  of	  syndicates,	  even	  if	  these	  other	  types	  of	  benefits	  play	  a	  role	  in	  maintaining	  their	  institutional	  legitimacy.	  	  	  Chemmanur	  and	  Tian	  (2010)	  and	  Bubna	  et	  al	  (2011)	  show	  that	  complementarity	  combines	  with	  homophily	  to	  form	  cliques,	  which	  leads	  VCs	  to	  work	  with	  the	  same	  group	  repeatedly,	  especially	  on	  complex	  deals.	  	  Du	  (2009)	  shows	  that	  homophily-­‐based	  syndicates	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are	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  in	  terms	  of	  exit,	  but	  that	  VC	  firms	  who	  participate	  in	  heterogeneous	  syndicates	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  survive.	  	  	  
	  It	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  entire	  investment	  process	  is	  taking	  place	  against	  a	  background	  of	  resource	  pressures	  (Hochberg	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  Founding	  teams	  might	  like	  the	  optionality	  that	  high	  status	  and	  deep-­‐pocketed	  investment	  partners	  enjoy,	  to	  hold	  out	  indefinitely	  for	  the	  “right”	  partner;	  they	  require	  money	  to	  so	  hold	  out,	  and	  therefore	  rarely	  have	  the	  luxury.	  	  Smaller,	  lower-­‐status	  VC	  firms	  (many	  of	  which	  by	  definition	  lack	  partners	  with	  an	  extensive	  track	  record	  of	  investment	  success)	  are	  also	  under	  time	  pressure	  to	  invest	  early	  in	  the	  life	  of	  their	  fund	  and	  to	  bring	  at	  least	  one	  of	  these	  investments	  to	  a	  relatively	  early	  liquidity	  event.	  	  Time	  presses	  on	  the	  lowest	  status	  players	  more	  severely	  than	  on	  the	  established	  firms,	  and	  this	  drives	  the	  matching	  process.	  	  	  
Methods	  
Research	  Design	  	  I	  interviewed	  37	  VCs	  (venture	  capital	  Associates	  and	  Partners)	  who	  ranged	  in	  tenure	  from	  two	  to	  34	  years	  in	  the	  field,	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  describe	  their	  networking	  activities	  and	  strategy	  at	  the	  point	  they	  first	  entered	  the	  field,	  and	  their	  current	  networking	  activities	  and	  strategy.	  	  I	  entered	  the	  field	  with	  a	  vague	  research	  question	  (cf	  Sutton	  and	  Hargadon,	  1996)	  concerning	  the	  dynamics	  of	  situated	  actor	  networking	  behavior.	  	  The	  intention	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  typology	  of	  action,	  attributions	  concerning	  that	  action,	  and	  inference	  about	  mechanisms	  additional	  to	  those	  known	  in	  the	  literature,	  to	  provide	  a	  perspective	  on	  behavior	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and	  a	  guide	  for	  future	  research	  into	  this	  aspect	  of	  behavior	  (Glaser	  &	  Strauss,	  1967)	  rather	  than	  to	  create	  predictive	  theory.	  	  	  	  There	  were	  no	  initial	  hypotheses.	  	  One	  core	  assumption,	  derived	  from	  the	  venture	  capital	  literature	  informed	  the	  analysis:	  	  firstly,	  that	  status	  ordering	  as	  described	  by	  Podolny	  (2005)	  might	  be	  an	  important	  determinant	  of	  networking	  behaviours	  in	  this	  context.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  question,	  of	  course,	  also	  framed	  the	  analysis,	  according	  more	  with	  the	  repositioned	  (Bryant	  &	  Charmaz,	  2002)	  approach	  to	  grounded	  theory	  development	  than	  with	  the	  model	  originally	  put	  forward	  by	  Glaser	  and	  Strauss;	  significantly,	  the	  analysis	  focused	  on	  indications	  that	  desired	  future	  states	  influenced	  the	  actions	  that	  respondents	  described	  (Ajzen,	  1991,	  2011).	  	  Table	  1	  describes	  the	  37	  interviewees,	  who	  worked	  for	  15	  firms.	  	  The	  dataset	  includes	  29	  interviewees/12	  firms	  investing	  in	  ‘high	  tech’	  industries,	  typically	  software	  and	  telecoms,	  and	  8	  interviewees/3	  firms	  investing	  in	  the	  ‘biotech’	  industry.	  	  12	  of	  the	  interviewees	  were	  Partners	  and	  25	  less	  senior	  employees,	  typically	  “Associates”.	  	  Partners	  and	  less	  senior	  VC	  employees	  have	  similar	  networking	  goals	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  search	  for	  potential	  ventures	  in	  which	  to	  invest	  and	  for	  fellow	  firms	  of	  VCs	  with	  whom	  to	  co-­‐invest;	  Partners	  have	  the	  additional	  goal	  of	  networking	  with	  actual	  and	  potential	  Limited	  Partners	  (LPs)	  whose	  capital	  provides	  the	  financial	  substance	  of	  the	  VC	  firm.	  	  Except	  incidentally,	  the	  interviews	  did	  not	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  networking	  and	  building	  relationships	  with	  LPs.	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Data	  Collection	  I	  collected	  data	  between	  September	  2012	  and	  May	  2013	  through	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  	  Typically	  these	  were	  of	  between	  50	  and	  90	  minutes	  in	  length,	  though	  three	  outliers	  who	  gave	  extremely	  brief	  replies	  to	  the	  questions	  are	  nonetheless	  included	  in	  the	  dataset,	  as	  they	  add	  generative	  variance	  to	  the	  data.	  	  All	  but	  four	  interviews	  were	  successfully	  recorded—these	  four	  insisted	  on	  meeting	  in	  restaurants	  and	  successful	  recording	  was	  made	  impossible—in	  these	  cases,	  immediately	  following	  the	  interview	  I	  made	  and	  typed	  extensive	  notes	  on	  the	  answers	  given.	  	  A	  consistent	  interview	  guide	  was	  used,	  asking	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  about	  the	  informants’	  early-­‐	  and	  recent-­‐career	  networking	  decisions	  and	  events,	  and	  then	  pressing	  for	  details:	  	  sometimes	  for	  concrete	  examples	  and	  incidents,	  and	  just	  as	  frequently	  for	  explanations	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  taking	  a	  particular	  described	  action.	  	  Interviews	  with	  Partners	  included	  an	  additional	  question:	  	  “how	  do	  you	  see	  more	  junior	  “players”	  in	  the	  industry	  making	  networking	  mistakes?”	  	  	  
After	  a	  fortuitous	  question	  response	  in	  the	  fourth	  interview,	  subsequent	  informants	  were	  asked	  “do	  you	  have	  a	  metaphor	  you	  use	  to	  think	  about	  your	  network,	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  is	  it?”	  	  Biographical	  and	  career	  data	  was	  also	  gathered,	  in	  some	  cases	  by	  email	  after	  the	  interview	  took	  place.	  	  
Data	  Analysis	  First,	  each	  interview	  was	  translated	  into	  an	  ‘explanatory	  events	  matrix’	  (Miles	  &	  Huberman,	  1994)	  as	  a	  way	  of	  deriving	  the	  data	  into	  a	  form	  while	  making	  clear	  its	  temporally	  embedded	  nature.	  	  Underlying	  the	  translation	  was	  a	  concern	  with	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how	  respondents’	  view	  of	  the	  future	  influenced	  their	  decisions	  about	  what	  networking	  actions	  to	  take.	  	  For	  example,	  rather	  than	  simply	  recording	  that	  the	  respondent	  visited	  a	  conference	  in	  order	  to	  make	  new	  contacts,	  the	  context	  or	  rationale	  proffered	  for	  this	  action	  was	  also	  recorded.	  	  These	  contexts	  and	  rationales	  provided	  in	  vivo	  (Strauss	  &	  Corbin,	  1990)	  codes.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  these	  codes	  made	  clear	  that	  a	  divide	  existed	  in	  the	  data	  regarding	  the	  time	  horizons	  being	  considered	  by	  the	  respondents	  when	  they	  made	  their	  decisions.	  	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  this	  gave	  rise	  to	  an	  additional	  research	  question.	  	  As	  a	  second	  step,	  individual	  actions,	  together	  with	  their	  associated	  context/rationales,	  were	  separately	  recorded	  and	  subjected	  to	  analysis.	  	  210	  individual	  actions	  were	  recorded	  and	  coded,	  using	  five	  categories	  of	  axial	  codes	  which	  I	  judged	  emerged	  from	  the	  data,	  considering	  the	  five	  research	  questions	  (allocation	  of	  time,	  with	  whom	  to	  connect,	  tactics	  for	  connection,	  content	  and	  affect	  of	  connection,	  influence	  of	  time	  horizon):	  	  1.	  	  type	  of	  action	  (for	  example,	  meeting	  socially	  (a	  setting	  such	  as	  a	  dinner	  party	  where	  business	  would	  not	  be	  the	  principal	  subject	  discussed);	  meeting	  quasi-­‐socially	  (a	  informal	  setting	  such	  as	  a	  coffee	  or	  a	  drink	  where	  business	  would	  be	  discussed);	  meeting	  in	  a	  trade	  association	  or	  other	  industry	  network	  setting;	  meeting	  in	  a	  conference	  setting;	  initiating	  a	  phone	  conversation;	  hearing	  a	  pitch;	  reviewing	  a	  business	  plan	  or	  idea;	  eliciting/receiving	  second-­‐hand	  information	  about	  an	  alter;	  having	  a	  multi-­‐participant	  meeting).	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2.	  	  type	  of	  alter	  (for	  example:	  venture	  founder;	  same-­‐firm	  VC	  colleague;	  other-­‐firm	  VC	  colleague;	  seed	  (non-­‐VC)	  investor;	  accountant;	  lawyer;	  corporate	  finance	  adviser;	  sector	  expert;	  academic;	  other	  adviser.)	  3.	  	  immediate	  intention	  of	  contact	  	  (for	  example:	  initiate	  contact;	  maintain	  contact	  through	  business	  discussion;	  maintain	  contact	  through	  social	  discussion;	  provide	  counsel;	  learn;	  negotiate;	  introduce	  alter	  to	  a	  third	  party.)	  4.	  	  (espoused)	  strategic/medium-­‐term	  intention	  of	  contact	  (for	  example:	  	  assessing	  opportunity;	  strengthening	  relationship;	  building	  firm	  ‘presence’	  in	  a	  domain;	  building	  personal	  reputation/prominence;	  creating	  a	  basis	  for	  reciprocity;	  communicating	  the	  VC’s	  own	  firm’s	  position/attractiveness.)	  5.	  	  additional	  codes	  indicate	  employing	  VC	  firm	  status	  (and	  the	  potentially	  anomalous	  status	  of	  the	  six	  ‘movers’),	  years	  of	  tenure	  in	  the	  VC	  field,	  partner/associate,	  tech/biotech,	  early-­‐career	  action/recent-­‐career	  action.	  	  I	  also	  considered	  the	  status	  of	  the	  firms	  which	  employed	  the	  VCs,	  and	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  recent	  career	  change	  had	  been	  made	  by	  the	  VC,	  whether	  the	  movement	  was	  to	  a	  lower	  status	  firm	  (as	  when	  a	  partner	  in	  an	  established	  high-­‐status	  firm	  leaves	  to	  set	  up	  a	  new	  firm)	  or	  to	  a	  higher-­‐status	  one.	  	  	  	  Since	  one	  aspect	  of	  this	  study	  is	  how	  status	  ordering,	  as	  perceived	  by	  the	  respondents	  themselves,	  influenced	  their	  decisions	  and	  actions,	  my	  objective	  in	  establishing	  firm	  status	  was	  to	  establish	  not	  an	  objective	  raking	  based	  on	  financial	  size	  or	  activity	  measures,	  or	  network	  centrality	  measures,	  but	  to	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establish	  a	  ranking	  which	  would	  reflect	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  interviewees	  themselves	  about	  their	  “place”	  in	  their	  industry.	  	  My	  preference	  would	  have	  been	  to	  use	  a	  league	  table	  of	  firm	  status,	  known	  to	  all	  the	  participants	  and	  from	  which	  they	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  draw	  their	  perception	  of	  their	  own	  firm	  (Bromley,	  2002);	  however,	  no	  such	  league	  table	  as	  yet	  exists	  for	  London-­‐based	  VCs.	  	  Thus,	  to	  establish	  firm	  status,	  I	  reviewed	  a	  range	  of	  industry	  publications	  such	  as	  unquote.com,	  venturechoice.com,	  cbinsights.com,	  entrepreneurhandbook.co.uk,	  bvca.co.uk,	  askivy.net,	  pseps.com,	  pitchbook.com	  and	  venturebeat.com.	  	  I	  compiled	  an	  initial	  status	  ranking	  of	  the	  15	  firms	  based	  on	  my	  subjective	  impressions	  in	  reading	  these	  industry	  publications.	  	  I	  then	  returned	  to	  two	  of	  my	  prior	  interviewees	  and	  two	  individual	  VCs	  who	  had	  not	  been	  part	  of	  the	  previous	  research,	  and	  asked	  them,	  in	  face	  to	  face	  meetings,	  to	  place	  the	  15	  firms,	  along	  with	  an	  additional	  15	  ‘dummy’	  firms	  I	  selected	  to	  maintain	  the	  anonymity	  of	  my	  interviewees,	  into	  three	  tiers.	  	  There	  was	  very	  substantial	  unprompted	  agreement	  about	  the	  placement	  of	  the	  15	  firms	  of	  interest	  into	  high-­‐,	  middle-­‐	  and	  low-­‐status	  firms,	  with	  total	  agreement	  between	  the	  four	  respondents	  (and	  my	  own	  subjective	  impressions)	  about	  11	  of	  the	  firms.	  	  I	  followed	  up	  by	  email	  to	  ask	  the	  four	  respondents	  if	  they	  felt	  that	  the	  four	  firms	  over	  which	  there	  was	  disagreement	  were	  “edge	  cases”,	  or	  would	  they	  stand	  by	  their	  original	  rankings.	  There	  remained	  substantial	  disagreement	  about	  two	  of	  the	  firms.	  	  I	  then,	  by	  email,	  asked	  10	  of	  my	  original	  respondents	  and	  10	  “new”	  respondents	  to	  classify	  these	  two	  firms	  and	  two	  dummy	  firms	  I	  selected.	  	  I	  received	  eight	  replies	  from	  these	  twenty.	  	  There	  remained	  some	  disagreement.	  	  In	  coding,	  analysing	  and	  considering	  the	  data	  I	  reflected	  on	  whether	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  clarity	  over	  the	  status	  of	  these	  two	  firms	  was	  significant	  to	  my	  conclusions	  and	  propositions.	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  Ultimately,	  I	  placed	  the	  firms	  in	  three	  tiers:	  	  five	  of	  the	  firms	  and	  nine	  of	  the	  respondents	  worked	  at	  firms	  were	  categorised	  by	  my	  respondents	  as	  high	  status	  (Tier	  1);	  six	  of	  the	  firms	  and	  20	  of	  the	  respondents	  at	  firms	  were	  categorised	  as	  middle	  status	  (Tier	  2);	  four	  of	  the	  firms	  and	  eight	  of	  the	  respondents	  were	  categorised	  as	  low	  status	  (Tier	  3).	  	  Of	  this	  last	  group,	  two	  respondents	  were	  partners	  who	  had	  set	  up	  their	  firms	  in	  the	  last	  three	  years,	  having	  previously	  worked	  for	  a	  Tier	  2	  firm.	  In	  analysing	  the	  data	  I	  considered	  whether	  the	  old	  or	  new	  status	  of	  these	  two	  ‘movers’	  might	  be	  more	  influential	  in	  a	  given	  setting.	  	  Once	  the	  210	  events	  were	  recorded	  in	  the	  matrices,	  and	  the	  actions	  coded,	  I	  considered	  how	  the	  actions	  fell	  into	  groups	  and	  clusters,	  and	  how	  they	  related	  to	  the	  four	  original	  principal	  research	  questions	  (and	  the	  additional	  emergent	  question)	  concerning	  hunting/harvesting,	  alter	  choice,	  choice	  of	  approach	  tactics	  for	  new	  alters,	  choice	  of	  communications	  tactics	  for	  ongoing	  alters	  and	  additionally,	  the	  time	  horizon	  over	  which	  the	  actor	  was	  considering	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  networking	  actions.	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AGENT	  NETWORKING	  BEHAVIOUR	  What	  emerged	  from	  the	  data	  were	  insights	  into	  actions	  taken	  by	  VCs	  used	  for	  networking,	  into	  their	  choice	  of	  networking	  strategies,	  and	  into	  their	  cognitions	  about	  their	  networking	  actions.	  	  The	  findings	  are	  reported	  here,	  in	  five	  sections:	  	  1.	  	  Dealing	  with	  FOMO:	  	  splitting	  bandwidth	  when	  there	  are	  ‘too	  many’	  networking	  
opportunities	  2.	  	  Hunting	  or	  Harvesting:	  	  moving	  on	  to	  new	  domains	  	  3.	  	  Presentation	  to	  the	  prospective	  alter:	  	  conduct	  vs	  connections	  4.	  	  Thresholds:	  	  sequencing	  status	  moves	  5.	  	  How	  long	  will	  we	  be	  living	  together:	  	  cycle	  time	  and	  opportunism	  	  	  	  Each	  section	  is	  accompanied	  by	  propositions	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  testable	  outgrowths	  of	  this	  research,	  for	  further	  investigation	  and	  testing	  for	  generalisability.	  	  
FOMO	  (Fear	  of	  missing	  out)	  “We	  know	  about	  the	  deals.	  	  If	  there’s	  anything	  interesting	  going	  on	  in	  the	  space	  we	  cover,	  we	  will	  either	  already	  know	  the	  players	  or	  it	  will	  get	  brought	  to	  us	  by	  one	  of	  our	  colleagues	  or	  associates	  for	  review.”	  	  Partner,	  1st	  tier	  firm	  
	  “The	  big	  fear	  for	  any	  one	  of	  us	  is	  missing	  out	  on	  too	  many	  of	  the	  largest	  exits	  in	  a	  row.”	  Partner,	  2nd	  tier	  firm	  	  “The	  truth	  is,	  if	  it’s	  a	  really	  promising	  deal,	  we	  could	  meet	  the	  founding	  team,	  but	  they	  will	  quickly	  realize	  they	  are	  able	  to	  access	  bigger	  fish	  than	  us.	  	  There	  are	  ways	  we	  can	  try	  to	  deal	  with	  that	  but	  it's	  a	  fact	  of	  doing	  business.”	  	  associate,	  3rd	  
tier	  firm	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Among	  Tier	  2	  respondents,	  a	  pervasive	  theme	  of	  networking	  discussions	  was	  “fear	  of	  missing	  out”	  (popularly	  referred	  to	  as	  FOMO.)	  	  Respondents	  from	  the	  lowest-­‐	  and	  highest-­‐status	  firms	  did	  not	  express	  concerns	  about	  this.	  	  Those	  employed	  at	  the	  highest	  status	  firms	  said	  they	  rarely	  invest	  in	  the	  earliest	  stage,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  founding	  teams	  who	  have	  previously	  made	  a	  successful	  exit,	  and	  many	  of	  their	  members	  expressed	  confidence	  that	  they	  would	  get	  sight	  of	  all	  relevant,	  high-­‐quality	  opportunities.	  	  The	  lowest	  status	  firms	  are	  often	  not	  able	  to	  invest	  in	  later	  stage	  opportunities,	  due	  to	  a	  limited	  fund	  size,	  and	  have	  limited	  opportunities	  to	  create	  reciprocity	  unless	  they	  are	  bringing	  a	  solid	  relationship	  with	  a	  firm,	  one	  in	  which	  they	  have	  already	  invested,	  to	  the	  table.	  	  Their	  fear	  is	  of	  missing	  out	  through	  never	  making	  a	  mark,	  not	  of	  missing	  out	  through	  inadequate	  vision	  across	  their	  network.	  “I	  have	  got	  to	  appear	  not	  as	  an	  investor	  but	  as	  an	  advisor.	  	  If	  I	  get	  to	  an	  entrepreneur	  early,	  then	  I	  can	  build	  up	  the	  trust	  over	  a	  period	  of	  months	  and	  years	  so	  that	  when	  they	  start	  talking	  to	  other	  investors	  I	  am	  already	  someone	  on	  their	  side.”	  	  associate,	  3rd	  tier	  firm	  	  “I	  do	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  with	  alumni	  networks	  and	  trade	  bodies	  in	  China	  so	  that	  I	  can	  talk	  to	  a	  range	  of	  people	  without	  it	  being	  directly	  about	  how	  their	  company	  and	  its	  growth	  is	  going.	  	  I	  need	  the	  visibility	  just	  to	  get	  to	  sit	  down	  with	  people.”	  	  
associate,	  3rd	  tier	  firm	  	  Networkers	  in	  the	  middle	  tier	  appear	  to	  have	  more	  potential,	  and	  therefore	  “more	  (networking)	  problems”:	  	  in	  any	  given	  technology	  space,	  they	  might	  be	  able	  to	  take	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  nurturing	  and	  leading	  a	  syndicate	  for	  a	  particular	  venture—but	  they	  might	  also	  have	  opportunities	  to	  play	  a	  subsidiary	  role	  investing	  through	  a	  syndicate	  led	  by	  another	  firm.	  	  Although	  the	  terms	  of	  investment	  might	  be	  notionally	  better	  (Wright	  &	  Lockett,	  2003)	  for	  the	  lead	  firm	  in	  a	  syndicate,	  this	  is	  merely	  an	  ‘edge’—the	  truly	  significant	  payoff	  comes	  from	  backing	  the	  right	  venture,	  not	  from	  being	  in	  charge	  of	  a	  syndicate.	  	  In	  such	  a	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‘game’,	  the	  optimal	  strategy	  for	  both	  the	  highest	  status	  and	  the	  middle	  status	  players	  may	  be	  to	  develop	  ties	  to	  keep	  track	  of,	  and	  have	  relationships	  with,	  all	  (or	  as	  many	  as	  possible)	  of	  the	  potential	  counterparts,	  while	  delaying	  committing	  to	  any	  of	  them	  in	  order	  to	  await	  further	  information	  which	  may	  shed	  further	  light	  on	  the	  value	  of	  backing,	  or	  syndicating	  to	  back,	  a	  given	  firm.	  	  (This	  is	  the	  obverse	  of	  the	  ingratiation	  and	  ‘triggering’	  strategy	  venture	  teams	  use	  to	  create	  a	  scarcity	  dynamic	  and	  get	  an	  auction	  started,	  as	  identified	  in	  Hallen	  and	  Eisenhardt,	  2012).	  	  For	  the	  highest	  status	  networkers,	  their	  prominence	  helps	  ensure	  that	  their	  network’s	  ‘reach’	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  past	  reciprocal	  ties	  with	  other	  top	  tier	  firms	  and	  VCs	  makes	  this	  a	  low	  risk	  strategy:	  “We	  take	  a	  hotel	  room	  at	  the	  …	  conference	  and	  just	  fill	  up	  the	  diary	  with	  deals	  people	  we	  trust	  are	  recommending	  to	  us	  to	  listen	  to	  and	  just	  hear	  pitches	  and	  have	  conversations	  with	  teams.”	  	  Partner,	  1st	  tier	  firm	  	  	  	  But	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  middle	  tier,	  the	  network	  is	  not	  ‘doing	  the	  scanning	  for	  them’.	  	  This	  is	  potentially	  more	  FOMO	  anxiety-­‐inducing,	  (or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  their	  network	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  dominant	  strategy	  for	  exploiting	  their	  existing	  ties)	  and	  thus	  more	  proactive	  strategies	  emerge:	  “I	  do	  spend	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  my	  time	  with	  entrepreneurs	  and	  teams.	  	  But	  so	  much	  of	  what	  you	  have	  to	  do	  is	  spend	  time	  at	  conferences	  where	  you	  can	  keep	  on	  the	  pulse	  of	  how	  deals	  are	  developing	  across	  the	  tech	  space	  I	  am	  working	  on	  at	  that	  moment.	  	  I	  want	  to	  know	  what	  experts	  think	  is	  happening	  and	  hear	  about	  the	  latest	  numbers	  as	  much	  as	  I	  want	  to	  keep	  in	  touch	  with	  specific	  people.”	  	  
(Associate,	  2nd	  tier	  firm)	  	  “We	  got	  a	  group	  of	  associates	  together,	  all	  a	  similar	  age	  and	  stage	  of	  career,	  from	  different	  firms,	  and	  we	  have	  drinks	  like	  once	  a	  quarter	  and	  just	  get	  to	  know	  each	  other.	  	  Once	  a	  few	  of	  us	  went	  skiing….you	  probably	  don’t	  talk	  about	  deals	  directly	  too	  often	  when	  it’s	  supposed	  to	  be	  social,	  only	  a	  few	  people	  want	  to	  come	  on	  too	  strong,	  but	  you	  just	  listen	  to	  what	  people	  are	  working	  on	  and	  then	  for	  the	  future	  you	  know	  who	  is	  interested	  in	  what	  kind	  of	  deals…later	  you	  can	  phone	  them	  knowing	  they	  are	  already	  interested	  in	  what	  you	  have	  to	  say.”	  
(Associate,	  2nd	  tier	  firm)	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Divergence	  in	  dealing	  with	  FOMO.	  All	  of	  the	  interview	  respondents	  who	  mentioned	  FOMO	  were	  from	  the	  2nd	  tier	  of	  firms.	  	  Not	  all	  mentioned	  FOMO,	  but	  among	  those	  in	  this	  second	  tier,	  almost	  all	  discussed	  strategies	  for	  splitting	  their	  network	  “bandwidth”	  between	  scanning	  for	  industry	  knowledge	  (triangulated	  by	  talking	  to	  people	  from	  many	  domains—customers	  for	  the	  new	  tech;	  lawyers,	  accountants	  and	  advisers	  with	  view	  of	  developments	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  development	  stages;	  academics	  and	  technology	  transfer	  offices)	  and	  seeking	  potential	  syndication	  partnerships	  instead	  of	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  building	  relationships	  with	  entrepreneurs/founders.	  	  These	  approaches	  diverged	  in	  significant	  ways,	  which	  often	  depended	  on	  the	  view	  the	  VC	  took	  of	  their	  skills	  and	  the	  likely	  outcome	  of	  applying	  them.	  	  In	  effect,	  VCs	  made	  a	  plan	  which	  was	  founded	  in	  the	  attributions	  they	  had	  formed	  about	  how	  to	  manage	  their	  ‘not	  enough	  time,	  not	  enough	  visibility’	  challenge.	  	  
Approach	  1:	  	  build	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  a	  chosen	  firm,	  courting	  them.	  One	  cohort	  of	  VCs	  from	  middle	  tier	  firms	  clearly	  indicated	  their	  belief	  that	  the	  core	  of	  their	  role	  was	  to	  get	  to	  know	  founding	  teams	  and	  to	  build	  multiplex	  ties—ties	  with	  an	  advisory	  and	  social/personal	  aspect	  to	  the	  fore,	  not	  directly	  potential	  investment-­‐focused—with	  them.	  	  As	  a	  corollary	  to	  this	  approach,	  three	  partners	  mentioned	  that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  be	  “in	  pursuit”	  of	  more	  than	  one	  and	  potentially	  several	  teams.	  	  *‘If	  I	  have	  a	  personal	  [social]	  connection	  with	  someone,	  then	  it	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  mean	  anything	  but	  the	  odds	  are	  tilted	  just	  that	  tiny	  bit	  in	  my	  favour,	  so	  I	  might	  concentrate	  on	  them’	  (Tier	  2	  associate)	  	  *‘When	  I	  was	  recruited	  into	  this	  industry	  {decades	  ago},	  it	  was	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  having	  empathy	  with	  entrepreneurs	  and	  knowing	  how	  to	  build	  trust	  and	  that	  is	  what	  I	  still	  do’	  (Tier	  2	  partner)	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Approach	  2:	  	  build	  a	  strong	  scanning	  operation	  by	  focusing	  on	  peers/	  complementary	  contacts	  rather	  than	  specific	  deals.	  	  Seek	  suitable	  opportunities	  to	  promise	  (or	  hint	  at)	  reciprocity	  (or	  draw	  down	  on	  the	  store	  of	  it)	  to	  try	  to	  enter	  into	  syndicates	  in	  a	  given	  space	  rather	  than	  using	  direct	  founding	  team	  cultivation.	  *‘Industry	  colleagues	  are	  the	  future	  and	  you	  will	  be	  working	  with	  them	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  founders	  come	  and	  go’	  	  (Tier	  2	  associate)	  	  *‘”Flirt	  with	  everybody	  so	  you	  are	  known	  as	  available	  and	  open”’	  (Tier	  2	  associate)	  	  *”I	  make	  sure	  everyone	  I	  meet	  and	  keep	  in	  touch	  with	  knows	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  working	  on.	  	  That	  way	  I	  don’t	  have	  to	  ask	  if	  there	  is	  anything	  going	  on,	  or	  worse	  yet	  invite	  myself	  into	  a	  particular	  conversation,	  I	  can	  wait	  to	  be	  invited	  by	  people	  who	  know	  I	  am	  keen	  to	  be	  in	  on	  certain	  subjects.”	  	  (Tier	  2	  associate)	  	  
Proposition	  1.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  middle	  status	  networking	  agents	  will	  exhibit	  more	  variance	  in	  their	  choices	  of	  networking	  actions	  than	  high-­‐	  or	  low-­‐status	  networking	  agents.	  	  
Building	  a	  presence	  in	  a	  new	  sector—hunt	  or	  harvest?	  Sorenson	  &	  Stuart	  (2008)	  discuss	  how	  the	  emergence	  of	  ‘faddish’	  new	  technology	  developments	  leads	  to	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  tie	  rewiring	  in	  the	  VC	  network,	  as	  existing	  clusters	  of	  VCs	  do	  not	  move	  en	  masse	  to	  the	  new	  sector	  but	  less	  evenly.	  	  Why	  do	  brokers	  move	  on	  to	  new	  sectors	  (“hunt”)	  rather	  than	  “harvest”	  existing	  status?	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  puzzle	  in	  the	  brokerage	  literature.	  	  There	  is	  much	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  brokers	  move,	  as	  vividly,	  if	  speculatively,	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  Burt’s	  Brokerage	  and	  Closure	  (2000),	  from	  one	  structural	  hole	  in	  a	  network	  to	  the	  next,	  like	  Hayekian	  entrepreneurs	  seeking	  out	  new,	  inadequately	  brokered,	  opportunities	  based	  on	  fleeting	  local	  knowledge.	  	  Yet,	  we	  know	  that	  brokers	  do	  not	  always	  behave	  like	  this.	  	  Sometimes,	  they	  ‘stick	  
148 of 191 
around’	  and	  don’t	  move	  on.	  	  Obstfeld	  (2005)	  suggests	  ‘filling	  in’	  a	  structural	  hole	  rather	  than	  moving	  on	  away	  from	  it	  as	  it	  fills	  in	  is	  an	  orientation;	  Lingo	  and	  O’Mahony	  (2010)	  provide	  a	  task	  contingency	  basis	  on	  which	  brokers	  may	  create	  closure	  rather	  than	  moving	  on.	  	  I	  found	  that	  some	  individuals	  from	  both	  Tier	  1	  and	  Tier	  2	  firms	  don’t	  try	  to	  move	  on.	  	  A	  number	  said	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  working	  across	  more	  than	  one	  sector	  was	  theoretically	  attractive,	  but,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  one	  “too	  tiring	  to	  consider.”	  ’It	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  saying	  in	  the	  industry	  that	  every	  VC	  is	  washed	  up	  after	  10	  years.	  	  You	  come	  into	  the	  sector	  with	  a	  contact	  book	  and	  you	  work	  it	  for	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  then	  the	  world	  has	  moved	  on	  and	  you	  and	  most	  of	  your	  contacts	  are	  yesterday’s	  men.	  	  There	  are	  some	  exceptions,	  like	  Fred	  Wilson,	  who	  manage	  to	  move	  from	  sector	  to	  sector	  successfully,	  but	  it	  is	  really	  the	  exception.’	  (Partner,	  Tier	  1	  firm)	  	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  VC’s	  do	  move	  into	  new	  sectors,	  they	  often	  rely	  on	  being	  “pulled”	  by	  colleagues,	  partners	  and	  advisers,	  rather	  than	  pushing	  to	  form	  new	  ties	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  reputation	  in	  the	  new	  sector,	  or	  to	  form	  specific	  connections.	  	  It	  was	  notable	  among	  the	  biotech	  investors	  in	  the	  sample	  that	  they	  described	  any	  movement	  into	  new	  sectors	  as	  being	  based	  on	  new	  science,	  and	  thus	  on	  VCs	  following	  entrepreneurs	  following	  scientists	  (with	  some	  overlap	  in	  identity	  between	  the	  latter	  two	  categories.)	  	  	  	  Some	  players,	  who	  were	  more	  open	  to	  moving	  into	  new	  sectors,	  described	  themselves	  as	  having	  substantial	  “stored	  up”	  obligations	  and	  expectations	  of	  reciprocity	  with	  those	  who	  were	  moving	  first,	  and	  more	  aggressively.	  	  A	  policy	  of	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specialising	  in	  one	  sector	  but	  maintaining	  active	  ties	  to	  those	  ‘on	  the	  move’	  was	  described	  by	  one	  senior	  VC	  as	  ‘insurance’.	  	  	  Other	  common	  strategies	  for	  moving	  into	  new	  sectors	  were	  to	  grow	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  VC	  firm,	  by	  bringing	  new	  partners	  on	  with	  the	  specific	  purpose	  of	  “covering”	  an	  emerging	  or	  important	  sector,	  to	  launch	  a	  new	  venture	  capital	  fund	  with	  a	  different	  configuration	  of	  partners	  and	  specialisms	  to	  the	  old	  fund,	  or	  to	  task	  associates	  with	  the	  role	  of	  building	  connections	  in	  the	  new	  domain.	  	  Indeed	  VC	  associates	  indicated	  almost	  without	  exception	  that	  any	  decision	  about	  changing	  sector	  specialism	  was	  outside	  their	  control	  and	  several	  described	  being	  assigned	  as	  an	  advance	  scouting	  party	  into	  a	  particular	  sector	  of	  interest.	  	  	  	  Some	  low-­‐status	  (tier	  3)	  VCs,	  particularly	  associates,	  indicated	  that	  they	  were	  not	  yet	  specialists.	  	  With	  limited	  pre-­‐existing	  ties	  and	  a	  relatively	  open	  brief	  from	  limited	  partners,	  such	  VCs	  indicated	  that	  they	  would	  happily	  move	  their	  focus	  to	  get	  in	  on	  the	  ground	  floor	  of	  a	  new	  technology,	  in	  an	  emerging	  field	  where	  other	  firms	  have	  not	  already	  formed	  too	  many	  controlling	  relationships.	  	  It	  was	  this	  finding	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  fifth	  research	  question	  concerning	  the	  variance	  in	  networking	  strategies	  developing	  from	  differing	  time	  horizons.	  
Proposition	  2a.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  some	  network	  brokers	  will	  remain	  in	  the	  domain	  which	  formerly	  was	  the	  “site”	  of	  a	  structural	  hole	  which	  they	  bridged,	  seeking	  advantages	  from	  developing	  network	  closure	  rather	  than	  seeking	  out	  new	  brokerage	  opportunities.	  	  
Proposition	  2b.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  when	  brokers	  seek	  to	  move	  to	  a	  new	  domain,	  some	  will	  do	  so	  by	  following	  other,	  lower-­‐status	  alters	  who	  have	  moved	  more	  aggressively	  into	  that	  domain,	  thus	  benefiting	  from	  the	  embedded	  nature	  of	  these	  ties	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  exchange	  they	  represent.	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However,	  a	  few	  informants	  from	  top	  tier	  firms,	  even	  senior	  ones,	  did	  report	  instances	  in	  their	  career	  when	  they	  moved	  into	  new	  domains	  with	  what	  one	  might	  characterise	  as	  a	  ‘lead	  the	  way’	  strategy	  rather	  than	  a	  ‘let	  others	  light	  the	  way’	  strategy—reaching	  out	  to	  form	  new	  ties	  in	  the	  new	  domain	  directly	  rather	  than	  through	  intermediaries.	  	  This	  was	  described	  as	  “staking	  a	  claim”,	  “displaying	  thought	  leadership”,	  and	  “looking	  to	  the	  next	  growth	  horizon”	  by	  informants,	  who	  seemed	  to	  focus,	  in	  their	  retelling	  of	  these	  types	  of	  incidents,	  on	  just	  how	  far	  ‘ahead	  of	  the	  curve’	  they	  were	  in	  making	  such	  moves.	  	  Perhaps,	  just	  as	  when	  middle-­‐status	  players	  do	  not	  see	  a	  dominant	  networking	  strategy,	  dictated	  by	  their	  network,	  very	  early	  stage	  markets	  or	  technology	  domains	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  having	  higher	  levels	  of	  indeterminacy—the	  moves	  and	  possibilities	  are	  difficult	  to	  foresee.	  	  Within	  their	  “home”,	  established	  domains,	  high-­‐status	  players	  appeared	  to	  rely	  almost	  completely	  on	  adviser	  or	  peer	  referrals,	  yet	  in	  these	  few	  “new-­‐domain	  incidents”,	  they	  did	  not.	  	  	  	  Forming	  relationships	  directly	  with	  low	  status	  firms,	  we	  believe	  following	  Podolny,	  should	  impose	  costs	  through	  status	  leakage,	  and	  as	  this	  approach	  is	  not	  the	  dominant	  style	  of	  networking	  approach	  to	  which	  they	  are	  accustomed,	  perhaps	  there	  may	  even	  be	  a	  deficit	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relationship-­‐building	  skills	  required.	  	  Burt	  suggests	  that	  each	  new	  brokerage	  success	  confers	  (and	  requires)	  status,	  so	  perhaps	  this	  prospect	  is	  the	  incentive	  that	  draws	  even	  high	  status	  VCs	  to	  such	  approaches.	  	  Yet	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  by	  informants	  on	  the	  nascent	  stage	  at	  which	  they	  found	  it	  most	  interesting	  to	  make	  such	  moves	  suggests	  that	  potentially,	  the	  status	  leakage	  Podolny	  posits	  is	  lessened	  when	  uncertainty	  is	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near-­‐total:	  	  true	  pioneers	  may	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  status	  leakage,	  where	  mere	  ‘fast	  followers’	  are	  seen	  as	  jumping	  on	  the	  bandwagon.	  	  	  
	  
Proposition	  2c.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  when	  brokers	  seek	  to	  move	  to	  a	  new	  domain,	  some	  will	  do	  so	  by	  seeking	  out	  truly	  nascent	  domains,	  where	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  status	  penalties	  by	  achieving	  and	  claiming	  pioneer	  status;	  such	  status	  derived	  in	  part	  from	  direct	  formation	  of	  ties	  rather	  than	  use	  of	  intermediaries.	  	  
Presentation	  to	  the	  prospective	  alter:	  	  conduct	  vs	  connections	  One	  set	  of	  probe	  questions	  that	  was	  asked	  of	  almost	  all	  informants	  was	  how,	  and	  through	  what	  tactics,	  the	  VC	  presented	  himself/his	  firm	  to	  potential	  investee	  firms.	  	  Also,	  I	  asked	  many	  respondents	  what	  role	  namedropping,	  and	  making	  introductions	  to	  potentially	  helpful	  others	  (Pratch,	  2005),	  played	  in	  the	  way	  they	  formed	  relationships	  with	  founding	  teams.	  	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  some	  VCs	  push	  to	  form	  many	  direct	  ties	  with	  venture	  teams.	  	  Sometimes	  the	  effort	  was	  based	  on	  attempting	  to	  make	  the	  tie	  multiplex,	  trying	  to	  add	  a	  social/personal	  dimension,	  or	  basing	  the	  approach	  in	  the	  first	  place	  on	  using	  pre-­‐existing	  similarity	  such	  as	  school	  ties	  or	  former	  shared	  workplaces	  (Cohen	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  Such	  direct	  approaches	  were	  universal	  among	  Tier	  3	  firms:	  ‘I	  am	  the	  hardest	  working	  VC	  out	  there.	  	  I	  need	  to	  show	  founders	  that	  I	  will	  be	  on	  their	  team	  and	  on	  their	  side	  and	  having	  me	  there	  will	  be	  great	  for	  them.	  	  In	  the	  end	  I	  want	  to	  make	  it	  a	  very	  personal	  decision	  about	  bringing	  me	  into	  the	  team	  until	  they	  get	  to	  the	  next	  round	  of	  fundraising.’	  	  (Partner,	  tier	  3	  firm)	  	  ‘I	  do	  a	  lot	  to	  try	  to	  get	  my	  name	  out	  there	  as	  someone	  who	  is	  really	  on	  a	  mission	  to	  support	  the	  3D	  printing	  sector.	  	  I	  will	  go	  to	  any	  event,	  speak	  on	  any	  panel,	  as	  a	  champion	  for	  the	  sector.	  	  It	  gets	  my	  name	  out	  there,	  and	  I	  can	  talk	  to	  founders	  as	  someone	  who	  is	  on	  a	  mission,	  not	  just	  focused	  on	  whether	  we’ll	  invest	  in	  them.’	  	  (associate,	  tier	  3	  firm)	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‘I	  am	  very	  visible	  in	  my	  alumni	  network	  and	  I	  use	  that	  as	  my	  main	  starting	  point	  for	  new	  contacts.	  	  My	  firm’s	  name	  doesn’t	  open	  many	  doors	  yet	  so	  it’s	  a	  way	  to	  show	  I	  am	  a	  good	  citizen.’	  (associate,	  tier	  3	  firm)	  	  Most	  informants	  saw	  introductions	  as	  an	  important	  tool:	  	  ‘I	  don’t	  tend	  to	  lead	  on	  the	  introductions	  side.	  	  I	  do	  have	  some	  good	  connections	  but	  I	  need	  to	  use	  them	  carefully	  and	  make	  sure	  I	  am	  adding	  value	  for	  them	  when	  I	  do	  an	  introduction,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  founder.’	  (Partner,	  tier	  3	  firm)	  	  ‘Making	  introductions	  is	  really	  important	  to	  working	  with	  particular	  entrepreneurs.	  	  We	  want	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  fit	  between	  what	  we	  can	  do	  and	  who	  we	  are	  bringing	  to	  the	  table	  and	  what	  they	  need.	  	  It’s	  one	  of	  our	  main	  ways	  to	  counter	  what	  the	  bigger	  firms	  have	  to	  offer.’	  	  (Associate,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  Informants	  fairly	  often	  suggested	  that	  their	  efforts	  were	  based	  on	  what	  scholars	  know	  as	  triadic	  closure	  and	  balance	  theory:	  	  that	  introducing	  founders	  to	  many	  of	  their	  acquaintances	  and	  potentially	  helpful	  people	  was	  more	  than	  simply	  an	  effort	  to	  give	  some	  value	  to	  the	  alter,	  and	  to	  show	  or	  imply	  the	  value	  and	  status	  of	  their	  connections	  generally	  and	  thus	  their	  potential	  future	  value	  should	  the	  relationship	  deepen,	  but	  was	  also	  “to	  try	  to	  introduce	  them	  into	  ‘our	  gang’”.	  “If	  they	  start	  working	  with	  one	  of	  my	  lawyer	  friends,	  that	  is	  really	  a	  good	  sign”	  	  (Partner,	  Tier	  2	  firm)	  	  ‘Who	  you	  know	  is	  every	  VC’s	  stock	  in	  trade.	  	  Basically	  I	  want	  to	  make	  as	  many	  introductions	  as	  possible	  because	  I	  want	  to	  show	  what	  they	  will	  be	  getting	  when	  they	  work	  with	  us.	  	  There	  is	  one	  chap	  who	  I	  use	  a	  lot,	  he’s	  a	  retired	  CEO	  of	  [FTSE100	  firm]	  and	  it’s	  not	  only	  about	  namedropping,	  he	  is	  really	  a	  great	  mentor	  to	  these	  young	  entrepreneurs	  and	  helps	  them	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  a	  personal	  growth	  sense.’	  	  (Partner,	  Tier	  2	  firm)	  	  ‘Making	  introductions	  is	  really	  important	  to	  working	  with	  particular	  entrepreneurs.	  	  We	  want	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  fit	  between	  what	  we	  can	  do	  and	  who	  we	  are	  bringing	  to	  the	  table	  and	  what	  they	  need.	  	  It’s	  one	  of	  our	  main	  ways	  to	  counter	  what	  the	  bigger	  firms	  have	  to	  offer.’	  	  (associate,	  Tier	  2	  firm)	  	  As	  also	  previously	  discussed,	  some	  make	  connections	  with	  founders	  almost	  exclusively	  through	  intermediaries.	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“We	  don’t	  have	  to	  nudge	  very	  hard,	  if	  we	  announce	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  ideas	  in	  a	  new	  area	  we	  get	  a	  flood,	  so	  we	  only	  put	  the	  word	  into	  a	  few	  ears	  to	  keep	  it	  manageable.”	  	  (associate,	  Tier	  1	  firm)	  	  	  Courting	  ventures	  directly	  was	  described	  by	  higher	  status	  VCs	  as	  a	  low-­‐status	  thing	  to	  do.	  	  	  ’I	  never	  invite	  anyone	  to	  connect	  to	  me	  on	  LinkedIn,	  I	  wait	  to	  be	  invited.	  	  Then	  I	  know	  if	  someone	  is	  in	  my	  LinkedIn	  list,	  they	  have	  come	  to	  me.’	  (Partner,	  Tier	  2	  firm)	  	  ‘I	  hate	  socializing	  so	  what	  I	  do	  is	  work	  to	  establish	  myself	  as	  the	  expert	  in	  my	  key	  areas.	  	  Then	  I	  can	  talk	  to	  people	  that	  way,	  gathering	  or	  giving	  information.’	  (Partner,	  Tier	  2)	  	  ‘The	  approach	  I	  take	  is	  to	  play	  host.	  I	  bring	  groups	  together	  and	  introduce	  them	  to	  each	  other.	  	  Everybody	  likes	  the	  person	  sitting	  next	  to	  the	  drink,	  and	  we	  don’t	  have	  to	  sell.	  	  We	  keep	  it	  semi-­‐exclusive	  so	  people	  want	  to	  be	  there.’	  (Partner,	  Tier	  3)	  	  	  High	  status	  VCs	  mentioned	  that	  their	  status	  derived	  from	  the	  pulling	  power	  of	  their	  ties	  VC	  “at	  the	  other	  end”	  with	  potential	  trade	  buyers.	  	  Trade	  sales	  make	  up	  an	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  entrepreneurial	  firm	  exits,	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  show	  their	  access	  to	  specific	  teams	  at	  the	  potential	  purchasers,	  and	  successful	  track	  record	  of	  negotiating	  transactions	  with	  these	  named	  people,	  was	  a	  useful	  method	  of	  demonstrating	  status.	  	  “War	  stories”	  which	  depicted	  the	  VC	  as	  a	  trusted	  advisor	  to	  the	  potential	  firm	  purchaser,	  rather	  than	  a	  supplicant,	  were	  held	  out	  as	  potent	  displays	  of	  the	  precise	  aim	  of	  the	  intended	  relationship	  between	  the	  VC	  and	  the	  entrepreneur.	  	  	  However,	  several	  of	  the	  high-­‐status	  VCs	  interviewed	  indicated	  that	  they	  never	  name-­‐dropped,	  even	  in	  this	  particular	  way,	  and	  that	  they	  did	  not	  engage	  in	  making	  introductions	  between	  founder	  and	  others	  prior	  to	  investing	  in	  the	  firm.	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‘I	  don’t	  normally	  make	  introductions.	  	  I	  think	  it’s	  kind	  of	  insulting	  to	  the	  founder	  that	  you	  think	  you	  know	  what	  they	  need	  well	  enough	  after	  one	  meeting.	  	  If	  I’m	  sitting	  on	  their	  board	  it’s	  a	  different	  story,	  but	  not	  as	  part	  of	  the	  getting	  to	  know	  you	  process,	  you	  can	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good	  sometimes.”	  (Partner,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  ‘Before	  a	  team	  talks	  to	  us	  they	  will	  know	  where	  we	  stand.	  	  We	  don’t	  have	  to	  tell	  them.	  	  I	  don’t	  drop	  names	  or	  promise	  introductions	  before	  we	  invest.	  	  That	  is	  covered	  when	  we	  present	  our	  credentials,	  that	  we	  can	  and	  will	  provide	  them	  with	  valuable	  contacts.	  	  Compared	  to	  some	  others	  we	  are	  pretty	  hands	  off	  even	  then	  though,	  we	  would	  be	  looking	  for	  founders	  who	  can	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  make	  the	  contacts	  they	  need.’	  	  (associate,	  Tier	  2	  firm)	  	  ‘I	  only	  drop	  names	  of	  their	  fellow	  founders	  who	  work	  with	  us	  and	  are	  further	  down	  the	  road.’	  (associate,	  Tier	  1	  firm)	  	  And	  one	  higher	  status	  VC	  suggested	  that	  the	  “normal”	  approach	  (with	  which	  he	  contrasted	  his	  own	  method)	  of	  the	  top	  firms	  was	  to	  resolutely	  refuse	  to	  “open	  the	  book”	  either	  about	  the	  methods	  they	  would	  use	  or	  the	  identity	  of	  their	  contacts.	  	  Calling	  such	  firms	  “the	  Death	  Star”,	  he	  proposed	  that	  the	  general	  (“typically	  British”)	  approach	  was	  to	  simply	  exude	  confidence	  and	  the	  markers	  of	  being	  “on	  the	  inside”,	  and	  that	  the	  message	  intended	  by	  such	  behaviour	  is	  that	  joining	  their	  circle	  is	  the	  real	  barrier	  to	  success	  (rather	  than	  the	  other	  hurdle	  of	  commercial	  success	  for	  the	  entrepreneurial	  venture	  once	  it	  has	  secured	  investment.)	  	  His	  own	  approach,	  by	  contrast:	  ‘we	  present	  ourselves	  in	  the	  most	  transparent	  way	  possible.	  	  We	  make	  it	  clear	  how	  we	  do	  business.	  	  It’s	  a	  standard	  selling	  point	  for	  us	  that	  sometimes	  if	  you	  get	  in	  bed	  with	  the	  devil	  it	  looks	  great	  until	  you	  have	  signed	  your	  soul	  away.	  	  We	  always	  say	  to	  people	  that	  doing	  business	  with	  us	  after	  you	  take	  our	  money	  will	  be	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  now,	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  sell	  to	  people,	  although	  of	  course	  we	  are	  doing	  that,	  but	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  ever	  over-­‐promise	  or	  imply	  a	  sort	  of	  fairy	  tale	  about	  the	  way	  we	  will	  work	  together.	  	  It	  just	  saves	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  if	  you	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  them	  to	  evaluate	  you.’	  	  (Partner,	  Tier	  2	  firm)	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  Figure	  A	  shows	  the	  patterns	  derived	  from	  the	  data	  of	  the	  three	  logics	  I	  propose	  underlie	  tactical	  networking	  decisions	  in	  forming	  ties	  with	  potential	  investee	  alters.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  VCs	  in	  the	  lowest	  tier	  of	  status	  focus	  on	  displaying	  good	  conduct	  and,	  lacking	  an	  extensive	  or	  high-­‐status	  network	  on	  which	  to	  build	  trust	  through	  reputation,	  try	  to	  build	  trust	  dyadically	  (Burt	  &	  Knez,	  1995),	  for	  example	  through	  making	  ties	  multiplex	  and	  thereby	  seeking	  relational	  embeddedness.	  	  They	  have	  a	  much	  greater	  tendency	  to	  see	  all	  ties	  as	  potentially	  generative	  and	  often	  show	  a	  belief	  in	  serendipity.	  	  	  	  Those	  in	  the	  middle	  tier	  have	  two	  complementary	  approaches.	  	  Their	  networks	  are	  not	  so	  extensive	  or	  all-­‐pervading	  that	  they	  can	  simply	  rely	  on	  reputational	  power	  to	  draw	  alters	  into	  their	  orbit.	  	  Thus,	  their	  connections	  are	  currency.	  	  They	  seek	  to	  compete	  with	  higher-­‐status	  VCs	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  their	  particular	  set	  and	  configuration	  of	  connections	  are	  a	  good	  fit	  with	  their	  would-­‐be	  investee’s	  requirements—a	  close	  enough	  fit	  to	  obviate	  larger	  firms’	  advantages	  in	  terms	  of	  breadth	  of	  connections	  and	  status	  markers.	  	  But	  they	  also	  seek	  to	  show	  good	  
Status	  Tier	   New-­‐tie	  actions	  foregrounding	  conduct	  
New-­‐tie	  actions	  foregrounding	  connections	  	   	   	  High	  	  (9	  informants)	  	   13	   34	  Middle	  (20	  informants)	   40	   41	  Low	  (8	  informants)	   30	   1	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conduct:	  	  again	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  highest-­‐status	  firms,	  they	  wish	  to	  show	  how	  the	  investee	  firm,	  in	  working	  with	  a	  middle-­‐status	  firm,	  will	  not	  suffer	  from	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  reputational	  power—the	  power	  to	  extract	  rents	  from	  the	  firm	  in	  exchange	  for	  that	  reputation.	  	  The	  choice	  to	  emphasise	  conduct	  or	  connections	  to	  alters	  and	  potential	  counterparts	  appears	  to	  spring	  from	  a	  logic	  of	  
differentiation.	  	  The	  highest	  status	  firms	  rely	  on	  a	  connections-­‐based	  approach,	  allowing	  their	  reputation	  to	  do	  the	  work	  for	  them.	  	  They	  appear	  to	  maintain	  the	  density	  of	  their	  cluster	  of	  advisers	  and	  informants	  in	  part	  by	  not	  introducing	  them	  to	  alters	  “unnecessarily”	  and	  thus	  diffusing	  the	  flow	  of	  information,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  norms	  (cf	  Baum	  et	  al,	  2003	  on	  “control	  partnering”)	  in	  the	  network.	  
	  
Proposition	  3a.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  when	  agents	  seek	  to	  make	  new	  connections,	  some	  will	  do	  so	  by	  emphasising	  their	  intention	  to	  behave	  positively	  towards	  the	  alter.	  	  
Proposition	  3b.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  when	  agents	  seek	  to	  make	  new	  connections,	  some	  will	  do	  so	  by	  emphasising	  the	  potential	  value	  of	  their	  connections	  to	  the	  alter.	  	  
Proposition	  3c.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  when	  agents	  seek	  to	  make	  new	  connections,	  they	  will	  select	  their	  emphasis	  in	  part	  based	  on	  differentiating	  their	  “offer”	  to	  the	  alter	  from	  the	  “offers”	  of	  those	  they	  perceive	  as	  competitors.	  	  ‘I	  think	  what	  I	  try	  to	  do	  is	  be	  memorable.	  	  It	  sounds	  funny	  but	  that’s	  why	  I	  wear	  my	  hair	  like	  this.	  	  You	  have	  to	  not	  rely	  so	  much	  on	  the	  credibility	  of	  your	  employer	  but	  try	  to	  stand	  out	  as	  a	  professional	  yourself.	  	  Otherwise	  you	  are	  interchangeable.’	  (associate,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  “The	  mistake	  juniors	  make	  is	  that	  they	  simply	  try	  to	  copy	  the	  networks	  of	  their	  seniors.	  	  But	  this	  isn’t	  bringing	  anything	  fresh	  into	  the	  mix,	  they	  have	  to	  make	  their	  own	  mark.”	  (Partner,	  tier	  2	  firm)	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Thresholds:	  	  sequencing	  status	  moves	  ‘The	  contacts	  I	  brought	  into	  the	  job,	  I	  thought	  would	  be	  really	  valuable.	  	  But	  in	  the	  end	  I	  just	  realized	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  force	  connections	  between	  people	  and	  I	  more	  or	  less	  had	  to	  start	  from	  scratch.’	  (associate,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  many	  VCs	  did	  not	  consider	  that	  they	  had	  a	  networking	  strategy.	  	  But	  those	  who	  did	  often	  raised	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  were	  climbing	  a	  ladder	  of	  status.	  	  	  ‘you	  have	  to	  ask	  with	  each	  person	  you	  come	  into	  contact	  with,	  could	  this	  person	  help	  me	  in	  the	  future?	  	  Are	  they	  on	  the	  way	  up?	  	  What	  do	  they	  have	  that	  others	  don’t.’	  	  (Tier	  2	  associate)	  	  ‘anyone	  who	  is	  better-­‐regarded	  than	  you	  is	  worth	  associating	  yourself	  with’	  (Tier	  2	  associate)	  	  One	  pattern	  that	  repeatedly	  emerged	  in	  accounts	  of	  “social	  climbing”	  was	  that	  there	  were	  certain	  types	  of	  actions	  that	  were	  only	  worth	  taking	  once	  a	  certain	  threshold	  had	  been	  reached.	  	  When	  one	  had	  no	  track	  record,	  it	  was	  not	  worth	  reaching	  out	  to	  try	  to	  form	  alliances	  with	  the	  highest	  status	  people.	  	  ‘First	  I	  had	  to	  network	  outside	  and	  just	  hustle.	  	  I	  made	  some	  useful	  contacts	  that	  way	  but	  really	  I	  was	  just	  feeding	  them	  to	  the	  colleagues	  within	  the	  structure	  who	  could	  make	  more	  use	  of	  them.	  	  But	  eventually	  for	  the	  first	  time	  I	  was	  put	  on	  the	  board	  of	  one	  of	  our	  investee	  companies.	  	  And	  that	  meant	  I	  could	  be	  a	  bit	  bolder	  in	  asking	  for	  contacts	  from	  the	  ‘internal	  Rolodex’.	  	  If	  I	  had	  asked	  colleagues	  for	  contacts	  before	  it	  just	  would	  have	  been	  too	  big	  of	  a	  favour.	  	  But	  then	  I	  had	  more	  of	  a	  reason	  to	  ask	  so	  I	  could	  start	  trading	  internally	  more.	  	  Once	  you	  are	  in	  a	  colleague’s	  debt	  in	  a	  way	  that	  just	  creates	  a	  basis	  for	  you	  to	  talk	  to	  each	  other	  and	  for	  you	  to	  keep	  trying	  to	  repay	  them.’	  (associate,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  “In	  the	  medium	  term,	  I’d	  love	  to	  move	  from	  venture	  capital	  to	  private	  equity.	  	  So	  I	  have	  some	  old	  university	  friends	  who	  are	  now	  in	  private	  equity	  who	  I	  try	  to	  spend	  time	  with,	  and	  it	  certainly	  influences	  my	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  deals	  I	  think	  are	  worth	  doing—are	  they	  going	  to	  look	  interesting	  to	  anyone	  if	  I	  try	  more	  actively	  to	  make	  that	  move?”	  	  (Associate,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  ‘One	  way	  to	  look	  at	  it	  is	  that	  I	  am	  the	  employee	  of	  our	  main	  investor,	  out	  there	  scouting	  for	  deals	  on	  a	  quite	  healthy	  taste	  of	  the	  upside.	  	  If	  we	  want	  to	  go	  anywhere,	  then	  I	  need	  to	  get	  one	  or	  two	  deals	  done	  and	  keep	  him	  happy	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  looking	  for	  two	  or	  three	  other	  partners	  to	  come	  into	  the	  fund.	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Then	  we’ll	  be	  a	  proper	  VC	  firm	  instead	  of	  just	  looking	  for	  scraps.’	  (Partner,	  tier	  3	  firm)	  	  	  In	  considering	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  the	  effort	  to	  trade	  up	  in	  status	  through	  the	  lateral	  (in	  status)	  assembly	  of	  contacts,	  expertise	  and	  their	  signifiers,	  which,	  once	  assembled,	  will	  allow	  one	  to	  move	  into	  a	  “higher	  league”,	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  important	  driver	  for	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  networking	  decisions.	  
Proposition	  4.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  when	  agents	  manage	  their	  connections,	  they	  will	  sequence	  their	  actions,	  seeking	  threshold	  levels	  of	  reflected	  status	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  later,	  reputation-­‐based	  approaches,	  to	  new	  higher-­‐status	  alters.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
How	  long	  will	  we	  be	  living	  together:	  	  cycle	  time	  and	  opportunism	  	  	  “One	  difference	  between	  our	  industry	  and	  investment	  banking	  is	  that	  we	  are	  working	  on	  projects	  that	  may	  take	  seven	  or	  more	  years	  to	  complete.	  	  We	  have	  to	  live	  with	  the	  teams	  we	  invest	  in	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time,	  and	  so	  that	  makes	  everyone	  nicer.”	  	  (Partner,	  tier	  1	  firm)	  	  “A	  mark	  of	  a	  good	  VC	  that	  everybody	  talks	  about	  is	  how	  they	  treat	  the	  teams	  where	  the	  investment	  has	  failed.	  	  I	  am	  never	  sure	  how	  much	  that	  is	  really	  true,	  but	  we	  certainly	  spend	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  talking	  about	  it.”	  	  (associate,	  tier	  2	  firm)	  	  During	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data,	  a	  clear	  divide	  became	  evident	  between	  those	  who	  primarily	  sought	  out	  early	  stage	  founding	  teams/firms	  and	  those	  who	  primarily	  sought	  out	  syndication	  opportunities	  and	  later	  stage	  opportunities.	  Those	  in	  the	  former	  category	  typically	  described	  themselves	  as	  having	  no	  other	  choice.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  low-­‐status	  firms	  are	  typically	  unable	  to	  enter	  deals	  with	  large	  firms	  (and,	  if	  they	  do	  so,	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  taken	  advantage	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  subsequent	  rounds	  of	  the	  firm’s	  development	  through	  the	  power/status	  imbalance)	  and	  this	  was	  confirmed	  by	  the	  observations	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  	  The	  path	  ahead	  for	  a	  small,	  low-­‐status	  firm	  was	  to	  cultivate	  early	  stage	  ventures	  and,	  if	  it	  wished	  to	  become	  higher	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status	  to	  attempt	  to	  ride	  the	  back	  of	  the	  success	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  those	  investments	  to	  form	  higher	  status	  partnerships.	  	  	  	  A	  clear	  dividing	  line	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  role	  an	  investor	  plays,	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  founding	  team	  and	  their	  imperatives	  for	  managing	  their	  network,	  arises	  between	  the	  situation	  where	  a	  small	  or	  low-­‐status	  investor	  is	  in	  the	  “lead	  position”	  as	  the	  largest	  or	  most	  influential	  investor,	  and	  a	  situation	  where	  they	  give	  up	  that	  seat	  to	  a	  larger	  player.	  	  Low	  status	  VCs	  know	  that	  in	  all	  likelihood	  they	  will	  be	  ‘in	  the	  lead	  seat’	  for	  only	  a	  short	  time	  (typically,	  say,	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	  large	  rounds	  of	  investment);	  that	  if	  the	  venture	  succeeds	  a	  further	  round	  of	  investment	  will	  follow,	  where	  even	  if	  they	  manage	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  lead	  role,	  their	  status	  within	  the	  board,	  relative	  to	  deeper-­‐pocketed	  investors	  will	  fall.	  	  	  	  Simultaneously,	  early-­‐stage	  investors’	  opportunities	  may	  be	  biggest	  when	  a	  sector	  is	  in	  its	  relatively	  early	  stage	  of	  growth.	  	  And,	  it	  is	  in	  such	  a	  stage	  that	  both	  the	  absolute	  and	  relative	  rate	  of	  firm	  failures	  (both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐outside	  investment)	  will	  be	  higher.	  	  As	  a	  newly	  opened	  territory	  matures,	  the	  chance	  to	  bypass	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  a	  weak	  position	  in	  the	  overall	  status	  ordering	  and	  make	  a	  connection	  which	  may	  help	  pull	  them	  up	  the	  ladder	  may	  be	  lower.	  	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  higher-­‐status	  firms	  invest	  in	  sectors	  that	  are	  relatively,	  and	  slightly,	  more	  mature.	  	  They	  may	  work	  to	  develop	  their	  networks	  in	  truly	  nascent	  domains	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  knowledge	  and	  future	  relationships,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  still	  planning	  to	  invest	  only	  once	  firms	  are	  ready	  (e.g.,	  have	  proven	  products)	  to	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benefit	  from	  larger	  investments.	  	  And,	  these	  investing	  firms	  may	  expect	  to	  remain	  in	  relationships	  with	  their	  investee	  counterparts	  for	  several	  years	  before	  exit.	  	  Thus,	  low-­‐status	  firms	  seek	  higher-­‐uncertainty	  investments	  and	  expect	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  lead	  position	  in	  those	  investments	  for	  a	  relatively	  short	  time;	  higher-­‐status	  firms	  make	  (slightly)	  less	  uncertain	  investments	  and	  expect	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  lead	  position	  for	  a	  much	  longer	  time.	  	  For	  low-­‐status	  firms,	  the	  shorter	  expected	  co-­‐tenure	  of	  relationships	  may	  make	  some	  of	  their	  networking	  choices	  (how	  much	  to	  “invest”	  in	  actions	  that	  build	  reputation,	  as	  opposed	  to	  actions	  designed	  to	  secure	  business	  in	  a	  short-­‐term	  time	  horizon,	  how	  to	  treat	  investee	  firms	  post-­‐investment)	  more	  opportunistic	  and	  short	  term.	  	  Simultaneously,	  with	  a	  higher	  absolute	  and	  relative	  chance	  of	  investee	  firm	  failures	  within	  this	  earliest	  part	  of	  the	  sector,	  the	  frequency	  of	  opportunities	  for	  sector	  players	  to	  observe	  how	  investors	  treat	  entrepreneurs	  in	  cases	  of	  failure	  increases.	  	  Investors	  whose	  investments	  are	  failing	  must	  act	  either	  to	  minimise	  their	  losses	  and	  risk	  appearing	  heartless,	  or	  extend	  discretionary	  effort	  and	  resources	  which	  they	  can	  only	  be	  uncertain	  about	  the	  immediate	  utility	  or	  indeed	  the	  chances	  it	  will	  be	  widely	  known	  about	  to	  reflect	  on	  their	  conduct	  with	  credit	  when	  a	  future	  potential	  investee	  is	  considering	  a	  partnership.	  	  (This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  alternatives	  and	  consequences	  are	  the	  only	  considerations	  in	  such	  a	  decision.)	  	  Low	  status	  firms	  may	  more	  often	  follow	  patterns	  of	  networking	  decisions	  including	  plans	  to	  move	  on	  from	  sectors	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where	  an	  investor	  has	  failed	  and	  “made	  enemies”	  may	  more	  often	  be	  seen	  as	  necessary/desirable.	  	  Higher-­‐status	  firms’	  opportunities	  and	  networking	  choices	  are	  based	  on	  longer	  term	  time	  horizons.	  	  	  This	  discrepancy	  may	  help	  preserve	  the	  structural	  hole	  predicted	  by	  Podolny	  (2005)	  between	  low	  and	  high	  status	  players.	  	  An	  investor’s	  particular	  networking	  style/strategy	  is	  based	  on	  some	  implicit	  expectations	  about	  how	  soon	  he	  expect	  to	  get	  payoffs	  from	  his	  relationships,	  and	  these	  expectations	  may	  create	  path-­‐dependence.	  
Proposition	  5a.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  agents	  will	  manage	  their	  relationships	  with	  an	  expectation	  about	  how	  long	  their	  relationships	  with	  alters	  are	  likely	  to	  last.	  	  
Proposition	  5b.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  expectations	  of	  the	  length	  of	  relationships	  with	  alters	  will	  influence	  the	  balance	  of	  utilitarian	  and	  reputation-­‐building	  actions	  agents	  make.	  	  	  
Proposition	  5c.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  agents	  will	  manage	  their	  relationships	  with	  an	  expectation	  about	  how	  likely	  their	  relationships	  are	  to	  end	  in	  failure.	  	  
Proposition	  5d.	  	  In	  an	  ordered	  status,	  socialized	  matching	  network,	  expectations	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  failure	  of	  their	  relationships	  will	  influence	  the	  balance	  of	  utilitarian	  and	  reputation-­‐building	  actions	  agents	  make.	  	  DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  	  Understanding	  the	  short	  run	  of	  networking	  decisions	  requires	  researchers	  to	  attempt	  to	  differentiate	  between	  those	  who	  act	  expertly	  and	  strategically,	  and	  those	  who	  act	  according	  to	  the	  expectations	  and	  constraints	  of	  those	  around	  them	  and	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  their	  dominant	  strategy	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  	  This	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study	  has	  attempted	  to	  begin	  to	  open	  up	  this	  box,	  by	  investigating	  and	  codifying	  mechanisms	  driving	  behaviour.	  	  	  There	  are	  several	  contributions:	  -­‐-­‐I	  propose	  that	  middle-­‐status	  actors	  are	  the	  most	  strategic	  in	  the	  use	  and	  shaping	  of	  their	  networks.	  	  Their	  network	  does	  not	  provide	  them	  with	  a	  dominant	  strategy,	  so	  their	  range	  of	  choices	  is	  more	  ambiguous.	  -­‐-­‐I	  propose	  three	  logics	  actors	  use	  in	  deciding	  how	  to	  present	  themselves	  to	  alters.	  	  Some	  (especially	  high	  status	  actors)	  lead	  by	  presenting	  their	  connections;	  some	  (especially	  low	  status	  actors)	  lead	  by	  presenting	  their	  past	  and	  intended	  future	  conduct.	  	  Many	  actors	  (especially	  middle	  status	  actors)	  use	  a	  logic	  of	  differentiation,	  to	  consider	  how	  to	  present	  themselves	  in	  a	  way	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  stand	  out	  from	  perceived	  status	  peers	  or	  superiors.	  -­‐-­‐“Projective	  agency”,	  the	  collection	  of	  attributions	  actors	  have	  about	  their	  future,	  drives	  networking	  behaviour	  in	  two	  ways:	  -­‐-­‐ambitious	  actors	  seek	  to	  assemble	  a	  collection	  of	  connections	  which	  will	  enable	  them	  to	  attract	  the	  interest	  and	  engagement	  of	  higher-­‐status	  connections;	  -­‐-­‐actors	  consider	  how	  long	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  relationship	  with	  alters,	  and	  how	  long	  they	  will	  be	  “in	  the	  neighbourhood”	  of	  a	  set	  of	  alters,	  in	  determining	  appropriate	  action	  in	  respect	  of	  those	  alters.	  	  Two	  trajectories	  of	  further	  research	  are	  hoped	  to	  spring	  from	  this	  beginning:	  
n quantitative	  testing	  (and	  associated	  methodology	  development)	  of	  the	  propositions	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  paper	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n further	  qualitative	  research	  to	  triangulate,	  enrich	  and	  explore	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  findings	  here,	  with	  an	  aim	  to	  create	  a	  typology	  of	  networking	  strategies	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  structural	  factors.	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CHAPTER	  6:	  	  Summary	  of	  studies;	  final	  conclusions	  and	  thoughts	  	  The	  studies	  in	  this	  thesis	  seek	  to	  ‘lift	  the	  lid’	  on	  some	  black	  boxes,	  and	  pursue	  insights	  about	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  driving	  innovation	  success	  and	  networking	  behaviour	  by	  innovators.	  	  That	  networks	  “bend	  preferences”	  (Burt,	  2000)	  is	  well	  understood—how	  actors	  and	  teams	  of	  actors	  act	  despite,	  or	  because	  of,	  those	  preferences	  is	  less	  well	  understood.	  	  I	  set	  out	  to	  attempt	  answers	  to	  a	  range	  of	  related	  questions:	  	  
Chapter	  2:	  
	  
How	  can	  firms	  use	  boundary-­‐spanning,	  co-­‐ordinating	  teams	  to	  support	  successful	  
innovations?	  	  Can	  a	  team	  create	  or	  exploit	  bridging	  ties	  more	  effectively	  than	  an	  
individual	  and	  if	  so,	  how?	  	  Can	  a	  team	  diffuse	  the	  ‘blocking	  power’	  of	  gatekeepers	  
and	  if	  so,	  how?	  The	  research	  in	  this	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  co-­‐ordinating,	  boundary-­‐spanning	  teams	  are	  indeed	  able	  to	  support	  successful	  innovations,	  not	  only	  by	  bringing	  sets	  of	  bridging	  ties	  together,	  but	  by	  creating	  new	  avenues	  through	  which	  they	  can	  source	  needed	  information	  and	  political	  support.	  	  Appropriate	  leadership,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  informal	  ties	  when	  appropriate,	  allow	  the	  political	  and	  other	  ‘blocks’	  experienced	  by	  teams	  to	  be	  effectively	  responded	  to.	  	  Teams	  can	  be	  a	  structure	  through	  which	  organisations	  and	  their	  managers	  can	  circumvent	  “gatekeepers”,	  both	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  ties	  (when	  teams	  reach	  out	  to	  gather	  support	  for	  their	  initiatives)	  and	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  venue	  for	  competitive,	  rivalrous	  attempts	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  “go	  to	  person”	  in	  a	  given	  team,	  with	  actors	  seeking	  the	  gain	  of	  future	  opportunities	  to	  connect	  the	  team	  and	  its	  members	  rather	  than	  seeing	  their	  gains	  as	  coming	  from	  guarding	  or	  blocking	  connections.	  	  Teams	  need	  time	  to	  build	  new	  ties,	  and	  their	  willingness	  and	  ability	  to	  do	  so	  may	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be	  related	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  are	  assigned	  “full	  time”	  to	  their	  innovation	  projects.	  	  
Chapter	  4:	  
Which	  types	  of	  social	  networks	  and	  leadership	  styles	  contribute	  to	  Business	  Model	  
Innovation	  performance?	  	  How	  does	  this	  differ	  across	  the	  concept	  and	  development	  
stage	  of	  BMI?	  	  How	  do	  BMI	  team	  characteristics	  in	  the	  concept	  stage	  influence	  
those	  same	  variables	  –	  and	  ultimately	  BMI	  performance	  –	  in	  the	  development	  
stage?	  	  	  As	  proposed	  by	  the	  new	  TIMOTI	  model,	  the	  required	  characteristics	  for	  successful	  BMI	  teams	  change	  across	  the	  stages	  of	  the	  BMI’s	  development	  and	  there	  are	  fruitful	  and	  barren	  routes	  for	  this	  development	  to	  take.	  	  Success	  depends	  on	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  leadership	  style	  and	  the	  team	  composition	  (corresponding	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  team’s	  networks	  to	  parties	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organisation.)	  	  	  	  
Chapter	  5:	  
How	  do	  venture	  capital	  partners	  and	  associates	  employed	  by	  firms	  of	  variable	  
status,	  allocate	  time	  between	  different	  ties	  and	  different	  categories	  of	  ties,	  selecting	  
whether	  to	  “hunt”	  for	  new	  ties	  or	  to	  “nurture”	  or	  “harvest”	  the	  existing	  ones?	  	  How	  
do	  they	  decide	  upon	  particular	  alters	  as	  potentially	  fruitful	  connections?	  	  How	  do	  
they	  approach	  new	  prospective	  alters:	  	  what	  tactics	  are	  selected	  for	  forming	  
relationships?	  	  What	  efforts	  are	  made	  to	  influence	  or	  determine	  the	  basis	  (e.g.,	  
social,	  quasi-­‐social,	  transactional,	  multiplex)	  of	  the	  relationship?	  	  How	  do	  they	  
select	  the	  desired	  content	  and	  affect	  of	  their	  communications	  with	  their	  ongoing	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alters?	  	  How	  do	  they	  take	  the	  time	  horizon	  of	  their	  activities	  (e.g.,	  the	  cycle	  speed	  of	  
the	  types	  of	  transactions	  they	  conduct)	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  appropriate	  action?	  	  The	  tactics	  and	  strategies	  of	  networking	  actors	  were	  found,	  as	  expected,	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  their	  status.	  	  But	  many	  actors	  sought	  to	  lift	  their	  status	  through	  sequenced	  sets	  of	  actions,	  and	  to	  follow	  logics	  of	  differentiation	  to	  succeed	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  the	  “right”	  complementary	  alters.	  	  They	  timed	  their	  “moves”	  according	  to	  their	  status	  implications,	  and	  gauged	  their	  balance	  of	  reputation-­‐building	  and	  reputation-­‐harvesting	  activities	  according	  to	  their	  future-­‐directed	  plans	  and	  aspirations.	  	  
Where	  next?	  The	  domain	  of	  “networking	  strategy”	  or	  “strategy	  in	  networks”	  at	  the	  individual	  and	  team	  level	  needs	  filling	  out	  beyond	  these	  early	  steps.	  	  I	  hope	  to	  work	  with	  collaborators	  to	  undertake	  longitudinal	  studies	  capable	  of	  putting	  these	  proposed	  mechanisms	  to	  empirical	  tests	  and	  unearthing	  discoveries	  about	  the	  size	  of	  their	  effects.	  	  	  Can	  we	  understand	  more	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  strategies?	  	  Can	  we	  even	  begin	  to	  make	  some	  predictions	  about	  how	  and	  when	  these	  individually-­‐based	  phenomena	  intersect	  with	  the	  fascinating	  work	  on	  network	  emergence	  recently	  given	  voice	  in	  Padgett	  and	  Powell’s	  collection?	  	  In	  parallel,	  I	  hope	  to	  translate	  some	  of	  this	  observationally-­‐founded	  study	  of	  behaviour	  in	  networks	  over	  to	  some	  exploration	  of	  its	  cognitive	  foundations.	  	  For	  example,	  is	  there	  an	  emotional	  or	  personality-­‐based	  foundation	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  logic	  used	  for	  connecting	  to	  alters?	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I	  hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  pursue	  the	  trajectories	  this	  research	  opens	  up	  further	  and	  I	  thank	  the	  reader	  for	  his	  or	  her	  pains	  in	  engaging	  with	  the	  work.	  Chris	  Coleridge,	  London,	  July	  2014	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